Advance to Florence

Northward from Rome, as the Italian leg broadens at the calf, the Apennines, which in the region of the Winter Line cover two thirds of the peninsula, narrow away towards the Adriatic, leaving in the latitude of Lake Trasimene a series of rolling plains which stretch 100 miles across Tuscany to the Tyrrenhian Sea. Between Lake Trasimene and Florence the country becomes more rugged again. The main mountain backbone swings back towards the west, to form north of the River Arno a solid barrier spanning the peninsula from coast to coast, and blocking all approaches to the Lombard Plain except by the narrow coastal strip south of Rimini. Both topography and the season of the year were now against Kesselring. On these wide plains and with winter no longer on his side there seemed little likelihood that his armies could make any protracted defence until they reached the line of the Arno and the Northern Apennines.¹

Canadian Armour in the Advance to Florence (click to enlarge)
(adapted from map compiled by Historical Section, General Staff and originally published in Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Vol II

German Defences

Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, commanding Army Group C (in essence, all German ground forces in Italy) noted after the war that the Allied advance from Rome had been very slow, and that tank divisions pushed out on roads west of the Tiber immediately after the fall of Rome would have put his forces in "irreparable jeopardy." As it was, the 19 divisions that had fought at Rome were in a state of disorganization, having suffered over 38,000 dead, wounded and missing by 2 June. Some divisions, including 94th and 362nd Infantry Divisions, were down to as little as 10% of their established strength. The 1st Parachute, 44th Infantry and 90th Panzergrenadier Divisions mustered 15% while 26th Panzer and 29th Panzergrenadier Divisions were at 20% of establishment. None were over 50% and on 10 June no divisions of the 14th and 76th Panzer corps were capable of fielding more than 2,500 men. The once-vaunted Hermann Göring Parachute Panzer Division numbered just 811 while the 1st Parachute Division had 902 soldiers of all ranks. Major deficiencies in guns and tanks accompanied the casualty toll.²

On 1 July 1944 The Hermann Göring Division submitted a report on its personnel, including vehicle status. It was authorized 31 assault guns and held 0, authorized 102 PzKpfw IV and V medium tanks, and had 12 operational. Of 341 authorized armoured cars and half-tracked APCs, it could operate 118, and of 28 authorized self-propelled anti-tank guns, none were operational. Personnel strength was reported as 977 on 9 June and "a ruthless combing of the rear-echelon units and headquarters and the merging of various units" permitted an increase to 3,124 men again on 19 June.³

Kesselring moved to shore up the 14th Army in the west, vulnerable in open country west of the Tiber and in better terrain than the 10th Army, in the rugged Appennine mountains. He replaced the 14th Army's commander and sent three fresh divisions (the 356th Infantry, the 162nd (Turcoman) Division and the 20th Luftwaffe Field Division from Denmark. Three motorized divisions were also sent to the western flank west of the Tiber (29th Panzergrenadier, 90th Panzergrenadier and 26th Panzer) in exchange for the 76th Panzer Corps which went to the 10th Army. Three divisions in turn were sent to man fortifications in the Pisa-Rimini Line while they recuperated. Originally known as the "Apennine Position", the line became the "Gothic Line" in April 1944. On 16 June 1944 the Germans renamed it the Green Line.⁴

(T)he Germans needed time to complete the construction of the Gothic Line, and they hoped to buy that time by manning a series of incomplete defensive positions. Furthest south was the Albert-Frieda Line, which centred on Trasimeno, a large lake about midway between Rome and Florence, where the legendary Carthaginian general, Hannibal, had won a great victory over the Romans in 217 B.C. Kesselring was not very happy about having to defend partial defences such as these, but he obeyed Hitler's orders.⁵

The Gothic Line was upgraded beginning in early 1944 with Panzerturm (emplaced tank turrets) and other fortifications covering key approaches. After neglecting to fortify mountain approaches on the Gustav and Hitler Lines, these too were fortified on the Gustav Line. A four mile belt of barbed wire, land mines and demolitions lay in front of the Gothic Line.⁶

German leaders were pessimistic about being able to halt the Allied advance south of the Gothic Line. General Walter Warlimont, Deputy Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, reported to his superior, General Alfred Jodl, on 8 June that if Allied forces couldn't be halted, a withdrawal to the Gothic Line would occur in about 21 days. Kesselring ordered a comprehensive instruction the next day for a fighting withdrawal to the Gothic positions. Hitler reviewed the order with suspicion, fearing it meant Army Group C intended to withdraw without fighting south of the Pisa-Rimini line. Further communication between Kesselring and the High Command on 10 June reinforced Hitler's doubts, as Kesselring spoke of defending Italy as far south of the Apennines as possible on the one hand, while declaring imperative the preservation of the army before reaching the Gothic Line. Hitler ordered the resumption of defensive operations rather than delaying/withdrawal operations.

