Savojaards Platt

The Official History of the Canadian Army noted:

The Pocket was entirely low-lying land, much of it reclaimed from the sea and none of it more than a few feet above sea level; on a map where heights are shown by contours at 10-metre intervals, there are no contours whatever within the Pocket. Quite apart from the Leopold Canal along its front, the German position was protected by large areas of inundation on both its eastern and western flanks; and all the approaches, and the Pocket itself, were intersected by ditches and canals. The roads were almost all built on dykes, and the fields were saturated. Off the roads, movement even by infantry was difficult; movement by vehicles was impossible.¹

At the start of October the 2nd Canadian Corps was tasked with destroying the German forces south of the West Schelde. Their task was given the name Operation SWITCHBACK.

German Defences

The German 64th Infantry Division was established south of the Scheldt Estuary, their positions designated Scheldt Fortress South.

(The Division had) fought in the Battle of the Albert Canal and was left isolated when the 15th Army withdrew behind the Scheldt. On October 2 the division commander, Major General Kurt Eberding, had a total of 2,350 infantrymen, plus more than 8,500 support and miscellaneous service troops, many of whom were not organic to the division. Eberding hedgehogged, incorporated his service troops into the infantry and, despite overwhelming odds, chose to fight the entire Canadian II Corps, rather than surrender. This decision led to the month-long Battle of the Breskens Pocket, in which the 64th Infantry Division was gradually crushed...The 64th Infantry had been totally destroyed but had bought valuable time for the German Army; it had, in fact, given Hitler enough time to launch the Ardennes Offensive.²

Their front was covered by deep water barriers except for a gap near the Isabella Polder at the south-west angle of the Braakman Inlet. There, the 4th Canadian (Armoured) Division had made several attempts to breach the German line, beginning on 22 September 1944 when an entire platoon of The Algonquin Regiment had been lost. A full-scale attack on 5 October by the Algonquins was driven off by heavy fire. These attacks were intended to divert German attention from the Leopold Canal crossing though the Canadian official historian notes that German records do not reveal if that was actually the case.

The Leopold Canal front itself was unpromising...the entire western half of the Pocket was covered by the two canals, the Leopold and the Canal de Derivation de la Lys, running side by side, as well as by heavy inundations. It was very undesirable to attack here, the double canal obstacle in itself being extremely formidable. The operation therefore had to be launched east of the point where the canals separated, the area between them having been occupied by the 4th Division. But there too inundations almost all along the front made the problem extremely difficult. The best place available, and it was not a good one, seemed to be immediately east of the divergence of the two canals. Here there was a narrow strip of dry ground beyond the Leopold—a long triangle with its base on the Aldegem—Aardenburg road and its apex near the village of Moershoofd some three miles east. It was only a few hundred yards broad even at its
base. Its northern boundary coincided with the border between Belgium and the Netherlands.³

The 3rd Canadian Division, moving almost immediately from its assault on Calais 90 miles away, moved into the assault on the Leopold Canal, their plan to combine the water crossing of the canal with a waterborne attack from Terneuzen, ground that had earlier been cleared by the Polish Armoured Division. The 7th Brigade was to cross the Leopold with an additional battalion of the 8th Brigade under command, while the 9th crossed the Braakman Inlet in amphibious vehicles two days later. The Leopold Canal fighting consumed a week, from October 6 to October 13, as the Germans refused to give ground or conduct the expected fighting withdrawal.

The Assault Across the Braakman

Fierce resistance at the Leopold Canal changed the expected course of Operation SWITCHBACK. The 7th Brigade's effort, originally considered to be the main drive, became de-emphasized in favour of the 9th Brigades attack from Terneuzen. using Terrapin amphibious trucks and armoured Landing Vehicles, Tracked (LVTs, also known as "Buffaloes") from the 5th Assault Regiment, Royal Engineers of the 79th Armoured Division, the 9th Brigade married up near Ghent then swam up the Ghent-Terneuzen Canal to Terneuzen, then across the mouth of the Braakman Inlet to land east of Hoofdplaat at the rear of the German pocket.

Plans for an amphibious landing had been in existence since the Poles cleared the Germans from the south bank in September:

The situation now was that the enemy had been cleared from the south bank of the West Scheldt, but only as far as the inlet just west of Terneuzen called the Braakman—and always miscalled at this time Savojaards Plaat. (The name "Savojaards Plaat" properly applied only to the shoal in the mouth of the inlet. See the letter in The Times (London), 24 October 1944, from Dr. G. J. Renier, who also begged English readers to pronounce the name of the Scheldt in the Dutch fashion ("Skelt") and abandon the German pronunciation "Shelt".⁴

Following the clearing of Cap Gris Nez, the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade was picked to perform this amphibious assault, effectively outflanking the defenders in the Breskens Pocket. The brigade trained for two days at Ghent with LVTs, then sailed down the Terneuzen Canal.⁵

Terrapin amphibious truck (left) passed by a column of LVTs near Terneuzen, the Netherlands, 13 Oct 1944. LAC photo

The landing was planned for early morning on 8 October, but a diversion was necessary at Terneuzen around damaged locks, and some vehicles were damaged in the process. Despite anxious moments where fear of German observation suggested a loss of surprised, a 24-hour delay imposed no actual danger, and the landing occurred early on 9 October. Two columns of 48 vehicles left the mouth of the canal at Terneuzen just after midnight, following a motorboat bearing the Royal Navy liaison officer from 1st Canadian Army headquarters. One column, with The North Nova Scotia Highlanders, headed for GREEN BEACH two miles east of Hoofdplaat, the other column with The Highland Light Infantry of Canada, landed on AMBER BEACH closer to the Braakman. Guided by coloured markers fired by artillery, the columns touched down only five minutes late, with no opposition other than a few scattered shots fired at the HLI. German coastal batteries at Flushing did not become active until dawn.

