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History |
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Wars & Campaigns |
|
►Boer
War
►First
World War
►►Western
Front
►►►Trench
Warfare: 1914-1916
►►►Allied
Offensive: 1916
►►►Allied
Offensives: 1917
►►►German
Offensive: 1918
►►►Advance
to Victory: 1918
►►Siberia
►Second
World War
►►War
Against Japan
►►North
Africa
►►Italian
Campaign
►►►Sicily
►►►Southern
Italy
►►►The
Sangro and Moro
►►►Battles
of the FSSF
►►►Cassino
►►►Liri
Valley
►►►Advance
to Florence
►►►Gothic
Line
►►►Winter
Lines
►►North-West
Europe
►►►Normandy
►►►Southern
France
►►►Channel
Ports
►►►Scheldt
►►►Nijmegen
Salient
►►►Rhineland
►►►Final
Phase
►Korean
War
►Cold
War
►Gulf
War |
|
Operations |
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Battle Honours |
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Boer War
First World War
Western Front
Trench Warfare: 1914-1916
Allied Offensive: 1916
|
►Somme, 1916 |
1
Jul-18 Nov 16 |
|
►Albert |
.1-13
Jul 16 |
|
►Bazentin |
.14-17
Jul 16 |
|
►Pozieres |
.23
Jul-3 Sep 16 |
|
►Guillemont |
.3-6
Sep 16 |
|
►Ginchy |
.9
Sep 16 |
|
►Flers-Courcelette |
15-22
Sep 16 |
|
►Thiepval |
26-29
Sep 16 |
|
►Le Transloy |
.
1-18 Oct 16 |
Allied
Offensives: 1917
|
►Arras 1917 |
8
Apr-4 May 17 |
|
►Vimy, 1917 |
.9-14
Apr 17 |
|
►Arleux |
28-29 Apr 17 |
|
►Scarpe, 1917 |
.3-4
May17 |
|
►Hill 70 |
.15-25
Aug 17 |
|
►Messines, 1917 |
.7-14
Jun 17 |
|
►Ypres, 1917 |
..31
Jul-10 Nov 17 |
|
►Pilckem |
31
Jul-2 Aug 17 |
|
►Langemarck, 1917 |
.16-18
Aug 17 |
|
►Menin Road |
.20-25
Sep 17 |
|
►Polygon Wood |
26
Sep-3 Oct 17 |
|
►Broodseinde |
.4
Oct 17 |
|
►Poelcapelle |
.9
Oct 17 |
|
►Passchendaele |
.12
Oct 17 |
|
►Cambrai, 1917 |
20
Nov-3 Dec 17 |
German Offensive: 1918
|
►Somme, 1918 |
.21
Mar-5 Apr 18 |
|
►St. Quentin |
.21-23
Mar 18 |
|
►Bapaume, 1918 |
.24-25
Mar 18 |
|
►Rosieres |
.26-27
Mar 18 |
|
►Avre |
.4
Apr 18 |
|
►Lys |
.9-29
Apr 18 |
|
►Estaires |
.9-11
Apr 18 |
|
►Messines, 1918 |
.10-11
Apr 18 |
|
►Bailleul |
.13-15
Apr 18 |
|
►Kemmel |
.17-19
Apr 18 |
Advance to Victory: 1918
|
►Arras, 1918 |
.26
Aug-3 Sep 18 |
|
►Scarpe, 1918 |
26-30 Aug 18. |
|
►Drocourt-Queant |
.2-3
Sep 18 |
|
►Hindenburg Line |
.12
Sep-9 Oct 18 |
|
►Canal du Nord |
.27
Sep-2 Oct 18 |
|
►St. Quentin Canal |
.29
Sep-2 Oct 18 |
|
►Epehy |
3-5
Oct 18 |
|
►Cambrai, 1918 |
.8-9
Oct 18 |
|
►Valenciennes |
.1-2
Nov 18 |
|
►Sambre |
.4
Nov 18 |
|
►Pursuit to Mons |
.28 Sep-11Nov |
Second World War
War Against Japan
South-East Asia
Italian Campaign
Battle of Sicily
Southern
Italy
The Sangro and Moro
Battles of the FSSF
|
►Anzio |
22
Jan-22 May 44 |
|
►Rome |
.22
May-4 Jun 44 |
|
►Advance
|
.22
May-22 Jun 44 |
|
to the Tiber |
. |
|
►Monte Arrestino |
25
May 44 |
|
►Rocca Massima |
27
May 44 |
|
►Colle Ferro |
2
Jun 44 |
Cassino
|
►Cassino II |
11-18
May 44 |
|
►Gustav Line |
11-18
May 44 |
|
►Sant' Angelo in
|
13
May 44 |
|
Teodice |
. |
|
►Pignataro |
14-15 May 44 |
Liri Valley
|
►Hitler Line |
18-24 May 44 |
|
►Melfa Crossing |
24-25 May 44 |
|
►Torrice Crossroads |
30
May 44 |
Advance to Florence
Gothic Line
|
►Gothic Line |
25 Aug-22 Sep 44 |
|
►Monteciccardo |
27-28 Aug 44 |
|
►Point 204 (Pozzo Alto) |
31 Aug 44 |
|
►Borgo Santa Maria |
1 Sep 44 |
|
►Tomba di Pesaro |
1-2 Sep 44 |
Winter Lines
|
►Rimini Line |
14-21 Sep 44 |
|
►San Martino- |
14-18 Sep 44 |
|
San Lorenzo |
. |
|
►San Fortunato |
18-20 Sep 44 |
|
►Sant' Angelo |
11-15 Sep 44 |
|
in Salute |
. |
|
►Bulgaria Village |
13-14 Sep 44 |
|
►Pisciatello |
16-19 Sep 44 |
|
►Savio Bridgehead |
20-23
Sep 44 |
|
►Monte La Pieve |
13-19
Oct 44 |
|
►Monte Spaduro |
19-24 Oct 44 |
|
►Monte San Bartolo |
11-14
Nov 44 |
|
►Lamone Crossing |
2-13
Dec 44 |
|
►Capture of Ravenna |
3-4
Dec 44 |
|
►Naviglio Canal |
12-15 Dec 44 |
|
►Fosso Vecchio |
16-18 Dec 44 |
|
►Fosso Munio |
19-21 Dec 44 |
|
►Conventello- |
2-6 Jan 45 |
|
Comacchio |
. |
Northwest Europe
Battle of Normandy
|
►Quesnay Road |
10-11 Aug 44 |
|
►St. Lambert-sur- |
19-22 Aug 44 |
Southern France
Channel Ports
The Scheldt
Nijmegen Salient
Rhineland
|
►The
Reichswald |
8-13 Feb 45 |
|
►Waal
Flats |
8-15 Feb 45 |
|
►Moyland
Wood |
14-21 Feb 45 |
|
►Goch-Calcar
Road |
19-21 Feb 45 |
|
►The
Hochwald |
26
Feb- |
| . |
4
Mar 45 |
|
►Veen |
6-10 Mar 45 |
|
►Xanten |
8-9
Mar 45 |
Final Phase
|
►The
Rhine |
23
Mar-1 Apr 45 |
|
►Emmerich-Hoch
|
28
Mar-1 Apr 45 |
|
Elten |
. |
Korean War
|
|
Domestic Missions |
|
►FLQ
Crisis |
|
International
Missions |
|
►ICCS
Vietnam 1973
►MFO
Sinai 1986- |
|
Peacekeeping |
|
►UNTEA |
W. N. Guinea 1963-1964 |
|
►ONUCA |
C. America
1989-1992 |
|
►UNTAC |
Cambodia
1992-1993 |
|
►UNMOP |
Prevlaka
1996-2001 |
|
|
Exercises |
|
Amiens
|
Amiens was a
Battle Honour granted to Canadian units participating in the Battles
of Amiens in August 1918, during the battles on the Western
Front during the First World War. The battle was the first act in
what became known as the Last Hundred Days, and the opening day of
the battle was to be the "Black Day of the German Army."
