History |
Wars & Campaigns |
►Boer
War
►First
World War
►►Western
Front
►►►Trench
Warfare: 1914-1916
►►►Allied
Offensive: 1916
►►►Allied
Offensives: 1917
►►►German
Offensive: 1918
►►►Advance
to Victory: 1918
►►Siberia
►Second
World War
►►War
Against Japan
►►North
Africa
►►Italian
Campaign
►►►Sicily
►►►Southern
Italy
►►►The
Sangro and Moro
►►►Battles
of the FSSF
►►►Cassino
►►►Liri
Valley
►►►Advance
to Florence
►►►Gothic
Line
►►►Winter
Lines
►►North-West
Europe
►►►Normandy
►►►Southern
France
►►►Channel
Ports
►►►Scheldt
►►►Nijmegen
Salient
►►►Rhineland
►►►Final
Phase
►Korean
War
►Cold
War
►Gulf
War |
Operations |
|
Battle Honours |
Boer War
First World War
Western Front
Trench Warfare: 1914-1916
Allied Offensive: 1916
►Somme, 1916 |
1
Jul-18 Nov 16 |
►Albert |
.1-13
Jul 16 |
►Bazentin |
.14-17
Jul 16 |
►Pozieres |
.23
Jul-3 Sep 16 |
►Guillemont |
.3-6
Sep 16 |
►Ginchy |
.9
Sep 16 |
►Flers-Courcelette |
15-22
Sep 16 |
►Thiepval |
26-29
Sep 16 |
►Le Transloy |
.
1-18 Oct 16 |
Allied
Offensives: 1917
►Arras 1917 |
8
Apr-4 May 17 |
►Vimy, 1917 |
.9-14
Apr 17 |
►Arleux |
28-29 Apr 17 |
►Scarpe, 1917 |
.3-4
May17 |
►Hill 70 |
.15-25
Aug 17 |
►Messines, 1917 |
.7-14
Jun 17 |
►Ypres, 1917 |
..31
Jul-10 Nov 17 |
►Pilckem |
31
Jul-2 Aug 17 |
►Langemarck, 1917 |
.16-18
Aug 17 |
►Menin Road |
.20-25
Sep 17 |
►Polygon Wood |
26
Sep-3 Oct 17 |
►Broodseinde |
.4
Oct 17 |
►Poelcapelle |
.9
Oct 17 |
►Passchendaele |
.12
Oct 17 |
►Cambrai, 1917 |
20
Nov-3 Dec 17 |
German Offensive: 1918
►Somme, 1918 |
.21
Mar-5 Apr 18 |
►St. Quentin |
.21-23
Mar 18 |
►Bapaume, 1918 |
.24-25
Mar 18 |
►Rosieres |
.26-27
Mar 18 |
►Avre |
.4
Apr 18 |
►Lys |
.9-29
Apr 18 |
►Estaires |
.9-11
Apr 18 |
►Messines, 1918 |
.10-11
Apr 18 |
►Bailleul |
.13-15
Apr 18 |
►Kemmel |
.17-19
Apr 18 |
Advance to Victory: 1918
►Arras, 1918 |
.26
Aug-3 Sep 18 |
►Scarpe, 1918 |
26-30 Aug 18. |
►Drocourt-Queant |
.2-3
Sep 18 |
►Hindenburg Line |
.12
Sep-9 Oct 18 |
►Canal du Nord |
.27
Sep-2 Oct 18 |
►St. Quentin Canal |
.29
Sep-2 Oct 18 |
►Epehy |
3-5
Oct 18 |
►Cambrai, 1918 |
.8-9
Oct 18 |
►Valenciennes |
.1-2
Nov 18 |
►Sambre |
.4
Nov 18 |
►Pursuit to Mons |
.28 Sep-11Nov |
Second World War
War Against Japan
South-East Asia
Italian Campaign
Battle of Sicily
Southern
Italy
The Sangro and Moro
Battles of the FSSF
►Anzio |
22
Jan-22 May 44 |
►Rome |
.22
May-4 Jun 44 |
►Advance
|
.22
May-22 Jun 44 |
to the Tiber |
. |
►Monte Arrestino |
25
May 44 |
►Rocca Massima |
27
May 44 |
►Colle Ferro |
2
Jun 44 |
Cassino
►Cassino II |
11-18
May 44 |
►Gustav Line |
11-18
May 44 |
►Sant' Angelo in
|
13
May 44 |
Teodice |
. |
►Pignataro |
14-15 May 44 |
Liri Valley
►Hitler Line |
