Flers-Courcelette

In the meantime, Canadians did not prepare to move to the Somme front until late mid-August 1916. The Canadian Corps was optimistic about the move, having grown tired of the dreary conditions of the Ypres Salient which had too many unpleasant memories. They received advanced training in the conduct of attacks and began taking over trenches in early September, followed by their first major action at Flers-Courcelette on 15 September.

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The Battle of Flers-Courcelette

The Canadian Corps' first major attack in the Battle of the Somme came on 15 September 1916. Two major tactical innovations were tested in this battle for the first time: the use of the tank to support infantry in penetrating into enemy trenches, and the "rolling barrage" which was a moving curtain of shells behind which infantry could traverse No Man's in relative safety.²

Mark I Tank prepares to advance on 15 September 1916. (Imperial War Museum photo)

The battle was to be fought on a ten mile front between Combles and Thiepval, with Rawlinson's 4th Army delivering the main attack with three corps, aimed at Flers, Morval, Lesboeufs and Gueudecourt - all under the guns of the German Third Position, a network of defences that had the Germans had begun in February 1916 and completed after the opening of the Allied July Offensive. There were hopes that a breakthrough here might open the way for a cavalry advance on Bapaume. The role of the Reserve Army was to protect the left flank, and the Canadian Corps would attack and secure Courcelette and points of observation over the Third Position. To the left of the Canadian Corps, the 2nd Corps was to exert pressure on the Germans south of Thiepval.

One other novel feature of the attack on 15 September was that in general (except in the Canadian Corps' sector) it was planned not as a continuous advance to a final line but in limited bounds to a series of successive objectives. The July battles had exposed the fallacy of trusting to the preliminary bombardment to wipe out all opposition. No longer army commanders dared emphasize that "nothing could exist at the conclusion of the bombardment in the area covered by it", and imply that the infantry would be able to walk over at leisure and take possession. Almost invariably the infantry had encountered bitter resistance, so that frequently even if the first wave reached its distant goal it had become too exhausted and reduced by casualties to complete its task; and later waves, following across no man's land at intervals of 100 yards, had found themselves similarly exposed to deadly fire from the uncaptured position. Official doctrine was not as yet ready to accept the idea of advancing by small detachments instead of in waves; infiltration was yet unknown. Once the artillery had done its allotted part the responsibility was the infantry's - and there was supreme faith in numbers. To the end of the Somme battles unit and formation commanders were to be governed by the training instructions issued by General Headquarters in May: ".... in many instances experience has shown that to capture a hostile trench a single line of men has usually failed, two lines have generally failed but sometimes succeeded, three lines have generally succeeded but sometimes failed, and four or more lines have usually succeeded."

Although limited, the bounds prescribed at Flers-Courcelette were long enough by later standards, amounting to as much as 1900 yards on the Fourth Army's front. The Canadian Corps, attacking on the Reserve Army's right flank with two divisions on a 2200-yard front, was to advance in a single bound which from 1000 yards on the right fell away to less than 400 yards on the left. Objectives of the 2nd Division, making the main effort astride the Albert-Bapaume road, were the defences in front of Courcelette. These included Candy Trench (which ran north-west from Martinpuich), the strongly fortified ruins of a sugar factory beside the Bapaume road, and some 1500 yards of Sugar Trench, which cut across Candy. On the left Major-General Lipsett's 3rd Division, its front held by the 8th Brigade, was charged with providing flank protection.³

Remains of the sugar refinery on the Somme, photographed in September 1917. (LAC photo)

A total of 49 tanks were available for the operation, and the Reserve Army's total allotment of seven were given to General Turner. The Canadians organized them into two detachments of three vehicles each, with the remaining tank in reserve. One detachment moved on the right with the 4th Brigade, ordered to advance at top speed through a gap in the barrage astride the road to Bapaume and tasked to engage German machine guns in Martinpuich and the sugar factory. On the left, the other detachment supported the 6th Brigade by advancing behind the barrage, assisted in "mopping up" and attacked machine guns in the sugar factory or Courcelette as needed. Five infantrymen were assigned to every tank to pull casualties out of their way.

