Le Havre was a Battle Honour granted to Canadian units participating in actions at this city from 10 Sep 1944 to 12 Sep 1944, as part of the overall battle to clear the Channel Ports. Only one Canadian unit was involved in this battle, which was fought by I British Corps.

Background

The fall of Dieppe in early Sep 1944 brought hope that Allied logistical concerns might be speedily remedied by the capture of port facilities along the coast of northern France. In the first week of Sep, then, First Canadian Army moved quickly to try and secure several cities. Le Havre was invested by I British Corps, while 3rd Canadian Infantry Division moved on Boulogne and Calais. It is worthy of note, however, that administrative plans drafted by the Allies had provided for the use of Le Havre to resupply American forces in the field rather than First Canadian Army or British 2nd Army.¹

On 6 Sep, General Montgomery, commander of 21st Army Group asked the commander of First Canadian Army, General H.D.G. Crerar, for an estimate on how long the battle for Boulogne might last. Crerar was of the opinion that capturing the channel ports was vital to the conduct of the war, and recognized that the speedy advance by the Allied armies away from Normandy at the end of Aug had imposed a great logistical burden.
Approach to Battle

I British Corps had crossed the Seine in the first week of Sep, and leading elements of the 49th (West Riding) Division made contact with German perimeter defences on the evening of 3 Sep. A surrender demand was rejected by the garrison the next morning by Oberst Eberhard Wildermuth, in charge of the garrison. The German commander had already made the harbour unserviceable and hoped the Allies might forgo a formal siege knowing that the port would be unusable for many months after capture.

The grand Allied plan, outlined as early as Mar 1944, had been to capture Rouen and Le Havre at approximately D+90. The first outline plan for Operation ASTONIA, the capture of the Le Havre, was drafted on 3 Sep (D+89). The plan called for an assault by two infantry divisions supported by two armoured brigades (49th Division would be accompanied by 51st (Highland) Division, supported by 34 Tank Brigade and 33 Armoured Brigade respectively).

Operational Plan

The Highland Division was to move down the coast and take over the Western half of the line and the two divisions were to continue to drive in the enemy outposts and by vigorous patrolling intimidate him and learn everything possible about his dispositions. If the enemy showed any sign of weakness and presented the opportunity, penetration of his main positions was to be made. Arrangements were made for Naval and Air bombardment to "soften up" his defences, and to facilitate this co-operation, Corps Headquarters was put in direct touch with the Royal Navy and with Bomber Command. In the event of these attacks and the preliminary efforts of the ground forces having no effect the assault was to take place on 8 or 9 September, depending on the administrative situation and the amount of information obtained.²

Defences

Le Havre was strongly defended and surrounded by water on three sides (the English Channel to the west, the mouth of the Seine River to the south, and the flooded Lezarde River valley to the east). Strong defensive works strengthened these natural obstacles, and the obvious route for a land assault - the north - was under observation from high ground around Octeville as well as two high plateaux to the north-east. Barbed wire and minefields protected an area from the Lezarde valley at La Rive to the sea coast at Octeville. A 20-foot wide anti-tank ditch, about 10 feet deep, had also been dug on the northern approaches to the city and concrete emplacements housing machine guns and anti-tank weapons were numerous, 11 on the northern plateau alone. Inside the city were 28 artillery positions, usually of four guns each, though the majority could only be trained out to sea. Two forts inside the city (Fort Ste Adresse and Fort Saniv) were combined with road blocks, pill boxes, fortified houses, and concrete shelters to form an interlocking defensive system. The garrison was estimated at between 7,350 and 8,700 men, including 4,000 artillerymen and flak troops and 1,300 naval personnel untrained in ground combat. Infantry number 4,500 men according to post-war interrogations of the garrison commander, including a battalion of Grenadier Regiment 936 of Infanterie Division 245.³

Battle-experienced men on leave from the eastern front, hastily banded together into two battalions, had not yet shaken down into a smooth-working team. The men of 81 Fortress Unit, and two battalions of 5 Sicherungs Regiment (Protective Regiment) were infirm and of small fighting value. The fortress commander having considered the quality of his troops and the facilities for defence, had reported to the Commander of Fifteenth Army, so he alleged later, that the fortress could be held against an assault for 24 hours in unfavourable circumstances, or 72 hours if circumstances favoured the defence.⁴

Fire Support

Preparation for the battle included naval bombardment and tactical mission by heavy bombers. The chief effects of the shelling and bombing was to knock out two anti-aircraft batteries, damage the telephone exchange, and make streets impassable due to rubble. Some 922,000 leaflets were also dropped on the city by RAF aircraft and artillery shells. Propaganda missions were also executed by loudspeaker.

