Mount Sorrel

Hill 62 was also known as Tor Top, from which a broad spur known as Observatory Ridge jutted out 1,000 yards due west. This protuberance, covered in farmland, split Armagh Wood from Sanctuary Wood. Enemy capture of Tor Top, and further advance down Observatory Ridge, would prove to be such a threat given the commanding position it would prove behind friendly lines that such a move could even compel withdrawal from the Salient. At a minimum, such a move by the Germans would draw additional British resources to the area to counter such a threat, and the Germans were well aware of this threat. British resources relocated to Ypres would obviously be unavailable for use elsewhere.²

Observatory Ridge and the corner of Armagh Wood, taken from Mount Sorrel. (click to enlarge). LAC photo

Mount Sorrel, with Armagh House in the foreground. (click to enlarge). LAC photo

Enemy

The German 27th and 26th Infantry Divisions opposed the 1st and 3rd Canadian Divisions, and were in fact preparing for an assault on Tor Top. German engineers had been reported by Canadian patrols in May to be pushing forward saps on either side of the heights. Machine guns and artillery was unable to deter their progress. The sap heads were connected by a lateral trench by the end of May, fifty yards ahead of the main front line trench. Other saps were also observed in the vicinity of Mount Sorrel and further south. Royal Flying Corps pilots reported life-size models of the Canadian positions at Tor Top behind enemy lines, which post-war histories confirmed to be practice trenches used by the German 26th Infantry Division for assault rehearsals.³

German activity across the lines also indicated an attack, included the deployment of trench mortars of large calibre, unusual activity by artillery, aircraft and observation balloons. Poor weather prevented decent Allied observation of German rear areas to confirm suspicions of an attack, and no evidence of significant troop movements lent credence to a belief that such an attack was imminent. In actual fact, no additional troops were deployed by the Germans other than artillery.⁴
 

German Attack

On the night of 1-2 June, the German guns fell silent for seven hours and no artillery hit the Canadian trenches. The reason, which the Canadians did not deduce, was that enemy work parties were in No Man's Land clearing paths through the barbed wire and did not want their own artillery interfering with their work. Canadian suspicions were averted when the guns resumed firing later.

At 06:00hrs on 2 June, General Mercer and Brigadier-General Williams, commander of the 8th Brigade, set out on a reconnaissance of Tor Top and Mount Sorrel.

They had just reached the front-line trenches of the 4th Canadian Mounted Rifles on the brigade right when the enemy's preliminary bombardment burst upon them. It was the Canadian Corps' first experience of the terrific violence that artillery preparation was to attain in the summer of 1916. "All agreed", writes Lord Beaverbrook,* "that there was no comparison between the gun-fire of April and of June, which was the heaviest endured by British troops up to that time." ⁵

The bombardment lasted four hours, ranging over Canadian positions from half a mile west of Mount Sorrel itself to the northern flank of Sanctuary Wood. The 4th CMR was the hardest hit unit, on the right flank of the 8th Brigade, while the 1st CMR and PPCLI also came under heavy fire. The 4th CMR positions in front of Armagh Wood dissolved into "a cloud of dust and dirt," in the words of a German observer, and trenches dissolved under the weight of fire. A feature known as "The Tunnel" dug on the reverse slope of Mount Sorrel was used as a casualty collection point. This gallery, dug by sappers of the 2nd Canadian Tunnelling Company, only offered temporary safety, as it too was eventually destroyed by gunfire and the survivors captured. The 4th CMR suffered 626 killed and wounded of a strength of 702 officers and men. The 76 men who came through unharmed represented an 89 percent casualty rate.

Among the casualties were Major-General Mercer, felled by a broken leg and burst ear-drums and then killed by shrapnel as he lay on the ground wounded. Brigadier-General Mercer was wounded and taken prisoner by German assault infantry. Command of the 3rd Canadian Division was assumed temporarily by Brigadier-Genearl E.S. Hoare Nairne of the Lahore Divisional Artillery, and the 8th Brigade by Lieutenant-Colonel J.C.L. Bott, commander of the 2nd CMR, then in brigade reserve. However, the transition was not made for several hours and both formations were required to conduct a defence of their positions without leadership.

Enemy fire became more intense as the morning went on. Allied artillery was unable to respond effectively, nor could the two squadrons of British aircraft flying in support. Forward observation officers spotting for the artillery were killed or wounded by German shellfire, and all telephone lines back to the batteries were eventually cut.