In vain Kesselring protested to Jodl the hopelessness of attempting to defend unprepared positions, emphasizing the continued threat of an encirclement of the Tenth Army, and the danger that too slow a withdrawal to the Gothic Line might not only weaken his forces below the point where they could form an adequate garrison, but might allow the Allies to arrive there simultaneously with German troops, and so achieve an immediate break-through.20 Hitler was adamant. As a staff officer of Army Group "C" observed, "When the Fuhrer says `Thus it shall be done', that is the way it will have to be done." (A short time later, however, Kesselring, as told in his Memoirs, won a concession from the Fuhrer. On 3 July he flew to Hitler's headquarters and successfully urged that he be given a free hand in Italy, guaranteeing "to delay the Allied advance appreciably, to halt it at latest in the Apennines.)⁷

By 14 June, ten days after the fall of Rome, the Allies had advanced 70 miles north. Kesselring issued his order that Army Group C would stand firm on the Albert-Frieda Line (known to the Allies as the Trasimene Line). They would build up the Gothic Line to resist an Allied breakout into the Po River plain. Kesselring took Hitler's orders to heart, reprimanding his new commander of the 14th Army for withdrawing 20 kilometres in a single day on 15 June. The Trasimene Line, extending from Grosseto to Porto Civitanova, was to be held, and Kesselring ordered "that upon reaching this line the delaying tactics will come to an end and the enemy advance and break-through must be stopped."⁸

Tank crew of the 11th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Ontario Regiment) roasts a pig near Piucarelli, Italy on 28 June 1944. In the photo are Troopers Harry Turner, F. Hoshoian, W. Kerr, and Al Rice. Library and Archives Canada photo

Allied Strategy

In contrast to Kesselring's opinion, the Allies did not consider their pursuit of German forces following the fall of Rome to be slow. On 7 June, General Harold Alexander, commanding the Allied Armies in Italy (the formal title of the 15th Army Group, which went through several name changes in early 1944), adjusted the objectives of his armies, placing them further away in recognition of the satisfactory progress they were making. The 8th Army was ordered to advance on Florence-Bibbiena-Arezzo while the 5th was to advance to the Pisa-Lucca-Pistoia area. The army commanders, General Oliver Leese and General Mark Clark, were authorized to "take extreme risks" in securing their objectives before the Germans could reorganize or reinforce. Leese's 8th Army was aimed at the middle and upper Arno river region while Clark's 5th aimed at the northern bounds of the Tuscan plains. Only the British 5th Corps was relieved of its responsibility to follow the enemy closely, to save transportation and bridging resources. Alexander planned to take Ancona with the 2nd Polish Corps should the Germans fail to abandon it as the 8th Army advanced. Both armies reorganized for the pursuit, with the French Expeditionary Corps relieving the U.S. 2nd Corps on the 5th Army Front, while the U.S. 4th Corps relieved the 6th on the western coast. The latter was withdrawn from the Italian theatre. On 9 June the British 10th Corps took over for the 13th west of the Tiber while the latter prepared to advance on Arezzo. Orsogna fell to the 5th Corps the same day.⁹

Major fighting occurred again at positions known as the Dora Line, but the 13th Corps broke through on 14 June to take Orvieto while the 10th Corps approached Temi. Alexander was able to report that day to his superior, General Maitland Wilson, the Allied Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean, that Allied armies were almost halfway from Rome to Florence and Leghorn, averaging advances of seven miles a day, and promised to increase the tempo further. Grosseto and the island of Elba fell on 17 and 19 June respectively, the former to U.S. troops and the latter to a combined-arms assault from Corsica by French troops with British naval and American air support. The 13th British Corps reached Lake Trasimene (Lago Trasimeno in Italian) on 19 June and on 20 June the 10th Corps entered Perugia. While the 2nd Polish Corps was delayed by bad weather and extensive German demolitions, they were able to advance halfway between Pescara and Ancona. By 20 June the main Allied attack had reach the Albert-Frieda Line.