Background
Field Marshal Haig,
commander of the British Expeditionary Force in France, had selected
the ground in front of Amiens for an Allied offensive as early as
May 1918; this sector was vital to securing the railway line running
from Paris to points north. Initially planned for a June start,
German attacks on the Marne river postponed this offensive until
early August.
German defences were
weak - they themselves had only overrun the area in March, and they
had not had time to construct concrete fortifications or deep trench
systems and belts of wire emplacements. Both time and surprise were
seen as vital factors to success. Marshal Foch, the Allied supreme
commander, and Field Marshal Haig, agreed that the Canadians and
Australians - "colonial storm troops" - would bear the main burden
of the upcoming attack, and that secrecy would be a prime
consideration in the planning. General Currie, the Canadian corps
commander, was not advised of his role until 16 July, giving him
only three weeks to prepare, and battalion, brigade and even his
division commanders were kept out in the dark until 29 July, just a
day before the corps was tasked to move south.
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|
Advance to Victory 1918 |
|
|
Amiens –
Arras, 1918 – Scarpe, 1918 – Drocourt-Quéant –
Hindenburg Line – Epéhy – Canal du Nord – St. Quentin
Canal – Beaurevoir – Cambrai, 1918 – Ypres, 1918 –
Valenciennes – Sambre – Pursuit to Mons – Courtrai
|
|
Planning
Not wishing to signal an
imminent attack, as the arrival on the front of the Canadians adjacent
to the Australians surely would, elaborate deception measures were taken
in order to give the impression to the Germans that the lines were being
thinned instead of being prepared for an attack. Canadian officers on
reconnaissance missions dressed in Australian uniform, and at Kemmel
Hill in Flanders, the 27th Battalion and 4th Canadian Mounted Rifles
staged a trench raid, leaving equipment and insignia in their wake to be
identified as Canadian. Canadian Corps wireless messages were sent to
establish a presence in the area, as well as two casualty clearing
stations. In the meantime, 100,000 Canadians, with 20,000 horses and
1,000 guns moved as discretely as possible between 30 July and 3 August
to a concentration area south of Amiens, with three of the four
divisions crowding into a wood just two by three kilometres in area.
8th August, 1918 A
painting by Australian official war artist Will Longstaff,
in oil on linen, painted in 1918-1919 on a 107cm x 274cm
canvas. This painting depicts shows German prisoners heading
back towards Amiens, visible in the distance, off to the
west from the artist's viewpoint, while artillery advances
after the Allied armies.
- Logistics
Not permitted to
establish their own supply dumps, the Canadian Corps struggled to move
seven thousand tons of shells for their artillery and 10 million rounds
of small-arms ammunition from distant British dumps before the start of
the offensive; some units had to scavenge for grenades and rifle bullets
from French units before Zero Hour despite Herculean efforts by Canadian
service corps units.1
Plan
The main attack, by five
Australian and four Canadian divisions, scheduled for 8 August, was to
go in without a preliminary bombardment. French attacks also planned for
that day were being conducted with a preparatory barrage. For the
Canadians and Australians, a rolling barrage would start at Zero Hour,
with tanks crashing through the enemy's front lines, as had been done at
Cambrai. Three objective phase lines were marked out; the German front
line (Green Line), the reserve and gun lines (Red Line), and a final line far to the enemy's
rear (Blue Dotted Line). The artillery planned elaborate counter-bombardment measures to
prevent German artillery from hindering the attack.
There would be no
preliminary bombardment, for two reasons. One was that the 106 fuse,
introduced in early 1917, was now available in substantial
quantities. The 106 fuse ensured consistent wire-cutting by causing
shells to explode on contact; previously, they would detonate either
high above the wire or far below the ground, which required a deluge
of shells for a prolonged period to make sure that gaps were cut for
the infantry at zero hour. The second reason to dispense with
preliminary bombardment was the presence of tanks - 324 Mark V heavy
tanks and 96 Medium Mark A "Whippets." With a road speed of 4.6
miles per hour, the Mark V weighed more than thirty tons and carried
a crew of seven who manned six machine-guns (the so-called "female"
tank) or four machine-guns and two light guns (the "male" version).
The Whippet's top speed was 8.3 miles per hour, but it was equipped
only with light machine guns. The Mark V's would lead the attack,
crushing barbed wire entanglements and smashing strongpoints, while
the Whippets would go into action with the Cavalry Corps during the
exploitation phase of the battle.2
Each of the 1st, 2nd and
3rd Canadian Divisions were scheduled to attack with a single brigade
up, a second brigade to move into the line as the front widened, and a
third brigade in reserve. The 4th Division remained in Corps reserve
with the cavalry, earmarked to leapfrog ahead once the advance passed
the Luce river upon the 1st and 3rd Divisions reaching the second phase
line. The three assault divisions had a battalion of 42 Mark V tanks
assigned to each, with a fourth battalion of 36 tanks assigned to the
4th Division. Two battalions of lighter Whippet tanks were to accompany
the cavalry.
