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Unification
On 1 February 1968, Bill C-243,
The Canadian Forces Reorganization Act became law and the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN),
the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) were combined into one
service - the Canadian Forces. This process was accomplished by "integration" of
the three services, and then Unification into a homogenous organization.
Early Attempts
While some serious study had been
given to unifying the three services (navy, army, and air force) as early as the
1930s, it was under Minister of National Defence Brooke Claxton in the 1950s
that Canada began to earnestly consider the possibility of unification (also
known as "integration").
Claxton, who served as MND from
1946 to 1954, ran the three services under a single ministry, and created the
position of Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee in 1951, in order to
coordinate the efforts of the three services and allow the Minister to receive
advice from the military with respect to fulfilling a singular defence policy
rather than three separate policies.
The structure worked. RMC
became a tri-service institution; the military's padres, legal services, and
dental and medical services were coordinated; and one service or another
operated various functions for the other two. The process continued under
George Pearkes, Diefenbaker's first Defence Minister, as procurement of food
and postal services became tri-service. To go beyond this point in the face of
entrenched habits and traditions required a minister with rare determination.
(Paul) Hellyer proved to be that man. 1
Paul Hellyer had served in the
RCAF in the Second World War, and was remustered to the Army in 1944 during the
Conscription Crisis, where he was required to take a basic training course
again. Hellyer's impressions of duplications in the services were carried with
him when he became a Member of Parliament for Toronto and Minister of National
Defence in the Lester Pearson government. "The Prime Minister, some believed,
also remembered the Suez difficulties over the Queen's Own Rifles and supported
Hellyer's plans."2
These plans included reshaping
defence policy to focus on the three national priorities as Hellyer saw them:
collective security under the UN, collective security through NATO, and the
defence of North America. Hellyer's determination was that Canada would decide
for itself how to organize itself to meet these commitments and Hellyer proposed
eliminating costly duplications of services by integration. Recruiting, basic
training, and the military colleges would all be done on a "tri-services" basis.
Phase One - Integration
1964-1966
The March 1964 White Paper on
Defence outlined a major restructuring of the separate services, describing a
new organization that would integrate operations, logistics support, personnel
and administration of the separate services under a single unified command
system.
The process actually began in
1964, when Bill C-90 "An Act to Amend the National Defence Act" was passed by
Parliament on 7 July 1964 and took effect 1 August of that year.
The three service chiefs were
replaced by a single Chief of the Defence Staff and the separate headquarters
were integrated into a single Canadian Forces Headquarters. Other offices that
disappeared were that of Vice Chief of the General Staff, Adjutant General,
Quartermaster General, and Master General of the Ordnance.
In June 1965, the services
themselves were reorganized into an integrated field structure, reducing 11
existing commands in Canada to just six:
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Maritime Command
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Mobile Command
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Air Defence Command
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Air Transport Command
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Materiel Command
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Training Command
Phase 2 - Unification
1966-1968
This second phase was dependent
on Parliamentary approval of Bill C-243 "The Canadian Forces Reorganization
Act", which was introduced into the House of Commons in November 1966 and passed in
April 1967.
The major effect of this
legislation was to abolish the historic titles Royal Canadian Navy, Canadian
Army, and
Royal Canadian Air Force, and create a single service called the
Canadian Armed Forces (later just Canadian Forces).
With approval of this bill into
law, the armed forces underwent reorganization of command and base structures
across the country, with streamlined organizations designed to reduce costs and
duplications and provide a functionally organized military that was highly
mobile and not bound by service traditions.
As well, one single uniform and
rank structure was introduced into the Canadian Forces, a move that was
unpopular and never fully implemented (personnel of Maritime Command, for
example, maintained their naval rank designations). These latter implementations
of policy are generally referred to as "unification".
According to Canadian Forces
publication B-GG-005-004/AF-000 "CANADIAN FORCES OPERATIONS":
While Unification was
ostensibly undertaken for cost savings, it has also been suggested that Prime
Minister Pierre Trudeau and Defence Minister Paul Hellyer did not care for the
traditions behind each service and that the new Canadian Forces (in Canada's
post-war modernist fashion) was easily translated to French. Some further
contend that a deliberate move away from monarchist references (use of the
word "Royal" in many corps titles, for example) was intended, though the use
of the Crown in official insignia including official badges and crests of
units and bases would seem to dispute that.
...The Honorable Paul
Hellyer, the Minister of National Defence throughout the period of the
reorganization, viewed this last phase in the reorganization as the end of a
logical, continuous process to create a unified force. In the House of Commons
during the 27th Parliament he stated:
Unification is the end
objective of a logical and evolutionary progression. Although integration and
unification are sometimes regarded as alternatives, and inherently different,
they are, in fact, merely different stages in the same process. Integration
was actually the term applied to the first stages of the unification of the
Canadian Armed Forces.
The celebrations of Canada's
centennial in 1967 slowed the pace of change, but only momentarily.