18-24 May 44 |
►Melfa Crossing |
24-25 May 44 |
►Torrice Crossroads |
30
May 44 |
Advance to Florence
Gothic Line
►Gothic Line |
25 Aug-22 Sep 44 |
►Monteciccardo |
27-28 Aug 44 |
►Point 204 (Pozzo Alto) |
31 Aug 44 |
►Borgo Santa Maria |
1 Sep 44 |
►Tomba di Pesaro |
1-2 Sep 44 |
Winter Lines
►Rimini Line |
14-21 Sep 44 |
►San Martino- |
14-18 Sep 44 |
San Lorenzo |
. |
►San Fortunato |
18-20 Sep 44 |
►Sant' Angelo |
11-15 Sep 44 |
in Salute |
. |
►Bulgaria Village |
13-14 Sep 44 |
►Pisciatello |
16-19 Sep 44 |
►Savio Bridgehead |
20-23
Sep 44 |
►Monte La Pieve |
13-19
Oct 44 |
►Monte Spaduro |
19-24 Oct 44 |
►Monte San Bartolo |
11-14
Nov 44 |
►Lamone Crossing |
2-13
Dec 44 |
►Capture of Ravenna |
3-4
Dec 44 |
►Naviglio Canal |
12-15 Dec 44 |
►Fosso Vecchio |
16-18 Dec 44 |
►Fosso Munio |
19-21 Dec 44 |
►Conventello- |
2-6 Jan 45 |
Comacchio |
. |
Northwest Europe
Battle of Normandy
►Quesnay Road |
10-11 Aug 44 |
►St. Lambert-sur- |
19-22 Aug 44 |
Southern France
Channel Ports
The Scheldt
Nijmegen Salient
Rhineland
►The
Reichswald |
8-13 Feb 45 |
►Waal
Flats |
8-15 Feb 45 |
►Moyland
Wood |
14-21 Feb 45 |
►Goch-Calcar
Road |
19-21 Feb 45 |
►The
Hochwald |
26
Feb- |
. |
4
Mar 45 |
►Veen |
6-10 Mar 45 |
►Xanten |
8-9
Mar 45 |
Final Phase
►The
Rhine |
23
Mar-1 Apr 45 |
►Emmerich-Hoch
|
28
Mar-1 Apr 45 |
Elten |
. |
Korean War
|
Domestic Missions |
►FLQ
Crisis |
International
Missions |
►ICCS
Vietnam 1973
►MFO
Sinai 1986- |
Peacekeeping |
►UNTEA |
W. N. Guinea 1963-1964 |
►ONUCA |
C. America
1989-1992 |
►UNTAC |
Cambodia
1992-1993 |
►UNMOP |
Prevlaka
1996-2001 |
|
Exercises |
|
Operation HUSKY
(Note: this article
describes the planning and other items of interest regarding Operation
HUSKY: discussion of the actual battles and fighting on Sicily
will be covered in other articles on the site.)
Operation HUSKY was
the Allied code name for the invasion of Sicily during the Second World
War. This operation was executed on 10 July 1943, resulting in the Battle
of Sicily.
Choosing the Target
Allied grand strategy
during the Second World War has been a long-standing subject of
controversy. The centre of gravity of Allied offensive operations moved
firmly to the Mediterranean in late 1942, with US and British landings in
North Africa. The decision was made to continue to prosecute the war in
that theatre. By the time German resistance in North Africa collapsed in
May 1943, plans were already in place to strike again in the
Mediterranean, by invading Sicily. Italy was one of the three major
partners in the Axis and such an invasion would mark the first time
fighting would take place directly on enemy soil.