And, more than any
other battle yet fought, Amiens involved air power. Each of the
corps had a squadron of two-seaters allocated to it for
reconnaissance patrols and artillery observations duties. These
corps squadrons were protected by eight single-seater fighter
squadrons, some of which would engage in close ground support when
circumstances permitted.3
Mark V tanks pass by soldiers of the
3rd Canadian Division at Hourges, while German prisoners are
escorted back by wounded assault troops on August 8th, 1918.
Library and Archives Canada photo.
The planning has been
described as "an astonishing departure from the methods of the Somme
and Passchendaele" for its reliance on surprise. Not only was there
no preparatory bombardment, but "in fact, the heavy artillery (also)
fired without registration)."4 Hopes were instead pinned
on the tanks. In all, the 4th Army under Rawlinson amounted to 420
tanks, 9 infantry divisions, 3 cavalry divisions, and 2,070 guns.
Facing them were ten under-strength German divisions in the line,
with four in reserve on a 14-mile front.5
After midnight on 8
August, two Canadian-flown Handley-Page bombers began low-level
flights over the front, using their engine noise to mask the sound
of tanks moving up to the front. Zero Hour was set for 04:20 a.m.
At 4:20 a.m., the
world seemed to explode. The barrage overhead lit up the dark
sky. "You could've read a newspaper whichever way you looked -
reflection from the gun fire," recalled Private William Curtis,
who professed amazement at the amount of artillery assembled for
this operation. "We had to step over the wheels of the guns,
between the hubs, to get forward."6
The Canadian official
history described the opening of the battle in these words:
The night of
7-8 August was fine with no moon. There was a tense air of
expectancy as the troops earmarked for the assault moved up
under cover of darkness to their assembly area. On the Canadian
Corps right the 3rd Division relieved an Australian brigade at
2:00 a.m.; it was four o'clock, only twenty minutes from zero,
before the last of General Lipsett's attacking units were in
position. By that time a thick ground mist had begun to
form in the valleys, blotting out visibility even after the sun
had risen. The supporting tanks began to move for ward at twelve
minutes before zero from positions one thousand yards behind the
front. To drown the hum of their engines - running as quietly as
possible in second gear - the artillery maintained a normal
harassing fire, and a large bombing plane droned noisily up and
down above the forward trenches. Exactly at 4:20 the barrage
opened with the thunder of more than nine hundred guns and
immediately the assaulting infantry pressed forward. In the Luce
valley, where the mist was especially heavy, the Canadians were
hard put to it to keep pace and direction. The enemy's barrage
came down within a few minutes of zero, but thanks to the
excellent counter-battery work of the British guns the German
fire was generally erratic and not particularly damaging.
The 1st and
2nd Divisions were each attacking on a single brigade frontage,
using a fresh brigade at successive lines of advance, but
because the River Luce split the 3rd Division's front General
Lipsett employed two brigades in the initial phase. He crowded
three battalions of the 9th Brigade and a company of the 5th
Tank Battalion into the narrow bridgehead south of the river
about Hourges, while on his left flank the 8th Brigade assaulted
with a single battalion up.
The leading
battalions advanced well deployed so as to reduce the number of
casualties from the enemy's fire. In general each was disposed
in five waves at intervals of one hundred yards. Skirmishers in
the foremost wave of two lines, thirty yards apart, helped guide
the tanks. The next three waves consisted of well dispersed
section columns in single file; and carrying parties brought up
the rear. The infantry found themselves less heavily burdened
than in former operations, for to meet the requirements of a
prolonged yet rapid advance General Rawlinson's staff had
devised a modified "fighting order"* which eliminated some
unnecessary weight and distributed the rest more evenly.7
The Attack
The three Canadian
divisions faced little opposition to the first assaults, as they
went in through heavy mist. While the tanks performed less than
admirably, many becoming lost, bogged (notably at the Luce river
crossings in the south) or else broke down with mechanical problems,
the infantry were able to overcome scattered resistance or simply
bypass them to secure the Green Line by 08:20 a.m. and push fresh
brigades onto the next objective.
As the fog began
lifting in mid-morning, resistance began to stiffen, especially from
enemy machine-gun crews. Four Canadians were awarded the Victoria
Cross for actions during the Battle of Amiens, all for engaging
enemy machine guns.
| Private John Croak
(posthumous, died 8 August 1918) |
13th Battalion |
1st Division |
| Corporal Herman Good |
13th Battalion |
1st Division |
| Corporal Harry Miner
(posthumous, died 8 August 1918) |
58th Battalion |
3rd Division |
| Lieutenant James Tait
(posthumous, died 11 August 1918) |
78th Battalion |
4th Division |
Third Division Assault - 8 August
The 9th Brigade began
the attack by over-running German defenders in their positions, many
taken completely by surprise and not firing a single shot in
defence. The 43rd Battalion on the right of the brigade took a
feature known variously as "Rifle Wood" or "Dodo Wood', and after
the 116th Battalion cleared German resistance north of the main
road, tanks worked through the wreckage of the feature to clean out
German M.G. posts still holding out. The Wood was reported cleared
at 7:30 a.m., and more than 250 prisoners and approximately 40
machine guns were reported captured. The tanks had been impeded by
lack of reconnaissance, which had not permitted to maintain secrecy,
the heavy mist, and marshy ground. Many arrived late and found it
hard to navigate and co-ordinate with the infantry. Nonetheless, the
9th Brigade was on the Green Line by 7:30 a.m., with the 116th
Battalion having captured Hamon Wood and the 58th Battalion having
taken Demuin and then pressed on into Courcelles.
Canadian tank passes a field hospital
at Hangard. Library and Archives Canada photo.
On the opposite side
of the Luce River, the 1st Canadian Mounted Rifles opened the 8th
Brigade's attack by advancing far ahead of their tank support, and
captured Cemetery Copse alone. The tanks linked up before the
battalion put in an attack on Hangard, and they advanced from there
to forge a bridgehead over the river at Demuin. The 2nd Canadian
Mounted Rifles passed through them.