The reserve battalion, The Stormont, Dundas & Glengarry Highlanders, protected by a smokescreen, was ashore by 09:30hrs in the company of mortars and machine guns of The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa. The SDG advanced on Hoofdplaat while the assault battalions pressed forward, the Germans beginning to react to the landings, with shellfire from Breskens and Flushing becoming vigorous.

Opposition was heaviest on the front of the Highland Light Infantry, moving against Biervliet. General Eberding had rapidly committed his divisional reserve against the new menace, and although he later described the reserve as composed of odds and ends it fought well. It is of interest that "the prevailing mist" allowed the Germans to ferry two companies of the 70th Division across the Scheldt from Walcheren to reinforce the 64th in this crisis. Our advance was slow. The Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry captured Hoofdplaat on 10 October. Biervliet did not fall until the evening of the 11th, after the 7th Reconnaissance Regiment, the first reinforcement sent into the bridgehead, had relieved The Highland Infantry of Canada in the line and enabled it to mount an attack against the village.⁶

The stalemated advance beyond the Leopold Canal bridgehead prevented the 8th Brigade from being used as intended. The General Officer Commanding the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, Major-General Dan Spry, changed his plans accordingly when the 9th Brigade made better than expected progress on their front. On 9 October the 8th Brigade was ordered to prepare to attack by land through the Isabella area to link up with the 9th, and the next day, plans changed again when The Algonquin Regiment failed to batter open a route for them at Isabella. The 8th Brigade was instead landed in the rear of the new bridgehead of the 9th Brigade, which was now over-extended with a gap between the HLI in Biervliet and the North Novas to their right.

As enemy resistance stiffened Hoofdplatt only fell to the SD&G Highlanders on 10 October with Biervliet taken by the HLI the next day. At this juncture Maj Gen Spry wisely decided against reinforcing 7 Brigade's bridgehead on the Leopold and sent 8 Brigade to reinforce the 9th on the north coast of the Pocket. But it was to be far from a cakewalk.

The advancing Canadians were faced with the Hobson's Choice of trying to slosh through the sodden, often flooded, beet fields or attack along the tops of the dikes which gridded the polder. The German machine guns were skillfully sited to cover either option. The advance thus became a dreary battle of attrition in which each enemy post had to be eliminated one-by-one.⁷

 Major-General Spry, the commander of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, agreed to have the 7th Reconnaissance Regiment relieve the HLI in front of Biervliet to allow the infantry time to reorganize. Guns from field and medium regiments assisted the HLI in their attack on the village, but enemy counter-attacks were heavy. Clearing skies permitted tactical aircraft of 84 Group to fly a record number of sorties, and while a number of friendly fire attacks took place, no casualties were suffered by the ground troops who had "long since learned to take cover during Allied air attacks."⁸

The North Shore (New Brunswick) Regiment led the 8th Brigade into the bridgehead on 11 October, and on the 12th the brigade was complete and ashore, taking over the left flank in the face of heavy German shelling.

Wounded infantrymen of The North Shore Regiment being offloaded from a Terrapin amphibious vehicle of the 79th Armoured Division,
photographed west of Terneuzen, Netherlands, on 13 October 1944. LAC Photo

Aftermath

On 9-10 October, patrols from The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada south of Watervliet met fierce opposition. On 14 October, the Argylls and the Algonquins at Isabella both found the enemy withdrawing and pushed their troops forward. Patrols of the Algonquins met up with those of The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada coming south past the southwestern angle of the Braakman Inlet. A land route to the bridgehead was open and the ferry service from Terneuzen could be dispensed with.

Battle Honours

The following Canadian units were awarded the Battle Honour "Savojaards Platt" for participation in these actions:

9th Canadian Infantry Brigade

• The Highland Light Infantry of Canada

• The Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders

• The North Nova Scotia Highlanders

Notes

1. Stacey, C.P. Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War: Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North-west Europe 1944-45 (Queen's Printer, Ottawa, ON, 1960)
2. Mitcham, Samuel W. German Order of Battle, Volume 1: 1st-290th Infantry Divisions in World War II (Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2007) ISBN 978-0-8117-3416-5, p.114
3. Stacey, Ibid
4. Ibid, pp.364-365
5. McKay, A. Donald Gaudeamus Igitur "Therefore Rejoice" (Bunker to Bunker Books, Calgary, AB, 2005) ISBN 1894255534 p.198
6. Stacey, Ibid
7. McKay, Ibid, p.199
8. Copp, Terry Cinderella Army: The Canadians in Northwest Europe 1944-45 (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, ON, 2007) ISBN 978-0-8020-9522-0, p.109