Debate in the House of
Commons was bitter; discussion before the Commons defence committee was
hotter still. Some argued that since navies, armies and air forces had
distinct and separate primary roles and functions "best understood in
each service," it was a mistake to force them together. "To do so," one
commentator noted, "would degrade their capability." Others,
particularly sailors but also including (General) Guy Simonds, could not
accept the disappearance of the Royal Canadian Navy, Canadian Army, and
Royal Canadian Air Force - and the history and traditions that had
served them so well - on both practical and emotional grounds. What
pride could anyone have, they asked, in the nondescript green uniform
chosen for the new single service? The (Chief of the Defence Staff),
(Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff), Chief of Personnel, and Comptroller
General all retired early, protesting the speed at which unification was
proceeding, and Admiral Landymore was dismissed. But the unification
bill passed in April 1967, to come into effect on 1 February 1968. Thus,
when the last sailors, soldiers, and airmen of the Centennial Tattoo
marched out of the stadium, spectators knew they were witnessing the end
of an era. Within a few months, all that had just been celebrated and
glorified would be no more.3
The Canadian Forces remained a
single service into the 21st Century, but beginning in the 1980s, each member
would come to belong to one of three "environments": sea, land or air, usually
determined by the member's trade. Environmentally non-specific trades (referred
to as "purple" trades such as medical technician or military police, an
environment may have been assigned at random.)4
The newly unified "Canadian Armed Forces" went
to a single set of uniforms for the three services. Work Dress, as worn by
the personnel at left, resembled a bus driver's clothing, with short jacket
and lack of unit insignia. The airman in the centre, wearing the "Linden
Green" shirt, is identified as a member of Air Command only by the badge on
his cap. The officer at right is identified by the gold braid on his cuffs.
Epaulettes were not included on the "CF Greens", the shoulder strap
apparently being an element of military dress too closely associated with
land forces and thus considered inappropriate for a uniform that was to be
worn by a tri-service organization. These personnel - they could be a mix of
soldiers, sailors or airmen judging only by the uniforms - are receiving
refugees from Uganda at Longues Pointes in October 1972. Library and
Archives Canada photo
Impact and Legacy
The impact of Unification is
still felt in the Canadian military, and its effectiveness still judged by
historians. Jack Granatstein placed it on a list of "12 Military Events That
Shaped Canada":
Paul Hellyer became
defence minister in 1963, determined to rationalize the Canadian
military (whose) three services...had an unwieldy structure and no war
plans in common. The ambitious minister's first stage was integration,
the creation of a Chief of Defence Staff to manage new functional
commands that operated across service lines and reduced triplication.
There were difficulties aplenty, but integration was a much needed
forward step. Emboldened, Hellyer pressed ahead, in November 1966
introducing a measure to unify the services by doing away with the Army,
the RCN, and the RCAF and replacing them with the Canadian Forces...The
uproar was intense, senior officers resigning in wholesale. Hellyer
persisted, his bill becoming law on Feb. 1, 1968, but his hope of
becoming prime minister disappeared in the clamour. Many of Hellyer's
changes were gradually accepted, but the CF soon began a slow process
back towards the status quo ante.5
The gradual process has
included such things as the Distinctive Environment Uniform (DEU), adopted
in the mid to late 1980s, returning the sea, land and air elements of the CF
to distinctive coloured uniforms (the Army briefly adopting a tan uniform
for summer, while the sea and air elements returned to familiar blue
uniforms). The process has continued into the 21st Century with official,
historic, designations such as "Canadian Army" being restored.
Other changes have remained
more permanent. The army's rank of staff sergeant (flight sergeant in the
air force) was replaced by that of warrant officer. The status of the rank
of corporal was downgraded, and a new appointment - Master Corporal - had to
be introduced.
The pre-unification
system of rank (Private, Corporal, Sergeant, Staff Sergeant, Warrant
Officer II Class and Warrant Officer I Class) and appointment (Lance
Corporal and Lance Sergeant) were a development that evolved through the
British system for centuries. It was tried, tested and true for the
Army's system of organization and addressed the whole concept of command
and control efficiently. It attached a degree of prestige and status to
the various levels of supervision/leadership. For example not everyone
was automatically promoted to a higher rank simply for being a good
soldier or doing one's job well. The individual had to be outstanding
amongst his peers, and prove that he was, through tough training and
leadership courses which had to be passed to certain standard to
qualify. Of course battlefield promotions were another matter where the
outstanding qualities observed alone qualified the individual for
obvious reasons. This older proven system was advantageous for another
but less important reason. Internationally, our ranks and their levels
of responsibility were understood by most other nations. A foreign
soldier - perhaps a belligerent in a UN setting - knew when he was
dealing with a Canadian Corporal that this NCO was a leader of men,
schooled in the art of war and no one to fool around with. I can
remember tours in Egypt and Cyprus where senior officers would negotiate
with Canadian Jnr NCOs almost on an on-par basis, there was (that much)
respect. The post-unification system has destroyed the status and
respect that several ranks had at one time.