The 7th Brigade, in
reserve, followed on in the rear, passing over the Luce over
duckboard bridges past streams of German prisoners, and formed up at
the far edge of Hamon Wood in jumping-off trenches, attempting to
keep to the tight schedule of the operation. They were on time for
the second phase, and at 8:20 a.m., the 49th Battalion stepped off
on the left, with the 42nd Battalion in the centre and The Royal
Canadian Regiment on the right, straddling the road to Roye.
Progress was
rapid. The 49th Battalion, meeting little opposition in its
advance across the unfenced fields of standing grain, reached
the Red Line at ten o'clock. In the centre the 42nd, having
overrun two German batteries that were engaging it with
point-blank fire, crossed over the plateau of Hill 102 and
arrived on its objective with four supporting tanks at 10:20.
The last part of the advance, wrote the regimental historian,
"was more or less of a route march enlivened by the sight of the
panic-stricken enemy running in every direction". Meanwhile the
R.C.R., proceeding with "something approaching the clock like
precision of a well rehearsed manoeuvre", was already on its
objective, having cleared two woods with the assistance of the
few surviving tanks. On the Canadian Corps' right the
Franco-Canadian liaison detachment, while maintaining contact
between the 3rd Canadian and 42nd French Divisions' flanks, had
contrived to clear a small copse south of Rifle Wood, taking
thirty prisoners and a dozen machine-guns. On reaching the Green
Line the original Canadian component rejoined its parent unit
(the 43rd Battalion) and was replaced by a platoon from the
R.C.R. The 3rd Division had completed its assignment, though of
its original 42 tanks only eight remained. The final infantry
advance to the Blue Dotted Line on this part of the front was to
be made by the 4th Canadian Division.
In German eyes
the capture of the southern part of the Red Line had settled the
fate of the 225th Division, except at Mézières, outside the
Canadian right boundary. The official German report spoke of the
loss of the entire artillery position and the virtual
destruction of all the front line and support battalions. The
division's reserve battalions, rushed in piecemeal, "had either
been thrown back or had not got into action at all". Towards
10:00 a.m., the faltering 225th Division was told that the 376th
Regiment of the 109th Division was being placed under its
command and sent to Cayeux. It would also receive the Regiment
Bellmann, composed of the three resting battalions of the 192nd
Division, being assembled in the wooded area south-east of
Beaucourt. In addition the 1st Reserve Division from the
neighbouring corps of the Eighteenth Army was moving forward
astride the Roye-Amiens road with orders to stop any Canadian
attacks in the Beaucort-Fresnoy area.8
When the 3rd Division
reached the Red Line just before 10:00 a.m., the Canadian Cavalry
Brigade, leading the 3rd Cavalry Division, passed through with 32
Whippet tanks, hoping to exploit the breakthrough. The tanks,
intended to deal with enemy machine-guns, proved to slow to support
the galloping cavalry.
The Royal
Canadian Dragoons and Strathconas charged forward with true
cavalry elan. Along the Corps' right boundary they advanced
nearly four kilometres and captured several hundred prisoners,
but enemy machine-gun fire killed hundreds of their horses, and
the cavalry thrust was soon blunted. They had been committed too
early - before a real gap in the enemy defences had been torn
open.9
German prisoners are escorted to the
rear near Amiens by Canadian cavalrymen. Library and Archives Canada
photo.
The 4th Division passed
through the 3rd Division and the Cavalry Brigade during the noon
hour but were halted by the same machine gun fire that had stopped
the horses of the cavalry units. In the meantime, the 1st Division
was pressing on in its own sector against light resistance, and they
reached the ambitious objective of the Blue Dotted Line, 14,000
yards ahead of their starting positions, ahead of schedule.10
First Division Assault - 8 August
In the centre of the
Canadian Corps, the 1st Division was charged with fighting through
the wooded area north of the Luce River and advancing beyond Hangard
Wood, through a narrowing frontage towards the Outer Amiens Defence
Line past the town of Caix. The final phase of the operation would
require the division to negotiate the steep, tree-lined Luce valley.
The initial attacks
were initiated by the 3rd Brigade; from north to south the 14th
Battalion, 13th Battalion and 16th Battalion attacked through the
dense mist, and here, too, tank-infantry co-operation was extremely
poor, though the attackers were well-hidden from German view and
enemy fire was much reduced in effectiveness.
Disregarding threats from
flank and rear, the Canadians pushed quickly ahead. Small
detachments which became involved in local actions left the
mopping up for succeeding waves. So rapid was the advance that
the 3rd and 5th Battalions, which theoretically were not
involved in this stage of the attack, found themselves committed
in sharp encounters with parties of Germans that had been
by-passed. Twenty-five hundred yards from the start line
fighting developed all along the trenches which formed the
enemy's main line of resistance in front of his artillery
positions. It was here that Private J.B. Croak earned the first
of two Victoria Crosses won that day by members of the 13th
Battalion. Having attacked and captured a machine-gun nest
single-handed, Croak, though badly wounded, later charged
another German strongpoint and with the aid of other members of
his platoon silenced three machine-guns, bayoneting or capturing
their crews. Wounded a second time, he died just after the last
resistance was overcome. Equally courageous was Corporal H.J.
Good, of the 13th, in disposing of three machine-guns and their
crews, and then with the assistance of three comrades,
assaulting and capturing German battery of 5.9-inch guns and
their entire crews.
Beyond
Aubercourt, where the division entered the Luce Valley, the
speed of the advance quickened, for with the lifting of the
fog the 3rd Brigade was able to get forward its supporting
tanks (of the 4th Tank Battalion) to deal with troublesome
enemy machine-guns. In a quarry on the river bank east of
the village a party from the 16th Battalion aided by a tank
flushed the regimental commander and headquarters staff of
the 157th Regiment (117th Division). The battalion crossed
the Luce, and abreast of the 13th and 14th reached the Green
Line by 8:15 a.m. Almost immediately the attacking
battalions of Brig.-Gen. Griesbach's 1st Brigade leapfrogged
the 3rd Brigade units and were on their way to the Red Line.
In this second stage the advance of all three battalions
followed the same pattern. On several occasions they were
held up by the fire of German machine-guns advantageously
sited on the high ridges or concealed in the small woods
that interspersed the grain fields. Before their tanks
caught up, the infantry had only the support of their own
Lewis guns in dealing with these. Canadian casualties were
light, most of the losses coming from German artillery fire.