Just after 1:00pm the enemy exploded four mines, just short of Canadian trenches on Mount Sorrel. This was the signal for their attack and two battalions of the 121st Infantry Regiment and two more of the 125th Infantry Regiment (both of the 26th Infantry Division) attacked on the right. On the left, two battalions of the 27th Infantry Division's 120th Regiment attacked Mount Sorrel. Five more German battalions remained in support, with six additional battalions in reserve.

In bright sunlight the grey-coated figures advanced in four waves spaced about seventy-five yards apart. Afterwards Canadian survivors spoke of the assured air and the almost leisurely pace of the attackers, who appeared confident that their artillery had blotted out all resistance.

All was methodically planned. The men in the first line had fixed bayonets and carried hand grenades and wire cutters. Those who followed were equipped with entrenching tools, floor boards and sandbags. As they flowed over the flattened trenches along Mount Sorrel and Tor Top they encountered only small, isolated bands of survivors from the 1st and 4th C.M.R. who could offer little effective resistance. There were brief episodes of hand-to-hand fighting with bomb and bayonet, and where sheer numbers were not sufficient to overcome resistance, the enemy used flame projectors. The machine-guns of Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry and the 5th Battalion (1st Division) - on the left and right flanks - raked the attackers. Though they inflicted substantial casualties they could not halt the advance. It remained for the 5th Battalion Canadian Mounted Rifles holding a series of strongpoints immediately behind the 1st and 4th battalions to check enemy attacks on the east and south-east sides of Maple Copse with rapid and accurate fire. Exploiting along Observatory Ridge, the Germans captured three strongpoints and overran a section of the 5th Battery C.F.A., killing or wounding all the gunners. Of this incident a German regimental historian was to write: "It is fitting to stress that here too the Canadians did not surrender, but at their guns defended themselves with revolvers to the last man."

This German attack marked the only time that guns of the Canadian Corps fell into enemy hands. Two 18-pounders had been posted well forward on Observatory Ridge, deployed to camouflaged pits within 400 yards of the front line as "sacrifice guns" in case of an emergency. Under the command of Lieutenant C.P. Cotton, the guns fired on German attackers at point blank range and remained in action until the position was overrun, the three surviving gunners and two sappers manning the weapons with Lieutenant Cotton were all killed or wounded. Both guns were later recovered during fighting on June 12 and June 13.⁷

The Germans were able to seize the bulk of Armagh Wood before consolidating, and had forced the Allies back all along the line, with the exception of the northernmost 600 yards of Canadian front line in Sanctuary Wood. Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry had one of its two forward companies overrun during the attack, but the second company emerged from the bombardment in relatively good order and was able to direct rifle fire into the enemy's right rear when it advanced. For eighteen hours, the company of P.P.C.L.I. held out, isolated and with all its officers killed or wounded.⁸

No. 1 Company of the P.P.C.L.I. was badly hurt by the bombardment and as the German fire slackened around 1:00pm, with half the company killed or wounded, both of the Patricia's flanks were open. To the right, the CMRs had been virtually destroyed. German infantry poured into the Canadian lines. No. 2 Company, posted on the Patricia's left, fired small arms into the right rear of the Germans swarming over the positions of No. 1 Company. No. 3 and No. 4 Companies, in support and communications trenches behind the main front, had to be redeployed to meet the new threat. At 3:00pm the German advance seemed to stall all along Observatory Ridge, though three more attacks went in against No. 2 Company that afternoon. They withdrew during the night, taking all weapons, stores and casualties with them and without suffering additional losses.⁹ The reserve companies defeated German attempts to reach the support line before Canadian reinforcements could arrive. The Patricias suffered 400 casualties in all, including 150 dead, among whom was Lieutenant-Colonel H.C. Buller, the Commanding Officer.¹⁰

Under orders issued before the attack the Germans dug in 600-700 yards west of their former line, though short of "the position to be occupied in the most favourable case". Their formation histories, reporting the road to Ypres open, regret the brake upon exploitation applied in advance by the command. Fortunately for the Canadians no German officer had the initiative to exceed instructions and capitalize on success. Pressure to the north against the weakened defenders might well have rolled up the Canadian left wing, which had been so gallantly held by the Patricia company backed by The Royal Canadian Regiment at Hooge.¹¹

Canadian Counter-Attack

The new corps commander, Lieutenant-General Julian Byng, pronounced that all ground taken by the Germans during the day would be retaken that night. The counter-attack was hastily planned. Machine guns from the 10th Battalion, along with batteries of the Motor Machine Gun Brigade, were sent forward.¹² The counter-attack was ordered to begin at 2:00am. The 10th Battalion moved to relieve the 7th Battalion in place so it could mass for the counter-attack.¹³

The 1st Division placed two brigades at the disposal of the 1st Division due to their heavy losses. The 2nd Brigade would operate against Mount Sorrel and the 3rd against Tor Top. The 7th Brigade of the 3rd Division, augmented by two battalions of the 9th Brigade, deployed on the left. The counter-attack was delayed past 7:00am due to the distance to be travelled by units involved, and the attack signal - seven simultaneous green rockets - proved troublesome. Fourteen rockets were employed due to misfires, and only six managed to burst. Not bursting simultaneously, and with at least two of the involved battalions reporting having seen no rockets at all, units continued to await the start signal past the appointed Zero Hour.