Where the Allied forces in Italy were losing was in the strategic discussions. Both Wilson, as Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, and Alexander, the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies in Italy, argued with the Combined Chiefs of Staff to keep the Italian campaign the main priority for operations in the Mediterranean. There had been agreement in February 1944, and in April, Operation ANVIL, a planned invasion of southern France, had been cancelled so as not to conflict with the major offensive in Italy. However, in May Alexander was warned by Wilson that amphibious operations would recommence no later than mid-September, either closely tied to operations in Italy, or outside the theatre altogether, requiring the release of four French and three American divisions. Alexander replied that after cracking the Gothic Line his choices would be to halt in order to free up resources for use elsewhere, or to use all the forces he had to carry on into the Po Valley and strike further into either France or Austria.

He warmly recommended the second as the course likely to achieve his object of completing the destruction of the German armed forces in Italy and rendering the greatest possible assistance to the invasion of North-West Europe. "I have now two highly organised and skilful Armies, capable of carrying out large scale attacks and mobile operations in the closest co-operation . . . ", he wrote. "Neither the Apennines nor even the Alps should prove a serious obstacle to their enthusiasm and skill."¹⁰

On 14 June the Combined Chiefs of Staff notified Wilson to withdraw the 6th U.S. Corps and the divisions earmarked for the U.S. 7th Army. Wilson urged strongly that an alternative proposed by the Chiefs be adopted - an advance across the Po Valley into Austria with an amphibious landing at Trieste. The American Chief of Staff, General Marshall, and the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force in western France, General Eisenhower, both felt Marseilles in southern France a superior target, through which 40 or 50 additional American divisions might pass into France. Operation DRAGOON was thus set for 15 August 1944, to take priority over the Italian campaign with an initial build-up of 10 divisions on French soil. Alexander was still tasked with destroying German forces in Italy, with the immediate objective of advancing over the Apennines to the line of the Po and if the situation allowed to cross the river to a line Padua-Verona-Brescia. The Combined Chiefs were hopeful that DRAGOON and offensive action in Italy would precipitate a withdrawal from north-west Italy and render further offensive operations unnecessary. Alexander thought any major penetration into the Po valley unlikely before winter, and on 12 July ordered the bombing of the 23 extant rail and road bridges spanning the river. In 72 hours, they were destroyed. Allied airpower prevented the Germans from rebuilding them; on 30 August the German 10th Army's chief engineer reported that all the bridges were still destroyed.¹¹

"Whatever value the invasion of Southern France may have had as a contribution to operations in North-western Europe", Alexander was later to declare, "its effect on the Italian campaign was disastrous. The Allied Armies in full pursuit of a beaten enemy were called off from the chase, Kesselring was given a breathing space to reorganize his scattered forces and I was left with insufficient strength to break through the barrier of the Apennines." Almost a full year after the landings in Sicily the Italian campaign had reached its climax. "From the beginning", observed the C.-in-C., "both Germans and Allies regarded Italy as a secondary theatre and looked for the main decision to be given on either the Eastern or Western front." Henceforth Allied commanders in Italy were to feel increasingly the effects of this subordination. But the main intention, to bring to battle the maximum number of German troops, never varied, and in the ten months of fighting that remained this object was relentlessly pursued.¹²

The Trasimene Line
(adapted from map compiled by Historical Section, General Staff and originally published in Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Vol II)

Canadian Armour at the Trasimene Line, 21-28 June
See also main article Trasimene Line

The main Canadian forces in Italy had been sent to rest and refit following the Liri Valley battles on 6 June 1944. The exception was the independent 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade, whose three armoured regiments supported British formations in the fighting between Rome and Florence.¹³ The 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Three Rivers Regiment) was operating in support of the lead brigade of the 8th Indian Division from 4 June, and for five days they advanced through the Simbruini mountains. The tanks had little to do in this phase, and were often far behind the infantry due to the skillful German demolitions and mines on the narrow mountain roads.

There was much more to do at the Trasimene Line. Arriving on scene in the third week of June, delayed by bad weather and enemy demolitions, the 13th Corps knew from captured documents that the Germans intended to hold south of the Gothic Line and fight a delaying action. The 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade was called out of corps reserve along with the British 4th Division and went into action left of the 78th Division, where the line extended west from Lake Trasimene. Shermans of the Ontario Regiment knocked out five tanks in four days of fighting, including three PzKpfw V "Panthers" and received a personal congratulations from the 8th Army commander.¹⁴

The Three Rivers Regiment likewise went into action with the 4th Division, who had little experience in operating with tanks. The remnants of the German 1st Parachute Division fought tenaciously in ground suited to the defence and by 1 July, the regiment had lost more men and tanks (94 all ranks and 26 vehicles) than it had during the Gustav Line and Hitler Line battles of May 1944.¹⁵ The Regment fought a particularly noteworthy action on 28 June at Casamaggiore when "C" Squadron boldly seized high ground in the toughest part of the German line and repelled counter-attacks by Panthers and infantry for seven hours.¹⁶