By eleven o'clock the 2nd Battalion, south of the Luce, had
reached its objective and established outposts on the high
ground east of Cayeux. In the centre the 4th Battalion,
advancing astride the river bed, cleared Cayeux without
meeting much opposition; while on the Brigade left the 3rd
Battalion, having run into trouble in the deep ravines that
entered the Luce valley from the north, made good its
portion of the Red Line by 11:30.11
The 2nd Brigade then passed through, advancing on a narrower front
with just two battalions forward, each with two companies forward.
The 7th Battalion had been delayed by the absence of bridges over
the Luce River and a stream of cavalry traffic barring the way, and
had to come up through the 1st Brigade's right wing an hour and a
half behind schedule. While organized enemy resistance had
collapsed, isolated machine gunners and snipers still occupied the
assault troops as the bulk of the Germans retreated. By 1:30 p.m.,
the 10th Battalion, on the north side of the river, managed to
attack through Caix and seized its final objectives in the Amiens
Outer Line, being joined by the 7th Battalion at 2:30 p.m.12
The first unit the
Canadian Corps to reach its objective was in fact the 10th
Battalion. The Amiens Outer Line, which had been built by the
British earlier in the war, and then captured by the Germans earlier
in 1918, in fact represented the Blue Dotted Line. German defenders
during this new battle at Amiens had put up a stronger fight from
sunken roads and the remaining trenches, but the part of the 1st
Canadian Division was now over, its objectives secure.13
German losses had been very
great. Thanks to the good work done by the heavy artillery
supporting the Canadian attack, many troops of the 117th
Division had been pinned in their shelters until overrun.
Resting battalions, thrown in piecemeal, had suffered heavily in
attempting to stand and even more severely in the subsequent
retreat. Examination after the battle showed that the
neutralization of German bakeries had been very effective. The
Canadians captured many batteries that had not fired a shot,
although there were some cases of German gun crews being
credited with firing until the last round before they
deliberately destroyed their pieces. According to official
German sources the 117th Division was virtually wiped out. In an
effort to bolster resistance opposite the centre of the Canadian
front, the German Second Army was thrusting in the 119th
Division, borrowed, like the 1st Reserve Division, from the
neighbouring Eighteenth Army. Farther north the exhausted 109th
Division, which... had been relieved by the 117th only a short
time before, on the morning of the 8th, was rushed forward from
corps reserve to Harbonnières, and thrown into action opposite
the Canadian left. It was evening before the 119th Division
arrived, but by 8:40 p.m. it could report having plugged the
last gap in the Second Army's front, in the area Caix-Beaucourt.14
Second Division
Assault - 8 August
The 2nd Canadian Division had the
most favourable terrain with which to contend of any of the Canadian
Corps' formations, being largely rolling farmland, some of it
already having been harvested, which left little cover for the
enemy. Occasional villages and wooded gullies provided some benefit
to German defenders, particularly Marcelcave which lay just out of
range of most of the divisional artillery; a 45-minute preparation
by heavy guns was ordered. The division attacked with the three
brigades (4th, 5th, 6th) in succession.
In the first phase, the 18th
Battalion attacked on the right of the 19th Battalion, and the heavy
mist prevented the tank support of the 14th Tank Battalion from
co-ordinating with the infantry, as was the case all along the
front. The tanks were nonetheless underway by thirty minutes past
Zero Hour and doing yeoman's work in neutralizing enemy M.G. posts.
A company of the 18th Battalion assisted the 14th Battalion of the
1st Division in seizing Morgemont Wood, south of the divisional
boundary, and the battalion went on to overrun a battery of 5.9-inch
howitzers, and a second battery of 7.7cm guns by the time it reached
the Green Line.
To the north, the 19th Battalion
paralleled its advanced with two companies of the 21st Australian
Battalion, who was using Lewis Guns to effectively shoot the
Canadians forward. The attack into Marcelcave was greatly assisted
by the heavy bombardment, but fighting in the town was more
difficult, and the 21st Battalion had to assist in clearing out
stubborn defenders. At 8:20 a.m., the second phase of the operation
began with the 5th Brigade passing through to assault Wiencourt and
Guillaucourt. The 24th Battalion attacked on the left and the 26th
on the right.
The main opposition...still came
from scattered machine-gun posts, whose positions could not be
sufficiently defined to be engaged by the artillery. It was
difficult for the tanks to deal with these, as the mist had
risen and the fighting had advanced out of range of protective
smoke-screens. There were costly tank casualties from German
batteries firing over open sights; and those that took evasive
action by dodging about the country soon found themselves short
of petrol. It took longer to clear Pieuret Wood and Snipe Copse,
east and south-east of Marcelcave, than it did to secure
Wiencourt, the first of the two villages in the 5th Brigade's
path. A mile to the east fairly heavy fighting developed in and
around Guillaucourt. The 18-pounders of the 5th Brigade Canadian
Field Artillery, which had moved forward to Marcelcave, gave
useful support, being supplemented by five German field- pieces
captured in Pieuret Wood. It was about 2:15 p.m. when the 5th
Brigade reached its Red Line objective. By half-past two the
three batteries of the 5th Brigade C.F.A. had moved up to
positions just west of Guillaucourt to support the final advance
by the 6th Infantry Brigade. (Before the day ended every battery
in the artillery brigade had taken up new positions at least
five times in support of the rapidly advancing infantry.)82
British units of the 1st Cavalry Division had taken the lead,
and following them the 29th (on the left) and 31st Battalions
crossed the Red Line at 4:30 p.m. Apart from some hostile
shelling, opposition was negligible. The Canadian infantry
passed through a British cavalry regiment a thousand yards short
of
the outer Amiens defences and, by early evening, were firmly
established on the Blue Dotted Line. North of the railway,
however, where the 15th Australian Brigade had not reached its
objective, there remained a small pocket of resistance opposing
the Canadian left. That night a patrol of the 29th Battalion
cleared up the trouble, capturing four
machine-guns, so that contact with the Australians was restored
next morning. For the Germans opposite this part of the Canadian
Corps front operations of 8 August had been as costly as to
their neighbours farther south. The 41st Division, facing the
2nd Canadian and 2nd Australian Divisions astride the railway,
was officially reported as having sacrificed all its front and
support battalions, "as well as the entire artillery down to
trifling remnants" (in fact only three guns). Reserve units had
been reduced to seven infantry and three machine-gun companies.15
Cavalry and 4th Division
Operations on 8 August
After the 3rd Division reached the
Red Line in the early afternoon of 8 August, men and horses of the
Cavalry Corps began to form up for attack. The Canadian Cavalry
Brigade led the 3rd Cavalry Division into action behind the 1st and
3rd Canadian Divisions while the 1st Cavalry Division followed
behind the 2nd Australian and 2nd Canadian Divisions. With the
Canadian Cavalry Brigade was two companies of Whippet tanks, or 32
machines in total. They crossed to the south bank of the Luce River
at Ignaucourt, reaching the Roye road just after 10:30 a.m., and
made contact with a force of Canadian armoured cars.