The decision to concentrate
in the Mediterranean was not reached easily; until late 1942 the United
States was keen on entering north-west Europe with an invasion launched
across the English Channel.
-
By early 1943, the war against
Germany had turned in favour of the Allies. The Battle of the Atlantic
was being won by the American, British and Canadian navies...The
Allies had also achieved decisive victories on both fronts where their
ground forces were engaged - North Africa, where a quarter-million
Germans and Italians were trapped in Tunisia, and the Soviet Union,
where two hundred thousand Germans had been lost in Stalingrad.
-
Everyone knew that, sooner or
later, the western Allies must invade Continental Europe. But the
British and American leadership disagreed sharply on the question of
timing. The Americans were anxious to mount an invasion via the
English Channel into occupied France as soon as possible, while the
British...preferred to delay this inevitable confrontation...American
and British philosophies of war were diametrically opposed: American
military doctrine was based on direct confrontation with the foe, and
the shortest route to Berlin...lay across the Channel and through
France; the British, wary of the high human cost of this approach,
preferred to use their naval superiority to chip at the periphery of
occupied Europe until a weak point appeared.1
Options in the Mediterranean included an
invasion of Sardinia (a plan called Operation BRIMSTONE was drawn up for
this eventuality) as well as an invasion of Sicily. Sardinia was less
heavily defended, but while it offered good airfields for supporting
future operations in the Mediterranean, it had little in the way of good
harbours or beaches. General George C. Marshall, the Chief of Staff of
the United States Army, felt that Sicily, Sardinia and Crete would all
have to be taken to secure the Mediterranean, and that the large forces
necessary could not be justified. The British came to feel that driving
Italy out of the war was a laudable goal and that invasion of France
could be postponed to 1944.
Planning
Sicily was finally chosen
as the next Allied target at the Casablanca Conference in Jan 1943. US
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston S.
Churchill, and the leader of French forces in exile (Free French), Charles
de Gaulle, were all present. The Conference was notable in that the Allies
agreed to call on the unconditional surrender of the Axis, as well as
committing themselves to an invasion of Sicily and then Italy, as well as
greater aid to the Soviet Union. While many questions of grand strategy
had been resolved by this face to face meeting of the Allied war leaders
(Russian leader Joseph Stalin and Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King
were not among them - Stalin had been invited, King had not), the question
of the Mediterranean had been thorny. The US reluctantly agreed, despite
the British thought that forcing Italy out would oblige Germany to send
troops to Yugoslavia and Greece that were otherwise needed to fight on the
Eastern Front, and eventually the Western Front when it opened in France.
Unfortunately, the
Casablance directive concerning Operation HUSKY was flawed. Observes
American historian Carlo D'Este: "It established Sicily as an end in
itself rather than as the first step in an agreed joint strategy for the
Mediterranean." Further friction between the allies was certain because,
although the Americans did not yet know it, Churchill had no intention
of stopping there.
-
The post-Casablanca
preparations for the invasion of Sicily amount to a textbook study of
how not to plan a military operation.2
Command Structure
A command structure was set up in February 1943
with Allied Forces Headquarters under US General Dwight D. Eisenhower at
Algiers in overall command of the Mediterranean theatre. Task Force 141
(named after the hotel room in Algiers in which the organizers first met)
later became the 15th Army Group under British General Harold Alexander.
This organization was to oversee all land operations. Two armies would
serve in this group; an American group called Force 343 eventually became
the American 7th Army under US Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr.,
and Force 545 "essentially the British 8th Army" under General Bernard Law
Montgomery.3
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|
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Allied Force Headquarters |
General Dwight D. Eisenhower |
|
|
|
|
|
|
15th Army Group |
General Harold Alexander |
|
|
|
|
|
7th US Army
|
Lieutenant General
George S. Patton, Jr. |
British 8th Army
|
General Bernard L.
Montgomery |
Landing Areas
Planning for the invasion
was hampered by the fact that the senior commanders involved were still
fully occupied by the campaign in North Africa; US forces suffered a
severe blow at Kasserine Pass in the latter half of Feb 1943, being routed
by experienced German forces. Indeed, British and American forces were
both stumbling in their operations to clear Axis forces off the African
continent.