Paul Hellyer's basic concept - integration - was a good one. It had
meant an integration of logistics and support services - why have three
different logistical organizations cutting contacts, keeping files, and
awarding three different contracts for the same materiel? The
government, however, further likened the need for National Defence in
Canada to a US Marine Corps model. This showed no understanding of what
made the three arms (navy, army and air force) tick in Canada. Tradition
to the military is the food on which they are nourished and provide for
a sense of organization, family and probably most important, ideals to
be used as benchmarks for excellence and ability to prevail on the
battlefield.
One might compare the situation to a case where a politician or
non-elected human rights commissioner descended on the world renowned
Ottawa Heart Institute reorganizing the administration and operation of
the unit. One need only imagine them telling the heart doctors how they
were going to perform surgical operations, to the point of advising them
on which instruments they could have, to realize how ridiculous it would
be.
At the time of
Unification, servicemen were given a raise in pay to keep them enrolled.
Signing bonuses of $200.00 were given for each year to a maximum of five
that they re-enlisted for. $1000.00 in 1967 was a life changing amount,
possibly worth about ten times as much in 1999 dollars. Rank was given
away next; anyone who had ever had a Junior NCO course was automatically
promoted to Corporal. Everyone who had 4 years of service automatically
went on a new Junior Leaders Course to get him promoted to Corporal.
Corporal was now a giveaway, it meant nothing as far as status was
concerned, it was a shoe-in for everyone.
The problem was that at that time, Corporals were then section
commanders. The actual commander now was leading a whole section of his
rank peers. There was actual fighting in the ranks and discipline was
poor. So another level was instituted - Senior Corporal. But that was
not enough, they then introduced the "B" Corporal (indicating he had
qualified Part B of the Junior NCO Course). They changed the chevrons to
have a little crown sewed on over the hooks.6
Historian Stephen J. Harris
wrote that "soldiering in Canada had changed forever." The centralization of
personnel policies took authority from unit commanders, where influence had
traditionally resided.
At times, unified Base
units seemed more interested in keeping their files in order and their
stores tidy then in providing real service to field units. And, with the
creation of new, unified, 'green' logistics and administration branches,
among others, it was felt that the institutional closeness that had
existed between the various Corps of the old Army had been seriously
undermined.7
The goal of unifying
strategic planning for the armed services does not seem to have been
realized by Unification either:
Unfortunately, the
establishment in 1968 of a single unified service in Canada, even when
bolstered by the creation of a single national defence headquarters four
years later, did not eliminate the conflicting loyalties. It did not
achieve the effect Hellyer sought with his restructuring, and it has not
prevented the traditional “strong-service idea,” focused on the
preservation of the army, navy and air force as separate institutions,
to continue to exert strong dissenting pressure on the institution. The
absence of political and military leadership, and the lack of policy
direction in the 1970s and 1980s, combined with the continuation of
service- oriented alliance commitments and participation to United
Nations peacekeeping operations, only further reinforced service
planning and force development, and perpetuated the conditions for the
three services to continue to think and operate independently and to
compete over roles and missions.
Without a coherent national policy framework and a single strategy, the
ideals of unification were left to flounder over the years, with the
strong-service idea fostering “...a bias against planning from a
national perspective.” To make matters worse, as Bland noted in 1995,
defence policy in Canada over those years seldom originated from a
strategic idea – a notion Hellyer had attempted to introduce in 1964 –
but, rather, it evolved from the dynamics of the annual federal budget.
Deep and consecutive budgetary reductions in the 1990s, along with
pressure from powerful interest groups to steer the armed forces away
from combat capabilities, also triggered strong institutional reflexes
for service survival.8
Notes
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Granatstein, Jack Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace
(University of Toronto
Press, Toronto, ON, 2002) ISBN 0802046916 p.352
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Ibid, p.352
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Harris, Stephen J. "Chapter 14: The Post-Unification Land Force"
We Stand on Guard: An Illustrated History
of the Canadian Army (Ovale Publications, 1992) ISBN 2-89429-043-8
p.416
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The new system of environmental classifications was accompanied by a return
to different coloured uniforms. The term "purple trades" comes from the notion
that mixing army tan, army green, white, air force blue and navy blue together
will yield a purple shade.
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Granatstein, J.L. "12 Military Events That Shaped Canada" Legion
Magazine (November/December 2012)
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Commentary by David Willard. For the entire discussion, see the article on
the rank of Corporal, here.
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Harris, Ibid, p.416
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Gosselin, Major-General Daniel "Hellyer's Ghosts: Unification of the
Canadian Forces is 40 Years Old" Canadian Military Journal
(Volume 9, Number 2) accessed online at
http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo9/no2/03-gosselin-eng.asp
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