Lord Strathcona's Horse then
advanced astride the Roye road with the Royal Canadian Dragoons
on their left. In the Canadian path lay the villages of
Beaucourt-en-Santerre and Le Quesnel, roughly one-third and
two-thirds of the distance to the Blue Dotted Line; the 7th
Cavalry Brigade, moving up the valley of the Luce, would come in
turn to Cayeux and Caix. Moving across the inter-army boundary,
the Strathcona advanced guard squadron encircled
Fresnoy-en-Chaussée, and captured 125 prisoners there. Shortly
afterwards, however, the enemy reoccupied the village. Beaucourt,
which the Germans were already evacuating, presented no problem
and yielded 300 prisoners; but in the wood to the east a stand
by the Regiment Bellman was aided by fire from south of the Roye
road, where the French had not yet secured Fresnoy. As a result
Beaucourt Wood remained for the time in German hands. A mile to
the north, British cavalry were more fortunate in capturing
Cayeux Wood after a short, sharp fight.16
Two hours after the cavalry, the 4th
Canadian Division began passing through the 3rd Division at 12:40
p.m. The 11th Brigade directed its focus on Le Quesnel, with the
12th Brigade alongside to the left. A mile east of the Red Line, the
lead battalions met up with mounted units, near Beaucourt.
Each of the division's supporting
tanks of the 1st Tank Battalion-the new Mark V Star, capable of
transporting a score of men in addition to the crew-carried an
infantry officer, a scout, and three machine-gun detachments
(two Lewis, of three men each, and one Vickers, of five
men)-thirteen men in all, besides the tank crew. The plan was
for the tanks to make straight for the Blue Dotted Line, where
they would drop their passengers. Half would then remain forward
while the others drove back to assist the main body of the
infantry.
But this scheme to transport
foot-soldiers in tanks did not work out well. Jolted about in
their cramped quarters, the men suffered severely from the
unaccustomed heat and fumes from the engines; many became sick,
and a number fainted. More than half of the infantry detachments
were obliged to seek fresh air and follow on foot. But there was
worse to be faced than a lack of fresh air. A single German
battery hidden a thousand yards south of Beaucourt Wood knocked
out ten tanks. Eleven machines reached the objective; but
because of unexpectedly strong German fire coming from north and
east of Le Quesnel, seven of these picked up their infantry
again and withdrew with them some 1500 yards.17
North of the Luce
River, British cavalry reached the Blue Dotted Line by 1:00 p.m.,
making good use of the covered valleys, and the south bank of the
river was mostly secure by 2:30 p.m. The left wing of the 4th
Division's tanks and infantry arrived at 3:30 p.m. In the south, the
French 31st Corps was assisted forward by the efforts of a platoon
of The Royal Canadian Regiment and elements of the Independent
Force, and Mézières was occupied by the French. But the right wing
of the 4th Division was jeopardized when the Germans reoccupied
Fresnoy, and defended Le Quesnel in depth to the west, south and
east to more than a mile, blocking the way of the 11th Brigade with
machine guns and endangering the flank of the 12th Brigade. The 54th
Battalion's tank support - three vehicles - was knocked out, and an
effort personally led by the battalion commander to clear positions
in a wood was only partially successful. The 102nd Battalion, aided
by this effort, continued the assault on the wood and cleared it by
4:30 p.m. while the 75th Battalion passed through the 54th. Machine
guns continued to bar the way into Le Quesnel and Fresnoy, and the
brigade was forced to dig in a mile north-west for the night,
leaving the Corps only untaken objectives in enemy hands.
The 12th Brigade faced
lighter opposition and made better progress, as cavalry initially
swept over the ground they were to traverse. Despite initial heavy
M.G. fire from north of Beaucourt Wood, tanks and artillery got them
forward, and it was here that Lieutenant Tait of the 78th Battalion
knocked out an enemy machine gun post single-handed. the 72nd
Battalion passed through the 78th and reached the Blue Dotted Line
by 6:15 p.m. On their left, the 38th Battalion and 85th Battalion,
passing through, made their objectives by 4:30 p.m. The 11th Brigade
relieved units of the cavalry at about 5:00 p.m., and an hour later
the 7th Cavalry Brigade withdrew from positions it was holding with
the 12th Brigade. The 4th Division was secure in positions covered
by their divisional artillery, which had moved up to the Red Line
during the afternoon, and the danger of an attack on the flank was
reduced when Fresnoy fell to troops of the French 31st Corps.
Results - 8 August
On the left of the
Corps' flank, the Australians were on the majority of their
objectives by early afternoon; British failures north of the Somme
made for difficult going in the north of their sector. The 3rd
British Corps had suffered during the German offensives in March
1918, and shortages of officers and NCOs with experience were
telling, exacerbated by recent heavy fighting on August 6th and 7th.
The 3rd Corps also had to contend with extremely difficult terrain,
and by day's end had only advanced a short distance past its first
objectives, leaving the 4th Australian Division to also withdraw
from its final objectives.