One historian opines that:
Force 141 eventually
produced eight plans of which the front runner involved a multi-pronged
invasion at several widely separated points from Palermo in the west to
Catania in the east. Inexplicably the best, and to a layman obvious,
option seems never to have been seriously considered. Landings along the
Messina and Calabrian coasts, coupled with landings elsewhere, would
have cut off the Axis forces from either reinforcement or evacuation and
placed them in a hopeless situation.4
The problem with Sicily was
that it was "an island admirably suited by position and terrain for
defence against invasion from anywhere except Italy. Separated from the
Italian peninsula by the Strait of Messina, which at its narrowest is only
two miles wide, the island had long provided a natural springboard for the
projection of Axis troops into Tunisia - for Cape Bon on the African
mainland is but ninety miles from Sicily's western tip."5
Reinforcement from Italy by
air or sea would be very easy for the Axis forces. The terrain on Sicily
is also marked by hilly and mountainous terrain. In fact, the only flat
ground of note was the plain at Catania, above which towers Mount Etna.
Few roads existed in the interior of the island. The need to have a port
through which supplies could flow was a major factor in the planning.
The Canadian official
history described why Messina was rejected as an immediate objective
despite being the largest port in Sicily which would materially aid Axis
reinforcement of the island:
A direct assault on
the port or its vicinity could not be contemplated...for the Strait of
Messina was completely closed to Allied shipping by mines and coast
defence batteries, and was beyond the effective range of Allied fighter
cover based on Malta and Tunisia. It was therefore necessary to look
elsewhere for invasion sites through which operations could be developed
to overrun the island.6
Direct assaults on any of
the port facilities were not contemplated, in fact, and "planning focused
on beaches from the very beginning."7 The coast of Sicily
extends for a distance of 600 miles, and Allied intelligence identified 90
miles of beaches suitable for landing operations. Only two sectors were
within range of Allied air cover, however. Of the port facilities on
Sicily, three were considered "major" ports - Messina, Palermo and
Catania. Estimated daily clearance through those ports was 4,000 to 5,000
tons in the case of Messina, 2,000 for Palermo and 1,800 for Catania. (A
division required 500 tons of supplies a day, and one RAF squadron
required 30 tons.) Discussions early on decided that at least one major
port had to be taken early on in the invasion (though it was recognized
that there were smaller harbours around the perimeter of the island as
well).8
Other considerations were
the availability of airfields, both for Allied use upon capture, as well
as the ability of the enemy to use them to oppose the landings. Airfield
locations in Sicily were determined by geography rather than tactical
considerations; almost all were located within 15 miles of the coast and
concentrated in three clusters. Allied planners felt that the immediate
objective of the assault forces should be the airfields in both the
south-east and the west "in order to provide the extension of air cover
required for the capture of the ports of Catania and Palermo."9
- Casablanca Outline Plan
Therefore, early plans
(referred to as the Casablanca Outline Plan) concentrated on landings
simultaneously at Palermo and Catania, with British forces landing on
D-Day in the south-east with 3 divisions and the mission of securing
airfields and the ports of Syracuse and Catania. Three days later, using
those airfields for friendly fighter cover, and additional infantry
division, a brigade group, and an airborne division would assault the
Catania region to secure additional airfields and the port itself. On
D-Day, one US division would land at Sciacca on the south-west coast, to
capture western airfields in preparation for an assault on Palermo to be
delivered on D+2 by two US divisions, whose mission included securing the
port there. These plans were finalized by mid-Mar 1943. Two reserve
divisions (one for each Task Force) were allotted, to be ashore by D+7.10
- Second Outline Plan
The naval, ground and air
commanders (British Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, General Alexander, and
British Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, respectively) all objected to the
Casablanca Outline Plan. Alexander did not like the wide dispersion of the
landings, and Cunningham and Tedder both agreed that the quick seizure of
enemy airfields at Ponte Olivo was essential due to their proximity to the
Allied naval forces that would be offshore. The commanders of the two
armies also opposed the plan; General Montgomery wanted another division
for his force though "it was not clear whence such additional strength
would be found forthcoming...the limiting factor was once again that of
shipping, for all sea transport and landing craft expected to be available
for "Husky" had already been assigned." It was felt that a redistribution
of available forces would be the only solution.11
The US landing at Sciacca
was therefore cancelled, and the single division scheduled to land there
moved to Gela - however, this compromise left a single US division under
British command in the south-east of the island. This action also meant
that neutralization of the airfields in the west would have to be done by
air, thereby putting the dates for the Palermo landings in doubt as they
could not be attempted without aerial superiority. "There thus appeared
the unwelcome prospect of condemning the assaulting Seventh Army...to stay
aboard (ships) for an indeterminate period after D plus 3 somewhere
between the North African ports and Western Sicily, exposed to possible
attack from hostile aircraft based on the airfields behind Sciacca."12
Eisenhower and the British
Chiefs of Staff all opposed the new plan. By Apr, the plan was revised yet
again, to deal with concerns that Palermo would be used by the enemy to
reinforce Sicily, and make effective use of the airfields in the western
part of the island.