The 8th Army revised its plan for the drive on Arezzo and Florence and the 14th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Calgary Regiment) entered the battle in support of the 12th Brigade, as British battalions attempted to fight into the strongest part of the German defensive line north of Perugia. The attack was notable for the poor coordination with the Three Rivers Regiment which prevented the attack from being pressed or properly supported by artillery.¹⁷

At the strategic level, the Allies seemed to be breaking through all along the front. The 4th U.S. Corps was steadily advancing up the coast on the extreme western end of the Allied line in the 5th Army sector. The Corps Expeditionnaire Francais (French Expeditonary Corps) to their right had held a 29-mile front on the Orcia River between 22 and 26 June and thereafter broke through tough resistance by the 4th Fallschirmjäger and 356th Infantry Divisions. With no reserves to spare, Kesselring was forced to order a general withdrawal on the evening of 26 June. On 28-29 June, German units broke contact on the front of the 13th Corps and pulled back three to four miles.

German documents reveal that Kesselring's staff had been indulging in much uneasy speculation regarding the future movements of the 1st Canadian Corps, which on 24 June was erroneously reported to be in the Terni-Foligno area. In the momentary lull which followed the 78th Division's overrunning of the forward Trasimene positions, Tenth Army intelligence staffs waited for the commitment of the Corps (which they believed was being concentrated immediately behind the front) to disclose the centre of gravity of the expected attack. "One of these days", remarked Runkel (Chief of Staff of the 76th Corps) to Wentzell, "the Canadian Corps is going to attack and then our centre will explode." The capture of members of the Three Rivers Regiment on the 24th led to the faulty conclusion that a Canadian armoured division had entered the battle in the Vaiano sector, and for a time the identity of the attacking infantry was in question. "My Intelligence Officer tells me that it is the 1st Canadian Division ...", Wentzell reported to the Army Group's Chief of Staff (Lieut.- General Hans Rottiger). "Personally I believe it is the 4th British Division, but my Intelligence Officer says, `Only Canadians attack like that', and after all the 5th Canadian Armoured Division has been identified." Before the end of June the enemy correctly recognized the 1st Armoured Brigade as the only Canadian troops then opposing him in Italy; but he was still ignorant of the whereabouts of the Canadian Corps.¹⁸

The Arezzo Line
(adapted from map compiled by Historical Section, General Staff and originally published in Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Vol II)

The Advance to the Arezzo Line, 29 June - 16 July
See also main article Arezzo

The next fall back position for the Germans was the Arezzo Line, blocking the final approach to Florence. The Calgary Regiment took up the pursuit, and German rear-guards, opposed river crossings, demolitions and mined roads all slowed the pace of the advance. All progress stopped on 6 and 7 July as the Calgaries drew up to the line of German defences and supported two British battalions in assaults on hills overlooking San Pancrazio. Challenging terrain, sniper and mortar fire all exhausted the infantry, who suffered heavily. A week of stalemate was broken by a renewed attack by 6th South African Armoured Division an 2nd New Zealand Division on 15 and 16 July. The new attacks, as well as progress by the 5th Army to the west, convinced the Germans to pull out of the Arezzo Line and back to Florence.¹⁹

With Mount Lignano in our hands, Kesselring accepted the loss of the city, and gave permission for the 76th Corps to withdraw. The armoured division entered Arezzo on the morning of the 16th, and by evening had crossed the Arno four miles to the north-west. The next few days saw the enemy once more withdrawing across the entire Allied front. On the 17th the United States 4th Corps reached the Arno east of Pisa, Ancona fell to the Poles on the 18th, and next morning the Americans entered Leghorn.²⁰

A Stuart reconnaissance tank and a Sherman of British 6th Armoured Division in Arezzo, 16 July 1944.  Imperial War Museum photograph

The Pursuit to the Arno, 16 July - 5 August

Kesselring's delaying action on the Arezzo had bought ten extra days for completing the Gothic Line defences. However, in Florence the 8th Army would also gain a valuable administrative base from which to launch its attack. There would be three more weeks of fighting to secure the city. The 13th Corps began their advance with three divisions; the British 6th Armoured attacked northwest down the valley of the Arno, the 6th South African Armoured Division advanced north on the left flank of the corps, and the 4th Division used Highway 69 as its main axis, keeping contact with both armoured divisions. The 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade supported the brigades of the 4th Division but saw no serious combat as they advanced. The enemy pulled back from the heights at San Pancrazio-Civitella on the left of the divisional front, and on the right, only mines and blown bridges on the Arezzo-Florence highway, and some scattered shells and mortar bombs, deterred the advance. On 17 July the Three Rivers were welcomed warmly by Pergrine, and the infantry they supported in the 10th Brigade cleared La Querce by evening. The Calgary Regiment's recce troop entered Capannole unopposed on 16 July and infantry of the 28th Brigade followed up the next day. On the 18th Montevarchi was cleared of snipers by the Three Rivers and infantry of the 10th Brigade.