More far-reaching in its
effect than the setbacks on the Fourth army's flanks was the
failure to employ the cavalry to exploit the general
success. Because of difficulties in transmitting orders* and
an apparent reluctance by Cavalry Corps Headquarters to act
without instruction from the Fourth Army a great opportunity
was lost. Fighting ahead of the
infantry in the final phases, by early afternoon of 8 August
the cavalry had (except, on the extreme right, east of Le
Quesnel) gained a footing in the Amiens Outer Defence Line
across the whole of the Canadian Corps front. But there the
advance had stopped. In the meantime, at 12:30 General
Rawlinson's Major General, General Staff had sent
instructions to the G.O.C. Cavalry Corps that the cavalry
should not halt at the Blue Dotted Line, but push on
eastward towards the general line Chaulnés-Roye. But it was
4:15 p.m. before such orders, relayed by Cavalry Corps
Headquarters, reached the frequently moving headquarters of
the 1st Cavalry Division. Attempts in the late afternoon to
push patrols towards Chaulnes failed, for the Germans had
dug in strongly along the line Rosières-Vrély, some two
thousand yards east of the Blue Dotted Line. The 3rd Cavalry
Division, as we have seen, had been checked in front of Le
Quesnel. The 7th Cavalry Brigade on the divisional left,
however, reached the Dotted Blue Line before three o'clock;
but an attempt by the 2nd Cavalry Division to pass through
and push on eastward failed. At 5:20 p.m. General Kavanagh
ordered his 3rd Division to hold on to the line it had
reached until the infantry came up.
Although
the day's operations by the Fourth Army and the French
First Army had attained somewhat less than complete
success, the enemy had suffered its greatest defeat
since the beginning of the war. From north of the Somme
to south of Moreuil the German line had been thrown back
as much as eight miles in the Canadian sector and up to
seven on the Australian front. On the flanks the French
had advanced a maximum of five miles, and the British
two. The cost of all these gains had been remarkably
light. The Fourth Army's casualties were approximately
8800, exclusive of tank and air losses. Canadian
casualties totalled 3868-1036 killed, 2803 wounded, and
29 taken prisoner.
The enemy admitted that his forward divisions between
the Avre and the Somme had been "nearly completely
annihilated", while his troops north of the Somme had
"suffered severely". Official German figures gave the
Second Army's casualties as "650 to 700 officers and
26,000 to 27,000 other ranks.... More than two-thirds of
the total loss had surrendered as prisoners." Allied
forces had destroyed or seized more than 400 guns, many
trench mortars and "a huge number of machine-guns". The
Canadian Corps was credited with capturing 5033
prisoners and 161 guns.18
Another historian summed it up
succinctly:
In just over fourteen hours
the Canadian Corps had thrust forward by twelve kilometres, and
the Australians by nearly as much. In the process nearly two
German divisions had been obliterated. The Canadians alone took
over 5000 prisoners-of-war in that brief time. General
Ludendorf(f) later called this the "black day of the German Army
in the history of this war." And while the German Army was still
far from being defeated in the field, the morale of its high
command had suffered an irreparable blow; they were now
convinced that they would lose the war!19
Armoured car of the Independent Force
during the Battle of Amiens. Library and Archives Canada photo.
- The question of to whom the
credit should go to has been debated by historians:
The Canadian Corps possessed
infantry of a very high calibre, and although there remained
problems in integrating new methods into the existing system,
Canadian infantrymen stood up to their reputation at Amiens,
demonstrating a great deal of bravery and skill, as the advance
and the four Victoria Crosses awarded to their ranks on 8 August
attest. The large number of prisoners and guns captured for the
day also attested to the infantry's skill, as tanks, cavalry and
artillery units were not tasked or equipped for the capture and
holding of prisoners. The advance, in all phases, depended on an
infantry willing to push on often under very difficult
circumstances. The troops were certainly given extra drive by
their great advance, as several first hand accounts spoke of the
elation felt by all at such an advance after so many years of
static warfare. The valour of the infantry was especially
evident in the advance from the red to blue dotted lines, where
they played a vital role in securing the latter objective, when
planners believed that they would be unable to be of much use in
capturing such a distant and well defended objective on the
first day. Doyle
put it best when he noted that: "The Canadians were on top of
their form that day, and their magnificent condition gave
promise of the splendid work which they were to do from that
hour until almost the last day of the war."
The Mk V tanks working with
the Canadian Corps also performed generally quite well, despite
the aforementioned problems. The Germans captured in the battle
were much impressed by the new machine and realised that it
constituted a great improvement over past models. The machines
played an important role, particularly in the advance from red
to blue dotted lines where they were useful in attacking enemy
MG nests. There are problems with suggesting that the machines
played the decisive role in the victory of 8 August, as some
authors have done. While this holds some truth as far as the
attack on the Australian front, as demonstrated here they were
far from the decisive element on the Canadian.
It should not seem surprising
that some Canadian historians, such as Dancocks and Nicholson,
have seen Amiens as a whole as a victory of artillery and
infantry, while viewing tanks as minimal factors in the success.
These authors, examining the Canadian attack only and depending
almost exclusively on Canadian sources, have drawn the right
conclusion as far as the Canadian attack was concerned. The
problem, of course, arises when the whole battle is
characterized in this manner. But the problem with Dancocks'
conclusion that the conception of Amiens as a great tank victory
is a myth, and Nicholson's similar comments, are that tanks
played a very effective role in the Australian attack.
Conversely, Tim Travers has suggested that the tanks played a
great role in the victory at Amiens, and uses
Australian accounts to prove his point. Both assessments are
correct, depending on which sector is examined in the most
detail. The battle was thus neither a complete break from
previous attacks, nor the logical conclusion of earlier
operations, but rather a somewhat confused mix of the two, which
reflected the somewhat haphazard "trial and error" manner in
which the BEF developed during the Great War.20
- Another Canadian success story
occurred on the right flank of the Corps where the Canadian
Independent Force operated, under the command of Raymond
Brutinel. Fighting for the first time in their entirety, this
force of machine-gun armed armoured cars, signal and cyclist
units "had the difficult task of coordinating its actions with
the attacking infantry, tanks and cavalry" as it advanced down
the Amiens-Roye road, keeping contact with the French on the
right and preventing the two formations from dividing.
- In addition to this, the
CIF acted as a reconnaissance unit, and in doing so harassed
the enemy, particularly past the blue dotted line. The
force's mobility was certainly a great factor in its
success. It penetrated some distance past the blue dotted
line and thus played a valuable role in reconnaissance.