At the time Canadian
participation was announced in mid-Apr, the plan had changed considerably
and took the following form:
-
Another British division
from North Africa was sent to land at Gela, allowing the US division to
once again land at Sciacca.
-
A divisional landing at
Catania on D+3 was scrubbed in favour of leaving it in reserve at Malta
for employment on or after D+1 as needed. This division would not be
assault trained, and simply ferried to Sicily on craft used during the
initial landings, thereby not increasing the number of landing craft
needed for this additional British division.
-
Four British divisions to
land on beaches from Avola to Gela on D-Day
-
US landing at Sciacca
postponed to D+2
-
US landing of two
divisions at Palermo on D+5
-
Two divisions in reserve
(one for each Task Force) available in North Africa
-
Staggered airborne
landings in support of the beach landings
General Montgomery opposed
this plan as well, citing that it lacked concentration of force, and felt
that the ability of Axis forces to resist was underestimated. General
Alexander disagreed that enemy strength was not appreciated. It was
realized that the garrison on Sicily might easily outnumber the invaders.
For planning purposes, enemy strength was estimated at two German
divisions and six Italian mobile divisions with five Italian coastal
divisions (or 13 in total). (In the event, the actual numbers were two,
four and six, or 12 in total.) The Allies had only ten divisions
(including airborne formations), with two in reserve. The Allied
advantages of choosing the battlefield as well as naval and air
superiority, as well as material advantages on land (over the Italians if
not the Germans) would be compromised by the dispersal of effort called
for in the new plan.13
Beset by rivalry and
conflict, the planning for Husky quickly bogged down, and for some time
there was a real possibility that there would be no invasion of Sicily.
The crisis was not resolved until 3 May, when Eisenhower intervened
decisively...enabling the project to proceed.14
- Final Plan
The final plan saw the US
landings in the west cancelled, with the entire Western Task Force (US 7th
Army) instead landing immediately to the left of the Eastern Task Force
(British 8th Army).
The plan, which had
originally called for a double assault directed at the Palermo and
Catania areas, had been altered to provide instead for a single
concentrated blow at the south-eastern corner of the island. A
significant feature of the scheme was the fact that it did not depend
upon the immediate capture of a major port. The assault forces would be
maintained in the first instance over open beaches, the process being
facilitated by the many novel types of landing ships and craft now
available. The successful attack on Sicily has been called a landmark in
the development of the technique of combined operations, signaling the
transition from the belief in the absolute essentiality of obtaining a
port at the earliest possible moment...to the conception of "beach
maintenance" which was adopted...in Lower Normandy in 1944.15
The cancellation of the
western landings meant that Palermo's port could not be used to
support the invasion; Alexander "chose to take this administrative
risk rather than the operational one of too much dispersion."16
Canadian Participation
Canadian participation
was also a matter of some controversy. Canadian troops had not yet
been employed in a major operation outside of the Dieppe Raid in August
1942. The commander of the Canadians in the UK, General A.G.L.
McNaughton, preferred to keep his divisions under a unified command
until the main battle in Europe was underway. However, with the
knowledge that the invasion would not take place until 1944, Canadian
Prime Minister Mackenzie King asked the British Prime Minister in March
1943 if Canada might contribute to the upcoming battles in the
Mediterranean. The British in turn, specifically the Chief of the
Imperial General Staff, General Sir Alan Brooke, requested an infantry
division and a tank brigade. Canada agreed, though General McNaughton
argued in vain against splitting up his forces and pressed for a
limited role in HUSKY.