It was at Montevarchi that the Three Rivers Regiment encountered its first band of Partisans-tough, bearded men of many nationalities, whose fierce appearance explained the reluctance of the individual German to stir far from his fellows at night, or even by day. The unit diarist described them as a motley crowd, "dressed in odds and bits of every conceivable uniform from the German's grey-green to our own drab khaki. For weapons, they must have toured the arms factories of the world ... and from their persons hung a good supply of hand grenades, all different kinds. During the advance through Tuscany these rough guerrillas had frequently aided the 4th Division by disclosing details of enemy strengths and dispositions and the location of minefields, and on more than one occasion our artillery was able to pin-point hostile batteries as a result of information brought back by a Partisan patrol which had penetrated the German lines.²¹

German resistance increased. The Panzer Grenadier Regiment Hermann Göring 2, the last component of the division to fight in Italy (the remainder had transferred to the Eastern Front at the end of July), took up positions west of Montevarchi. Tasked with delaying the Allied advance as preparation of the Gothic Line continued, the series of positions overlooking Highway 69 was known as the Irmgard Line, and alternatively as the Fritz Line. The Ontario Regiment supported an attack by the 2nd Battalion, The Somerset Light Infantry on 18 July, attacking from the direction of Ricasoli. On 19 July, the 10th Brigade attacked from the Montevarchi with the Three Rivers in support, and two Canadian tanks were knocked out. The Germans were convinced to pull out of Ricasoli by heavy fire from self-propelled guns accompanying both attacking British brigades. Early on 20 July the Three Rivers Regiment put "A" Squadon into Ricasoli while the East Surreys moved up left of Highway 69.²²

All the while the countryside became increasingly hostile for tanks. In this extremely rugged terrain the 1st Canadian Assault Troop, created in early June to give the brigade its own indigenous armoured engineer capability, proved its worth in lifting mines, filling craters, and, on one occasion, blasting a route for tanks along a sheer cliff face. Without their excellent work, it is unlikely that the tankers could have continued effective support of the infantry units.²³

To the north of Ricasoli, a party of the Hermann Görings were cut off and surprised on a ridge. An officer among the 38 captured Germans reportedly couldn't believe that Sherman tanks were able to maneuver to their position, a testament to the work of the Canadian engineers. The first contact between German and Canadian forces in the Italian campaign had come between Three Rivers tanks and the Hermann Göring Division on Sicily in July 1943 at Grammichele. This encounter with the Three Rivers was to be the last time the Hermann Görings met Canadians in battle. Also at an end was the association between the 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade and the 4th  British Division. Together, the two formations had advanced 35 miles from Trasimene to the Arno. The Canadians suffered 26 killed and 102 wounded. On 20 July their relief by the 25th British Tank Brigade began, as the 13th Corps began to regroup.

The French Expeditionary Corps departed for the invasion of southern France and the 13th Corps extended its front. The advance of the corps in the Arno Valley had stopped, particularly on the front of the 6th Armoured Division, east of Highway 69 where two and a half German divisions barred the way. The left flank, a ten mile frontage between Highway 2 and the Chianti Hills, was held by just two German divisions and so the corps attack shifted there. The 8th Indian Division transferred from 10th Corps, tasked to follow up the main attack by the 6th South African Armoured and 2nd New Zealand Divisions. on 22 July, the 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade came under control of the 8th Indian Division, renewing a relationship that had been forged on the Adriatic and strengthened during fighting for the Gustav Line.