A tremendous weight of artillery was available to support the attack. In addition to the six field regiments of the two divisions, there were two AGRA's, comprising six medium and two heavy regiments. Besides timed concentrations, the corps commander could order, and divisions could request, Victor Targets. When one of these was ordered by the CCRA, every gun which could reach the target, and was not otherwise engaged, would take part in the shoot. The call to fire on a Victor Target took precedence over counter-battery or counter-flak tasks. Pre-arranged concentrations were also available on call.

Canadian Participation

1 Canadian Armoured Personnel Carrier Squadron had been formed on 1 Sep 44 as the result of the success which attended the use of "unfrocked Priests" carrying infantry during Operations TOTALIZE and TRACTABLE. The squadrons had 4 troops each of 12 Kangaroos. This squadron and its successor, 1 Canadian Armoured Personnel Carrier Regiment, (formed 23 Oct 44) were to provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of transporting infantry safely through the enemy's outer defences.

The first phase of the assault planned by Lieutenant General Sir John Crocker, commander of I British Corps, called for the 49th Division to breach the outer defences and capture the northern plateau while seizing a bridgehead on the southern plateau. The second phase would see the 51st Division secure a base north of the Foręt de Mongeon while 49th Division seized the southern plateau. The Highlanders would then destroy defences at Octeville and secure the northwestern outskirts of Le Havre itself. The final phase would see both divisions attacking from the captured high ground into the city itself.

British Churchill crews of the 34th Tank Brigade watch the aerial bombardment of Le Havre. IWM Photo.

The initial task of 49 (W.R.) Inf Div in the first phase was to breach and enter the enemy defences at a point a mile west of Montiville. Here it would be necessary to make three gaps through wire and minefield and, in the case of the central passage, bridge the anti-tank ditch. For the task, 56 Inf Bde had flails to deal with mines, AVsRE for the bridging of the ditch, and the Churchills of 7 R. Tks. To deal with the strongpoints behind the enemy minefields and wire, they had more AVsRE and Crocodile flamethrowing tanks. The battalion whose task it was to pass through the northern plateau and secure a bridgehead on the southern plateau, had Churchills in support, plus the very great advantage of being carried to their objectives in the Canadian-manned Kangaroos.

In the second phase, 51 (H.) Inf Div was to start its operations in darkness, with a break-in just west of the gaps made earlier by 49 (W.R.) Inf Div. For their part in the assault the Scotsmen also received the assistance of the strange contrivances of 79 Armd Div. The gap was to be three lanes in width, and each lane was to be made by an identical armoured column, or "gapping team". The leading vehicle was an AVRE, whose principal function was to clear the anti-landing poles and wires which infested the area. Next came the first "flail", whose responsibility included direction keeping by gyro compass, an important and difficult task at night, as had been found in Operation TOTALIZE. There would follow two AVsRE. with "snakes" for detonating by explosives the mines on the far side of the trench, and so giving the four flails which followed a clear area from which to start their work of mine detonation. The last two vehicles would be an A.V.R.E. towing a sledge full of fascines for use by the divisional sappers and a bulldozer to improve the crossings. As in Operation TOTALIZE, direction-keeping was to be aided by tapes and lights, and Bofors tracers.

Bad weather hampered planning, and frequent rain caused mud that made passage of vehicles difficult. The operation was postponed from 9 Sep to 10 Sep, though the ground remained a concern to commanders in the event.

The Battle

The opening bombardment began at 1000hrs on 10 Sep, with 300 15-inch shells falling on the city. At 1645hrs, 900 heavy bombers dropped 4,264 tons of high explosive.

To the waiting troops, formed up west of Montivilliers on the right bank of the Lezarde, the weight and apparent precision of the bombing was impressive and encouraging. They estimated that its effects on the defenders would be considerable. Prisoners stated subsequently, however, that although the bombardment was very frightening, comparatively few of the German troops were killed or wounded because of the excellent shelters, including those supplied for the civilian population. Damage was done to weapons, but the most important result was the breakdown in communications, which prevented the German artillery commander from controlling his resources, and precluded centralized direction of the defence.

