Falaise Road

Success by both the British and Americans created the opportunity for decisive action by 1st Canadian Army. By the end of July, the German armoured divisions barring the way to Falaise began moving away from the British front. By 7 August 1944 only a single panzer division remained opposite the Canadians, following the transfer of the 1st SS, 2nd, 9th SS, and 21st Panzer Divisions. While three new infantry divisions entered the line, and with them formidable anti-tank weapons, "to break through these positions was now a more practicable operation of war."⁷ General H.D.G. Crerar, commanding First Canadian Army, outlined a "basic tactical plan" that called for surprise. While the Germans would certainly be expecting an attack on the Canadian front, he hoped to secure surprise by timing and method of attack.⁸ The operation was Canada's first army-level battle, though operational command was entrusted in Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, commander of II Canadian Corps.⁹

Operation TOTALIZE

Operation TOTALIZE, launched on 7 August 1944, was planned by 2nd Canadian Corps to achieve the maximum surprise desired by Crerar. Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, commanding the corps, utilized a number of unique tactical innovations in the initial attack. He planned the breakthrough battle to occur at night, and mounted the infantry in armoured vehicles, including halftracks, universal carriers, and for the first time, fully-tracked armoured personnel carriers, which he created by stripping the armament from self-propelled guns. Direction finding for the attacking columns was aided by the use of tracers firing on fixed lines, special navigation parties, coloured star shells and the use of artificial moonlight (searchlights bouncing off of low-lying clouds).¹⁰

2nd Canadian Corps at the start of Operation TOTALIZE

TOTALIZE was a two-phase attack, with heavy bomber support preceding each phase. The initial, night, assault was supported by the Royal Air Force and the United States Army Air Force supported the second, daylight, follow-up attacks. The Army Commander noted the anniversary; 8 August 1918 had been described by General Ludendorff as the "black day of the German Army" as it marked the beginning of the final 100 day offensive that finished the First World War. There was hope that a similar chain of events might be set off as the Battle of Normandy drew to a close.

Phase I commenced half an hour before midnight on 7/8 August. The 51st (Highland) Division and the 2nd Canadian Division attacked in four columns each, each column consisting of a squadron of tanks in the lead, followed by flail and AVRE vehicles, a mounted infantry battalion in armoured carriers, and additional tanks following behind. The columns by-passed strong-points while infantry on foot mopped up.

The wisdom of General Simonds' plan of attack was more than vindicated by the event. The armoured columns tore through the Germans' front positions, and in the early hours of the morning they were fighting in the vicinity of their first objectives far to the rear and had almost cleared them. Thanks to the armoured carriers and the degree of surprise that had been attained, the infantry had been carried through the German fire zone and deposited close to these objectives with very few casualties. Meanwhile, the marching battalions moving up in rear had entered the villages of the enemy's front line, those little hamlets with the bloodstained names - May-sur-Orne, Fontenay-le-Marmion, Roquancourt, Tilly-la-Campagne. By following close behind the barrages put down by our guns, they got into them with comparatively little trouble, but some very bitter fighting followed.¹¹

One of the tactical innovations of TOTALIZE was the use of M7 Priest self-propelled guns as
extemporized armoured personnel carriers. The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division had a supply of
self-propelled guns added to their establishment for the Normandy landings, consistent with
their mission of defeating the German armoured counter-attack in the initial days of the invasion.
By the end of July, the divisional artillery reverted to the standard towed 25-pdr equipment of
an infantry division. The M7s were stripped of their guns at a workshop code-named KANGAROO
and the name stuck for the ad hoc APCs. See also the article on Kangaroo APCs.

Phase I achieved its goal of breaking through German defences north of Falaise, and did so "after suffering remarkably few casualties in men and equipment, especially by the bloody standards of Normandy."¹²

Aftermath

Phase II was delivered against the next line of German defences, sitting on high ground five miles further on, beginning at 13:55hrs on 8 August 1944. The attack was marred by short-bombing by U.S.A.A.F. heavy bombers, and several casualties were caused among Canadian and Polish troops, including the tactical headquarters of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division. Major-General Rod Keller, the General Officer Commanding the division, was wounded and evacuated. Brigadier R.A. Wyman, commanding the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade, was also wounded while conducting personal reconnaissance during the day.

The Polish armour passed through the 51st (Highland) Division while the 4th (Canadian) Armoured Division passed through the 2nd Canadian Division, taking the high ground that flanked the Caen-Falaise road. The Canadian Army's official historian concluded that "Had the two armoured divisions not been fighting their first real battle, they might perhaps have got further on this day. As it was, they did not attain the final objectives and further advance had to be deferred until the morrow."¹³

General Simonds was gambling for high stakes in Operation Totalize. So far, his gamble was paying off. His night attack had taken the enemy by surprise and had propelled 60,000 combat troops eight miles deep into enemy territory in the early hours of 8 August. But the ill-fated bombing raid later on the same afternoon that was to initiate the next phase of the attack backfired. It failed to subdue the Germans and, in fact, caused heavy casualties and confusion among the unfortunate Allied soldiers caught by "friendly bombs."