The Calgary Regiment went into action first, supporting the 21st Brigade on 23 July, and for four days as they attacked with the 19th Brigade down Highway 2 and a secondary road near Empoli. The 29th Panzergrenadier Division offered only light opposition, mines, demolitions and scattered long-range shelling, and they embarked on a general withdrawal. "A" and "B" Squadron of the Calgary Regiment continued on in support of the 19th Brigade through the towns of Certaldo and Castelfiorentino while "C" Squadron supported a unit of 21st Brigade to Tavarnelle on Highway 2. It was a leisurely advance, the division ordered not to apply strong pressure on the Germans. Resistance stiffened as the tank and infantry forces approached the Olga positions on 26 July, a 10-mile line through Montespertoli 13 miles north of Poggibonsi, held by the German 4th Parachute Division. The paratroopers were supported by self-propelled guns, medium artillery and Tiger tanks. "C" Squadron of the Calgary Regiment, in support of the 21st Brigade, lost two tanks and six casualties as they bumped into the positions. On the night of 26-27 July the Three Rivers relieved them, and the next day found the Germans had again broken contact, not planning to fight a major engagement in their Olga positions. They retreated in haste, with little time for mining or demolitions, and the Canadian tanks and Indian infantry made half a dozen miles on good roads, reaching Montelupo where the Pesa and Arno Rivers met. The advance was so rapid, they outpaced their artillery and required air support by Spitfires to do counter-battery work on German guns that shelled them. Patrols found rearguards of the 3rd Panzergrenadier Division holding Empoli and Montelupo.

The final holding positions south of Florence were the Paula Line, following the line of the River Pesa from the Arno at Montelupo for a distance of seven miles, then across Highway 2 and east towards the 10th Army boundary, four miles west of Highway 69. It was here that the 13th Corps advance came to a halt on 29 July, as five German divisions (west to east, they were 3rd Panzergrenader, 29th Panzergrenadier, 4th Parachute, 356th Infantry, and 715th Infantry) held the main front between the Elsa and the Middle Arno.

 The British Corps Commander decided to breach the "Paula" Line in the area about Highway No. 2, both because that road provided the best approach to Florence, and because the heights there were less formidable than in other sectors. Late in the evening of 30 July the 2nd New Zealand Division attacked on a narrow front between the highway and the River Pesa, supported by an extensive artillery programme in which the New Zealand guns were joined by those of the two flanking divisions and an Army Group Royal Artillery. The battle went well, and all initial objectives were taken from the stubbornly resisting 29th Panzer Grenadier Division; but heavy consumption of artillery ammunition made it necessary to postpone the second phase of the attack for twenty-four hours while stocks were replenished.

As the New Zealanders struck again on the night of 1-2 August, the 8th Indian Division went into action on their left. Units of the 21st Brigade, supported by all three squadrons of the Three Rivers Regiment, secured a bridgehead over the Pesa at Ginestra, three miles upstream from Montelupo.140 By daybreak on the 3rd the New Zealanders and South Africans had broken through the main "Paula" line and were driving towards Florence on the heels of a retreating enemy. That night Three Rivers tanks helped Mahratta and Punjabi infantry chase German rearguards out of the villages of Inno and Malmantile in the angle between the Pesa and the Arno. By the evening of 5 August the south bank of the Arno from Florence to Montelupo was firmly in Allied hands.²⁴

The Three Rivers Regiment and the Calgary Regiment continued firing in support of the infantry, though they remained south of the Arno to defend against possible German counter-attacks. They had reached the furthest limit of their advance on Florence. After a few days they concentrated with 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade headquarters 12 miles south of the city. The Ontario Regiment had briefly joined the pair on 3 August, supporting the 17th Indian Brigade, then less than two days later they moved off again, and came under command of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division, returning to the battle area after a stretch in reserve in the upper Volturno Valley with the rest of I Canadian Corps.²⁵

In June 1944, the 1st Canadian Corps was resting and refitting in reserve positions after the heavy fighting of the Liri Valley. The commander of the 8th Army, General Leese, was dissatisfied with the conduct of Lieutenant-General Burns, the corps commander. The Chief of the General Staff of the Canadian Army, General Ken Stuart, came to Italy to investigate, talking to Alexander and Leese as well as the two Canadian divisional commanders under Burns, Vokes of the 1st Division and Hoffmeister of the 5th (Armoured) Division. Burns stayed, with luke-warm support from his division commanders, but his chief of staff and chief engineer went, while Hoffmeister relieved the commander of the 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade, the infantry component of his armoured division.²⁶  