The 49th Division advanced at 1745hrs, and flail tanks began clearing mines from the left gap at 1825hrs, managing to clear three lanes by 1940hrs with the loss of four tanks. The centre attack went slowly, as it involved bridging the anti-tank ditch, and only one lane was cleared despite great effort. The assault on the eastern gap, also, resulted in just one line rather than the planned two. In all, 29 flail tanks were put out of action as well as two command tanks - almost all disabled by mines - and six AVsRE.

The German view of this part of the operation is interesting as showing the effectiveness of the methods employed by the attackers:

During the night 10/11 September, Allied artillery kept up its intensive fire. In addition a dome of light formed by huge searchlights was thrown over the fortress, and under this artificial moonlight infantry and flame-throwing tanks continued their break-in all through the night. Command during the hours of darkness was almost impossible with means of communication, wireless and roads, hopelessly damaged. Companies thrown in for relief reached their assembly points late, and with considerable casualties. When daylight came, Wildermuth realized a counter-attack was out of the question, and he ordered his troops to take up the defence of the second position, on the east and north-east edge of the forest of Mongeon...

Minefields were penetrated very quickly, and Allied tanks and infantry co-operated well in the attack. The flame-throwing tanks had a great morale effect in weakening the defenders' will to resist. The artificial moonlight on the night of 10/11 September, created considerable surprise. Preceding the attack into the town, Allied artillery gave prompt and mobile support to the spearheads of the attack. The infantry advanced carefully and capably, and the British fighter, according to Wildermuth, proved himself to be a hard fighter in the break-in and in house-to-house fighting.

Once the gaps had been cleared, however, tanks and Crocodile flamethrowing tanks passed through to engage enemy fortifications. As fighting broke out across the northern plateau past sundown, "The battalion whose task it was to seize a bridgehead on the southern plateau were forced to advance on foot from the gaps as the going, because of mud and undetonated mines, was too bad for the Canadian-manned Kangaroos which were carrying them to proceed further." Unable to establish a bridgehead, this force did manage to seize two intact bridges over the Fontaine (dividing the plateaux) and Royal Engineers completed two other crossings.

At 2359hrs the 51st Division's leading battalions passed through the right hand gap of the 49th, and manoeuvred to the rear of enemy defences opposite their division; then the Highlanders began their own gapping work. By 0240hrs, three lanes had been started, and bridges laid over the ditch. The first lane was completed two hours later.
11 Sep 1944

To the east of the Lezarde, a brigade of the 49th Division attacked four strong points east of Harfleur at 0530hrs on 11 Sep; the attack was supported by tanks and flails and the fire of four field regiments and one medium regiment. Despite this support, unexpected mines hampered the assault, and the addition of Crocodiles to the attack force did not immediately deter the German defenders; fighting lasted until after 1400hrs when the the last strongpoint surrendered. By last light the brigade was moving westward into the city itself, and reached a point northwest of the railway marshalling yards.

In the meantime, attacks from the north had penetrated further into German defences, and concrete emplacements were reduced by flame and explosives from Crocoiles and AVsRE. Bomber Command dropped 857 more tons of bombs early in the morning and tactical air support engaged targets throughout during the daylight hours, which saw troops reach Doudenville, and into the city as far south as the forts Ste Addressee and Sanvic.
 

12 Sep 1944

The final clearance of the city was effected on 12 Jul 1944; a brigade of the 51st Division cleared the area from Doudenville to the coast with little resistance, while the other two brigades of the division cleared Le Havre's southern portion including Fort Ste Addresse which stubbornly held out until 1500hrs. The 49th Division cleared areas in the south including the docks and Canal Vauban as well as Fort Sanvic. The 49th also captured Oberst Wildermuth, who had been wounded.

In 48 hours' fighting the great fortress of Le Havre had been reduced. The port was thus secured for our use 98 days after the first invaders landed in German-occupied Europe. The besiegers suffered just under 500 casualties killed, wounded and missing from 3 Sep to the end of the operation on 12 Sep. On the other hand the defence had cost the Germans 11,300 prisoners, as well as uncounted dead. An official report on the battle lists the dominant factors which led to the British success.

French citizens assist British armoured reconnaissance troops locate German holdouts during mopping-up operations, 12 Sep 1944. IWM Photo.