The 1st Polish and 4th Canadian Armoured Divisions - fresh to Normandy and totally unrehearsed in the battle plan - were plunged into exactly the situation Simonds had tried so hard to prevent. They clashed head-on in broad daylight, with no support, against a well-entrenched and heavily armed enemy. That they managed to advance at all was a great achievement. For one infantry battalion, the Canadian Argylls, it was a superb effort, ranking in tactical brilliance and raw courage with the best in any war. For another armoured unit, the British Columbia Regiment (BCR), it was a gallant effort, but one of the most disastrous of the war.¹⁴

The Germans relocated to new defensive positions, and the continued assault on 9 August made little progress. In one notable instance, the 28th Canadian Armoured Regiment (British Columbia Regiment) became confused and navigated to the wrong hill. the navigation error was compounded by the inability to contact supporting artillery, and as the sun rose, the exposed BCR was blasted apart by superior German firepower. The regiment lost 47 tanks, various other vehicles, and 240 men including the commanding officer.¹⁵

Operation TOTALIZE had pushed 2nd Canadian Corps eight miles toward Falaise, achieving the objective of breaking through the German front. Falaise itself lay eight miles distant and the bulk of German forces in Normandy were now moving eastward to try and escape the threat of encirclement as U.S. forces came up from the south.

Historians have struggled to put the battle into historical perspective. John English wrote:

The operational, strategic and operational consequences of a Canadian triumph in Normandy are impossible to know. Had the First Canadian Army succeeded in its 8 August drive to Falaise...it is not unreasonable to presume that it might have, as in 1918, spearheaded the British Army's advance into the heartland of Europe. The tragedy was that on the morning of the 26th anniversary of the Battle of Amiens, Simonds's corps had cleanly sliced open the German defensive zone without realizing it...

In very large measure, responsibility for the relatively lacklustre showing of Canadian arms in Normandy must be laid at the feet of division commanders....At best, Simonds's immediate subordinates were mediocre performers. Even at brigade level, with the possible exception of Foster, a lack of tactical judgement was often evident.¹⁶

More recent research by Brian Reid is slightly more forgiving, particularly with regards to TOTALIZE, and writes:

...TOTALIZE was successful, although it could and should have achieved more, more quickly. That it ultimately floundered on indecision and hesitation was due as much to cumbersome doctrine, inferior equipment and an unwieldy plan as it was to a few flawed commanders and the inability of the Allied air forces to follow through on their claims. However, it is indicative of the conditions under which the Allied armies fought in Normandy, that no one at the time thought that it was other than a successful operation of war.¹⁷

Battle Honours

The following units were awarded the Battle Honour "Falaise Road":

II Canadian Corps

• 12th Manitoba Dragoons

2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade

• 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars)

• 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse)

• 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Sherbrooke Fusilier Regiment)

2nd Canadian Division

• 8th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment (14th Canadian Hussars)

• The Toronto Scottish Regiment (MG)

4th Canadian Infantry Brigade

• The Royal Regiment of Canada

• The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry

• The Essex Scottish Regiment

5th Canadian Infantry Brigade

• Le Régiment de Maisonneuve

• The Calgary Highlanders

6th Canadian Infantry Brigade

• Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal

• The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada

• The South Saskatchewan Regiment

3rd Canadian Division

8th Canadian Infantry Brigade

• The North Shore (New Brunswick) Regiment

4th Canadian (Armoured) Division

• 29th Canadian Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment (The South Alberta Regiment)

• The Lake Superior Regiment (Motor)

4th Canadian Armoured Brigade

• 21st Armoured Regiment (The Governor General's Foot Guards)

• 22nd Armoured Regiment (The Grenadier Guards)

• 28th Armoured Regiment (The British Columbia Regiment)

10th Canadian Infantry Brigade

• The Lincoln and Welland Regiment

• The Algonquin Regiment

• The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada (Princess Louise's)

Notes

1. Wood, James A. (ed.)   Army of the West: The Weekly Reports of German Army Group B from Normandy to the West Wall (Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2007) ISBN 978-0-8117-3404-2 p.169

2. McKay, A. Donald Gaudeamus Igitur "Therefore Rejoice" (Bunker to Bunker Books, Calgary, AB, 2005) ISBN 1894255534 p.151

3. Stacey, C.P. Canada's Battle in Normandy: The Canadian Army's Share in the Operations 6 June - 1 September 1944 (King's Printer, Ottawa, ON, 1946) p.103

4. Ibid, p. 105

5. Ellis, L.F. Victory in the West: Volume I The Battle of Normandy (Queen's Printer, 1962 - reprint by The Naval and Military Press Ltd, Uckfield, East Sussex, UK, 2004) ISBN 1-845740-58-0 p.405

6. Ford, Ken Falaise: Death of an Army (Osprey Publishing Ltd, Botley, Oxford, UK, 2005) ISBN 978-1-84176-626-3 pp.37-39

7. Stacey, Ibid, pp.106-107

8. Ibid, p.107

9.  Jarymowycz, Roman J. "Canadian Armour in Normandy: Operation 'Totalize' and the Quest for Operational Maneuver" Canadian Military History, Volume 7 Issue 2 (1998)

10. McKay, Ibid, pp.165-166

11. Stacey, Ibid, pp.113-114

12. Reid, Brian. No Holding Back: Operation Totalize, Normandy, August 1944. (Robin Brass Studio, Toronto, ON, 2005) ISBN 1-896941-40-0 pp.359-360

13. Stacey, Ibid, pp.114-115

14. Whitaker, Denis and Shelagh Whitaker (with Terry Copp) Victory at Falaise: The Soldier's Story (HarperCollins Publishers Ltd., Toronto, ON, 2000) ISBN 0-00-200017-2 p.123

15. Bechtold, Mike "Lost in Normandy: The Odyssey of Worthington Force 9 August 1944" Canadian Military History, Volume 19, Number 2, Spring 2010

16. English, John A.  The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign (Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2009) ISBN 978-0-8117-3576-6 pp.238-239

17. Reid, Ibid, p.366