The 1st Canadian Division spent a brief period at Florence (see below) and when they left on 8 August the Ontario Regiment came under command of the 8th Indian Division. The Calgary Regiment stayed in reserve for two weeks, the Three Rivers until October. The Ontarios stayed south of the Arno for seven days, shelling enemy-held roads north-west of Florence and supporting infantry as they dealt with enemy patrols on the near side of the river. the Germans withdrew their rearmost elements from the northern suburbs and the 8th Indian and 1st British Divisions crossed the river to begin providing assistance to the civilians in Florence. On 14 August the divisions exchanged sectors, moving British troops into the city and the Indians ("more appropriately") into the mountains to the east, leaving the Ontario Regiment's tanks in support of the 1st Division. A troop of "A" Squadron became the first tanks into the city on 17 August, the remainder of the squadron following the next day. They were forbidden from firing their 75-mm main armament in the central part of the city but the tanks were used for reconnaissance, assisting British troops and Partisans in mopping up German machine guns and snipers, and as a counter-attack force in the event of a German attack.²⁷

The enemy, upon relinquishing the northern half of the city had retired no further than the outskirts. The 4th Parachute Division was still patrolling aggressively, although the German attitude was chiefly that of defense.²⁸

(adapted from map compiled by Historical Section, General Staff and originally published in Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Vol II)

1st Canadian Division at Florence

On 18 July 1944 the 8th Army directed 1st Canadian Corps to begin concentrating in secret near Perugia, in anticipation that they would continue offensive operations by the Army and break through the Gothic Line. The Canadian Corps' role in the attack was to take over the eastern flank of the 10th Corps in the Central Appenines, permitting the 10th and 13th Corps to concentrate for the main assault. In the meantime, the 1st Canadian Division was to reinforce the 13th Corps at Florence. Following a Royal Visit on 31 July 1944, the 1st Division began moving from the Volturno Valley, followed by the remainder of the Corps. Elaborate deception schemes and rigorous security was enforced to hide the move. Unit flashes (as well as the distinctive ribbon of the Canadian Volunteer Service Medal) were stripped from uniforms and identification symbols were removed from vehicles while enemy intelligence was provided false information in hopes of convincing them they Corps was concentrating behind the 2nd Polish Corps.

Towns along the way were put out of bounds, and the customary collection of unit direction signs lining the highway were replaced by route markers carrying only a single letter. That these measures effectively frustrated the inquisitiveness of those whom our intelligence staffs called "short range agents" among the civilian population is shown by the significant silence of enemy war diaries regarding the true whereabouts of the Canadian formations at this time. By a strange irony these elaborate precautions went for nought. On 4 August the illusion we had sought to create of a forthcoming drive in the Adriatic sector became our actual intention when, for reasons that will be shown in the next chapter, General Alexander abandoned the idea of a two-army attack through the central Apennines in favour of an offensive on the right flank by the Eighth Army. The change in plan cancelled the Canadian relief of the 10th Corps but did not affect the move of the 1st Division. Red patches and unit flashes returned to arms and shoulders, and vehicles once more showed their distinguishing signs; for not only was anonymity no longer necessary, but it was desirable to advertise to the enemy the presence of Canadians at Florence and so destroy the earlier concept of their being on the east coast.²⁹

The 2nd Canadian Brigade entered a front that had become static, taking over the sector of the 2nd New Zealand Division on the evening of 5 August 1944. The 1st Brigade moved into the sector of the 6th South Africa Armoured Division on their right the next night. The moves permitted the 8th Indian Division to move back into corps reserve, and left the Canadians facing the Arno river on a 10-mile wide front. The 1st Brigade's sector included that portion of Florence lying south of the river. Three battalions of the German 4th Parachute Division still held onto the 90% of the city lying on the opposite bank. All bridges over the Arno had been blown by German engineers, save the 14th-Century Ponte Vecchio, which instead had been blocked by the destruction of a series of buildings on the approaches.

The bulk of the city's population had made no move, and the front line provided the uncommon spectacle of soldiers crouching in watchful readiness with weapons at the alert, while civilians cycled or strolled past in apparent unconcern of stray bullets. The Canadians were using only their rifles and machine-guns, the firing of PIATs and mortars in the built-up area being forbidden-for Allied Force Headquarters had ruled that "the whole city of Florence must rank as a work of art of the first importance." It soon became apparent that not all the Italians south of the river supported the Allied cause. The R.C.R., holding the waterfront east and ;west of the Ponte Vecchio, suffered casualties from civilian snipers on nearby rooftops and from occasional mortaring and shelling which the enemy, less punctilious about preserving undamaged the treasured fabric of the city, was bringing down with the assistance of Fascist observers in the area. To end this practice a force of 250 Italian Partisans, assisted by a score of the battalion's "tommy-gunners", combed the south bank on 8 August, entering every building and scrutinizing its inhabitants. They rounded up more than 150 suspects, and enough rifles, pistols and hand grenades (some of these being found in the women's purses) to fill two 15-cwt. trucks.³⁰

The Division only remained in place until 8 August, when they were relieved by the 8th Indian Division. They moved once again under tight security to the south, rejoining 1st Canadian Corps on 10 August near Peruglia-Foligno.³¹

Final Acts
See also main article Cerrone

In the last half of August, the Germans gave no evidence they would give up their positions on the heights overlooking Florence. To the east, on the front held by the British 1st Division and 8th Indian Division, they began to withdraw on 20 August, pulling back 5 miles to more easily defended positions on the far bank of the Arno River. The 13th Corps pursued, to maintain contact and prepare for a broad crossing of the river as part of an upcoming offensive by the U.S. 5th Army, under whose operational command they came on 18 August.