Unlike the infantry, a post-battle report of the CIF noted
that: "The training and lessons learnt on recent open
warfare manoeuvres were of the greatest value, as all ranks
understood the role they had to play. " Among the most
successful weapons of t he force was the employment of 6"
Newton mortars mounted on armoured cars. These were
essentially an early version of a self-propelled gun and
acted as an independent unit. They engaged several enemy
batteries with a good deal of success, and provided the CIF
with responsive, indirect fire support. Even Fourth Army HQ
realized the value of this experimental weapon and
recommended a great increase in their use. Finally, the CIF
also aided the French on several occasions, especially in
outflanking strong points, as well as sending back many
useful reports from its main task of reconnaissance. That is
not to suggest that the force did not encounter problems, as
it would have been extremely odd if a new formation of such
an experimental nature did not encounter difficulties in its
first attack. There was some lack of co-ordination between
the armoured cars and problems in using these vehicles for
frontal attacks. The latter difficulty was no doubt caused
by a desire to keep the vehicles on the road, as they were
ill-equipped for off-road use. They were also relatively
vulnerable to enemy gun fire, due to their high profile,
which had to be compensated for with speed.21
- 9 August
Unaccustomed to such
success, British staff officers rushed to the front when reports
came through to General Headquarters (GHQ) of the breakthrough,
wanting to canvas the Canadian General Currie for his advice on what
to do next. The Germans were in no mood to give up, and their
reserves were rushed to the front. While the Allies continued the
advance, resistance stiffened. Four more Canadian Victoria Crosses
were awarded for actions on 9 August, as machine guns proved
troublesome to the attackers.
| Sergeant Raphael Zengel |
5th Battalion |
1st Division |
| Corporal Alexander Brereton |
8th Battalion |
1st Division |
| Corporal Frederick Coppins
|
8th Battalion |
1st Division |
| Lieutenant Jean Brillant
(posthumous, died 10 August 1918) |
22nd Battalion |
2nd Division |
The Canadians added
five more kilometres of gains on the 9th, but eight German divisions
had been thrown into the line, the enemy making good use of
railroads to reinforce their positions.
10 August
On 10 August, the 1st and 2nd
Divisions went into reserve and the 3rd and 4th Divisions were
ordered to clear the network of trenches directly in front of the
Canadian Corps. At 4:30 a.m. the 1st and 2nd CMR began their attack
on Le Quesnoy-en-Santerre and cleared it two hours later while the
1st Battalion cleared enemy trenches to the north. The 3rd Division
was relieved by the British 32nd Division who ran into heavy
resistance and made no further gains.
The 4th Division pushed the 10th and
12th Brigades two miles into German resistance, as Maucourt and
Chilly were taken, the latter by the 72nd Battalion. The 78th
Battalion passed through Chilly at noon and by 2:00 p.m. seized
Hallu. The 38th and 85th Battalions tried to advance past Maucourt
but came under heavy machine gun fire when the Australians were
unable to occupy Lihons north of the railway line. The Germans then
counter-attacked Chilly and Hallu. Lieutenant James Tait of the 78th
Battalion, who had distinguished him during the capture of Hallu,
now rallied his troops again when German troops re-entered the
village, stopping their advance, though at the cost of his life. The
44th and 46th Battalions of the 10th Brigade fought a spirited
battle at Fouquescourt, which changed hands three times in the
course of the day.22
Aftermath
The Battle of Amiens was the last
time that the Canadian Corps fought as an all-volunteer force;
reinforcements arriving at the front began to include conscripts,
the politically controversial solution to manpower problems in the
CEF.
As always during the First
World War, railways permitted the defender to reinforce his
failing front much faster than the attacker could widen and
deepen any gap that he might create. Another ten divisions would
arrive by midnight on the 11th, despite efforts by the (Royal
Air Force) to destroy the Somme bridges and thus isolate the
battlefield. Then too, the advance had reached the edge of the
1916 Somme battlefield, with mazes of old trenches and barbed
wire..
The fighting continued until
19 August, but after the 10th it involved mainly small, albeit
often sharp and bitter actions to straighten the line and to
clear some of the old trenches that the Germans had fortified
and were attempting to hold.
Amiens was a great tactical
victory. The Canadian Corps had advanced 22 kilometres on a
front of 10 thousand metres, and had captured nearly 9000
prisoners. These gains had cost nearly 12 thousand casualties,
but this time at least there had been real purpose, and very
substantial results. This battle changed the course of the war;
it brought the end in sight! And, as the London Times
wrote in August 1918, '"...it was chiefly a Canadian battle."23
- On August 14th the Corps was
ordered to move to the Arras sector as part of the First Army,
though in fact they did not move until the 16th. Amiens had been
costly for the Germans, and if conscription was a political
crisis for Canada, the Germans too had their manpower problems,
in the form of 75,000 new casualties. They had to break up
divisions to reinforce others. The German leadership finally
began to believe the war could be lost - and started negotiating
through neutral organizations.
-
- Battle Honours
The Battle Honour "Amiens"
was awarded to units for participation in these actions.
Canadian Cavalry Brigade
Notes
-
Marteinson, John. We Stand on
Guard: An Illustrated History of the Canadian Army (Ovale
Publications, Montreal, PQ, 1992) ISBN 2894290438 p.190
-
Dancocks, Daniel G. Gallant Canadians: The
Story of the 10th Canadian Infantry Battalion 1914-1919 (The
Calgary Highlanders Regimental Funds Foundation, Calgary, AB, 1990)
ISBN 0-9694616-0-7
-
Marteinson, Ibid
-
Goodspeed, D.J. The Armed Forces of Canada,
1867-1967: A Century of Achievement (Queen's Printer,
Ottawa, ON, 1967) p.58
-
Ibid
-
Dancocks, Ibid, p.172
-
Nicholson, Gerald Official History
of the Canadian Army in the First World War: Candian Expeditionary
Force, 1914-1919 (Duhamel,
Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, Ottawa, 1964)
-
Ibid
-
Marteinson, Ibid, p.192
-
Ibid, p.193
-
Nicholson, Ibid
-
Ibid
-
Dancocks, Ibid, p.176
-
Nicholson, Ibid
-
Ibid
-
Ibid
-
Ibid
-
Ibid
-
Marteinson, Ibid, p.193
-
Chappelle, Dean "The Canadian Attack at Amiens,
August 8-11 1918" Canadian Military History Volume 2,
Issue 2
-
Ibid
-
Bishop, Arthur True Canadian Battles That
Forged Our Nation: 1759-1953 (Key Porter Books Ltd.,
Toronto, ON, 2008) ISBN 978-1-55267-549-6 pp.159-160
-
Marteinson, Ibid, p.194
|
The
Royal Canadian Dragoons
Lord
Strathcona's Horse
Fort
Garry Horse