McNaughton
had agreed to participation in the Sicilian operation if the 1st
Division returned to Britain thereafter; he objected to the dispatch
of I Canadian Corps, which left his First Canadian Army with only
one corps and hence with its existence in doubt. He said he was
prepared to resign if this policy were carried out. McNaughton knew
that, as the Governor General in Ottawa wrote privately to Prime
Minister Churchill, he had become an "idol in the eyes of his
countrymen."17
The move did not make
McNaughton popular with General Sir Alan Brooke, who felt McNaughton
"devoid of any form of strategic outlook, and would sooner have risked
losing the war than agreed to splitting the Canadian forces." His
opposition contributed to his relief as senior Canadian combatant
commander later in 1943.18
In April 1943, the 1st
Canadian Infantry Division officially replaced the British 3rd
Infantry Division in the order of battle.19 |
 |
Canadian troops on the
way to Sicily. Both soldiers have been kitted out with Khaki Drill
clothing, and a Clasp Knife can be seen suspended from the equipment
of the man at left. He also carries a .45 calibre Thompson submachine
gun, standard issue for Commonwealth soldiers in the Mediterranean.
LAC Photo |
Axis Forces
-
Italian 6th Army
-
German XIV Panzer Corps
-
German Parachute Division 1
(reserve)
-
German Panzergrenadier Division 15
-
German Panzergrenadier Division 29
-
German Fallschirmpanzer Division
"Hermann Göring"
-
Infanterie Division 382
-
Italian 4th "Livorno" Motorized
Infantry Division
-
Italian 26th "Assietta" Mountain
Division
-
Italian 28th "Aosta" Infantry
Division
-
Italian 54th "Napoli" Infantry
Division
-
Italian XII Corps
-
202nd Coastal Division
-
207th Coastal Division
-
208th Coastal Division
-
133rd Coastal Regiment
-
Italian XVI Corps
-
206th Coastal Division
-
213th Coastal Division
-
18th Coastal Brigade
-
19th Coastal Brigade
Allied Forces
-
15th
Army Group
-
US
7th Army
-
U.S. II Corps
-
US Provisional Corps
-
British 8th Army
Notes
-
Dancocks, Daniel G. The D-Day Dodgers:
The Canadians in Italy, 1943-1945 (McClelland & Stewart Inc.,
Toronto, ON, 1991) ISBN 0771025440 p.7
-
Ibid, p.9
-
Ibid p.10
-
McKay, A. Donald Gaudeamus Igitur "Therefore Rejoice"
(Bunker to Bunker Books, Calgary, AB, 2005) ISBN 1894255534 p.49
-
Nicholson, Gerald Official History of the Canadian
Army in the Second World War. Volume II: The Canadians in Italy,
1943-1945 (Queen's Printer, Ottawa, ON, 1957) p.10
-
Ibid, p.11
-
Dancocks, Ibid, p.11
-
Nicholson, Ibid, pp.11-12
-
Ibid, p.12
-
Ibid, pp.13-15
-
Ibid, pp.14-15
-
Ibid, p.15
-
Ibid, pp.17-18
-
Dancocks, Ibid, p.12
-
Stacey, C.P. The Canadian Army 1939-1945: An Official
Historical Summary (King's Printer, Ottawa, ON, 1948) p.95
-
Nicholson, Ibid, p.19
-
Granatstein, Jack The Generals: The Canadian Army's
Senior Commanders in the Second World War (Stoddart Publishing
Co. Ltd., Toronto, ON, 1993) ISBN 0773727302 pp.74-75
-
Alexander papers, cable from Alexander to brooke, quoted in
Granatstein, Ibid, p.77
-
Stacey, Ibid, p.94
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