The Calgary Regiment went into action on 25 August supporting the Indian Division in a crossing of the Arno, wading the river on 25 August and then shooting Gurkha troops onto Mount Cerrone on 29 August. The Gurkhas drove 200 Germans off in hand-to-hand combat, with heavy fire and a counter-attack preventing them from exploiting their success. By the 31st, however, 8th Army actions on the Adriatic coast convinced the Germans that further delaying actions on the Arno were fruitless, and their last rearguards on the Arno were withdrawn.

The final entry in its diary for August recorded that the 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade experienced "no feeling of disappointment at being left out of the Adriatic operation." The brigade had been in almost continuous action since 11 May, and much of its fighting had been done in country anything but favourable to armoured warfare. For the time being, as the Fifth Army completed preparations for its attack on the Gothic Line, a series of reliefs gave every squadron a brief period of rest and refitting. Tanks were subjected to a programme of careful maintenance and rigorous inspection. It was time well spent, for in the mountains ahead lay stiffer tests than any that the three armoured regiments had yet been called upon to face.³²

Battle Honours

The following Canadian units were awarded the Battle Honour "Advance to Florence" for participation in these actions:

1st Canadian Armoured Brigade

• 11th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Ontario Regiment)

• 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Three Rivers Regiment)

• 14th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Calgary Regiment)

Notes

1. Nicholson, Gerald Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War: Volume II: The Canadians in Italy (2nd printing, Queen's Printer, Ottawa, ON, 1957) pp.458-459

2. Ibid, p.459

3. Kurowski, Franz The History of the Fallschirmpanzerkorps Hermann Göring (Soldiers of the Reichsmarschall) (English translation by J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing Inc., Winnipeg, MB, 1995) ISBN 0-921991-25-8 pp.251-255

4. Nicholson, Ibid, p.460

5. Dancocks, Daniel G. D-Day Dodgers: The Canadians in Italy 1943-1945 (McClelland & Stewart Inc., Toronto, ON, 1991) ISBN 0771025440 p.294

6. McKay, A. Donald Gaudeamus Igitur "Therefore Rejoice" (Bunker to Bunker Books, Calgary, AB, 2005) ISBN 1894255534 p.101

7. Nicholson, Ibid, p.461

8. Ibid

9. Ibid, p.462. Note that many histories of the Italian Campaign review this period very briefly, or in some cases not at all. For example, Tug of War: The Battle for Italy, 1943-1945 by Dominick Graham and Shelford Bidwell discuss the Liri Valley campaign and go straight into a chapter on the Gothic Line with passing mention to the fact that the 8th Army was "astride Florence" but with no mention of how they got there. Florence also does not appear in the Index.

10. Nicholson, Ibid, pp.462-463

11. Ibid, pp.463-464

12. Ibid, pp.464-465

13. Greenhous, Brereton "Italian Odyssey 1943-45" We Stand on Guard: An Illustrated History of the Canadian Army (Ovale Publications, Montreal, PQ, 1992) ISBN 2894290438 p.280

14. Dancocks, Ibid, p.294

15. Ibid, pp.294-295

16. Marteinson, J.K. and Michael R. McNorgan The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps: An Illustrated History (Toronto, ON: Royal Canadian Armoured Corps Association, 2000) ISBN 1-896941-17-6 p.203

17. Nicholson, Ibid, pp.469-470

18. Ibid

19. Dancocks, Ibid, p.295

20. Nicholson, Ibid, p.472

21. Ibid, p.473

22. Ibid

23. Marteinson, Ibid, p.204

24. Nicholson, Ibid, p.477

25. Ibid

26. Greenhous, Ibid, p.280

27. Nicholson, Ibid, pp.484-485

28. Schragg, Lex History of The Ontario Regiment 1866-1951 p.230

29. Nicholson, Ibid, pp.481-482

30. Ibid, p.484

31. Ibid

32. Ibid, p.486