When the attack did commence, it was at different times. The 7th Battalion went forward on the right, the 14th and 15th Battalions in the centre, and the 49th on the left. Rifle and machine gun fire was able to concentrate on each unit in turn, and all four suffered heavy casualties as they went across in broad daylight. Small numbers of Canadians reached the enemy line, where they proved unable to overcome the defences in hand-to-hand fighting, and many losses were suffered there. By 1:00pm three battalions had withdrawn, only the 49th on the left remaining in possession of some trenches just short of the previous German front line. In all, casualties for the 7th Brigade for the first four days of June totalled 1,050 all ranks.

The attacks had failed to regain the original Canadian line, but did close a 600 yard gap between Square Wood and Maple Copse while advancing the Canadian line forward approximately 1,000 yards from where they had been pushed back. The line was now extended north toward Hooge, and positions in depth were constructed. The Germans also fortified his own line with barbed wire, machine guns and new communication trenches.

Further Attacks

With preparations underway for the July Drive on the Somme, the commander of all British troops in France, Sir Douglas Haig was unwilling to divert more troops than necessary to the Ypres Salient even though he agreed with the local Army commander, General Plumer, that German troops on high ground just two miles from Ypres was undesirable. Therefore, only limited resources were redirected to the sector. This included artillery and just one brigade of infantry.

(Haig) suggested that the next counter-attack be carried out with few infantry but many guns. This emphasis on artillery - which followed the tactics so successfully employed by the Germans at St. Eloi - brought to the disposal of the G.O.C. R.A. Canadian Corps, Brig.-Gen. H. E. Burstall, one of the greatest arrays of guns yet employed on so narrow a front. The 218 pieces included 116 eighteen-pounders, and ranged in calibre up to two 12-inch howitzers. They represented the Canadian Corps Heavy Artillery, the 1st and 2nd Divisional Artilleries and the Lahore Divisional Artillery; the British 5th, 10th, 11th Heavy Artillery Groups, 3rd Divisional Artillery, 51st Howitzer Battery and 89th Siege Battery; and the South African 71st and 72nd Howitzer Batteries. The "heavies" of the British 5th and 14th Corps, on either flank, were to cooperate.

The main task of the artillery before the counter-attack was to hamper the enemy's consolidation by pounding his front and support lines and seeking out hostile batteries for destruction. German accounts admit the success of this programme. "The losses of the 120th Regiment and the 26th Infantry Division mounted in horrifying numbers ... What was constructed during the short nights was again destroyed in daytime". But bad flying weather made it impossible to register the heavy guns, and the counter-attack, originally set for 6 June, had to be postponed.¹⁴

The Germans struck first, this time attacking the spur at Hooge which had already changed hands several times since 1914. The most recent had been in August 1915, when the Germans had held it for eight days before being evicted. Overlooking Ypres, possession of the spur now would give domination of the Salient. The 2nd Division entered the fray when reliefs of the 6th Brigade came up from reserve and took over the 7th Brigade's sector north of Sanctuary Wood to hold the extreme left of the Canadian Corps front. On June 6, four large mines went off in the vicinty of 200 yards of trenches at about 3:05pm. Two companies of the 28th Battalion, guarding the eastern outskirts of Hooge's ruins, took heavily casualties, one company almost wiped out in the blasts. The remained of the 28th joined with the 31st Battalion in pouring rifle and machine gun fire into the following German infantry attack. But it was to no avail, as Hooge fell to the Germans. Following the policy of the Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant-General Byng opted to leave the trenches at Hooge in German hands so as to limit operations in the Ypres Salient and not hamper the preparations for the impending Somme operation.

Instead, the Canadians concentrated on seizing Mount Sorrel and Tor Top.

To guard against further trouble on his left, the British 2nd Dismounted Cavalry Brigade, organized in three battalions, came on loan to the Canadian Corps as a counter-attack force.77 After further postponement because of bad weather the Canadian operation was set for 1:30 a.m. on the 13th. It was to be carried out mainly by the 1st Division. Because of the casualties suffered by units of two of his brigades in the unsuccessful counter-attack of 3 June, General Currie regrouped his stronger battalions into two composite brigades. Brig.-Gen. Lipsett on the right had the 1st, 3rd, 7th and 8th Battalions, and for the attack on Tor Top Brig.-Gen. G.S. Tuxford (3rd Brigade) commanded the 2nd, 4th, 13th and 16th Battalions. The 58th Battalion (9th Brigade), plus a company of the 52nd, was to assault on the left. The 5th, 10th, 14th and 15th Battalions were placed in a reserve brigade under Brig.-Gen. Garnet Hughes.

Four intense bombardments of 20 to 30 minutes' duration carried out between the 9th and the 12th four times deluded the enemy into expecting an immediate attack; it was hoped that when none materialized he would suppose the artillery preparation for the real thing to be merely another feint. For ten hours on 12 June all German positions between Hill 60 and Sanctuary Wood were shelled unremittingly, particular attention being given to the flanks, from which machine-gun fire might be expected to enfilade the attackers. At 8:30 that evening, after an intense half-hour shelling which proved extremely accurate, the assaulting units moved up to their start lines - in some cases in no man's land. For forty five minutes before zero there was one more blasting by the heavy artillery, and then the attack went in behind a dense smoke screen and in heavy rain.

Brig.-Gen. Burstall had hoped that with so much artillery support our infantry would be able to advance "with slung rifles", and events proved him very nearly right. In four long lines the battalions pushed forward through the mud, each on a front of three companies-from right to left the 3rd, the 16th, the 13th and the 58th Battalions. There were occasional checks by fire from some machine-gun emplacement which had escaped destruction, or from grenades hurled by isolated pockets of Germans. But the majority of the Württembergers, completely surprised and badly shaken, offered little resistance.

Almost 200 were taken prisoner, the survivors falling back to the original German line. In an hour the battle was virtually over. "The first Canadian deliberately planned attack in any force", states the British Official History, "had resulted in an unqualified success." The 3rd Battalion had retaken Mount Sorrel, the 16th now held the northern part of Armagh Wood, the 13th had cleared Observatory Ridge and Tor Top, and the attached 58th Battalion (reporting casualties of 165 all ranks) had recovered much of the old line through Sanctuary Wood. Between 2 and 14 June the Canadian Corps losses numbered approximately 8000; in the same period the Germans in that sector sustained 5765 casualties. Inability to take effective counter-measures because of the Allied superiority in aeroplanes, artillery (40 batteries to 28 German) and supplies of ammunition was cited by the Germans for their failure to hold their gains of 2 June. They even judged the weather to be in our favour. "For the continual rain contributed to the softening up of the troops, which were exposed to heavy fire day and night." It was a meteorological viewpoint which the Canadian veteran lying in lashing rain in no man's land until the assault or standing knee-deep in water in the assembly trenches might find difficult to share.

Consolidation of the new front line began early on the 13th, as did the enemy's bombardment as soon as he realized the extent of his lost positions. On the morning of the 14th he launched two counter-attacks against Mount Sorrel, both of which were broken up by our artillery. He subsequently advanced his own line to within 150 yards of ours (the average distance which had existed between the forward positions before 2 June) but made no further move to reopen the battle.¹⁵

German trenches at Mount Sorrel, with German dead, photographed in June 1916. (click to enlarge). LAC photo

Battle Honours

The Battle Honour "Mount Sorrel" was granted for participation in these actions.

Notes

1. Nicholson, Gerald Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War: Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919 (Duhamel, Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, Ottawa, 1964)

2. Ibid

3. Ibid

4. Goodspeed, D.J., Battle Royal: A History of the Royal Regiment of Canada 1862-1962 (The Royal Regiment of Canada Association, 1962) pp.138-139

5. Nicholson, Ibid

6. Ibid

7. Nicholson, G.W.L. The Gunners of Canada: The History of the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery Volume II 1919-1967 (Royal Canadian Artillery Association, 1972) pp.254-255

8. Nicholson, Ibid

9. Bercuson, David J. The Patricias: The Proud History of a Fighting Regiment (Stoddart Publishing Co. Ltd, Toronto, ON, 2001) ISBN 0-7737-3298-5 pp.78-80

10. Nicholson, Ibid

11. Ibid

12. Ibid

13. Dancocks, Daniel G. Gallant Canadians: The Story of the 10th Canadian Infantry Battalion 1914-1919 (The Calgary Highlanders Regimental Funds Foundation, Calgary, AB, 1990) ISBN 0-9694616-0-7 p.78

14. Nicholson, Ibid

15. Ibid