Attack on Courcelette 15 September 1916

The attack was launched at 6:20 a.m. on 15 September, the din of the rolling barrage joined by a new, unfamiliar sound as the tanks ground forward. The German 45th Reserve Division put up heavy resistance but their front line nonetheless fell in just fifteen minutes, falling under the weight of the artillery fire. On the Canadian right, the 4th Brigade's trio of assault battalions were on their positions by 7:00 a.m. and the 21st Battalion had taken 145 prisoners from the sugar factory. At 7:30 a.m. the 6th Brigade to the left was reporting success as well, holding firm in Sugar Trench.⁴ General Byng ordered the attack pressed forward at 6:00 p.m., the soonest possible time artillery could be arranged. Two battalions of the 5th Brigade advanced to the far end of Courcelette following a hand-to-hand fight with German outposts, then came under repeated counter-attack, the 22nd Battalion fighting off seven such assaults during the night, and more again the next day.⁵

The first use of the tank had brought mixed results. The Germans had been encouraged to surrender, complaining that their use was "not war but bloody butchery." All six tanks assigned to the Canadians were put out of action, however, either becoming mired, breaking down mechanically, or being lost to shellfire. Only one of the six reached the objective, and one had failed to even reach the start line. Of the 32 tanks on the 4th Army front, only 10 were with the infantry and able to assist on the objective, and the remained were mired or mechanical failures (due to the heavily cratered ground and heavy use in demonstrations before the battle) as well as losses to artillery fire. There had been, in fact, little actual study as to how to best deploy armour tactically, and strategically, the unveiling of this secret weapon seems to have been mishandled.

It seems a questionable procedure to have distributed the machines piecemeal along the battle front, thereby removing them from the tank company commanders' control. Properly coordinated action of artillery, tanks and infantry was still to be learned...Mr. Winston Churchill records that he was shocked when he learned from Mr. Lloyd George of a War Office this tremendous secret to the enemy upon such a petty scale". He made a fruitless appeal to Mr. Asquith, have the introduction of tanks into operations postponed until they could be employed in tactically profitable (ways).⁶

Detail from Map 6 of the Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War showing employment of tanks at Courcelette on 15 September 1916.

Fabeck Graben and Zollern Graben: 15-20 September 1916

On the left the 8th Brigade of the 3rd Division was also successful in its attack attack in front of Mouquet Farm. The 7th Brigade also had mixed success. The 42nd Battalion reached their new line without trouble, but per Corps orders had attacked without prior reconnaissance. The P.P.C.L.I. was required to advance on the right through a shattered landscape in which all landmarks had been destroyed by shellfire. The Patricias managed to reach the Fabeck Graben despite heavy small arms fire and kept contact with the 5th Brigade in Courcelette. A 200-yard stretch of German trench remained occupied by Germans while on the far left the 4th Canadian Mounted Rifles of the 8th Brigade secured another sector of the Fabeck Graben despite enfilade fire from Mouquet Farm and heavy shelling. The 49th Battalion bounded forward to secure chalk pits beyond the Fabeck Graben after 8:00 p.m. though the nearby trench line remained in German hands. The 1st Motor Machine Gun Brigade had provided almost continual cover fire from their Vickers Guns. German counter-attacks came throughout the night while engineers worked to shore up communications trenches and strongpoints.

The 2nd British Corps to the left of the Canadian Corps managed to gain 400 yards, pushing closer to Thiepval. On the right, however, the 4th Army managed to break through the German Third Position on a front 4,500 yards wide to take Flers and Martinpuich, but Morval, Lesboeufs and Gueudecourt remained in enemy hands, while farther south the French 6th Army floundered and made little progress.

The Zollern Graben, a long trench, lay 1,000 yards beyond Mouquet Farm, with the Zollern Redoubt forming its midpoint. This strongpoint lay on high ground on the crest of the ridge and was one of the major features of the German Second Position. Zollern Graben climbed the western slope from Thiepval and joined the Fabeck Graben half a mile west of Courcelette. Troops in the Redoubt could hit adjoining trenches with heavy enfilading machine gun fire. Both Zollern Graben and the Redoubt were the objective of a surprise attack by the 3rd Canadian Division on 16 September.

The 7th Brigade would strike northwards from Fabeck Graben to Zollern Graben in order to secure a line from which the 9th Brigade (Brig.-Gen. F.W. Hill) might attack the redoubt from the east. But the first phase failed (for the opening bombardment had overshot the objective) and Brigadier Hill's attack had to be cancelled. In the meantime, bombing parties from the two battalions of the 7th Brigade on either side of the break in Fabeck  Graben had worked their way inward on the German stronghold and sealed the gap, taking some sixty prisoners. The end of enemy resistance here was hastened by the action of Private J.C. Kerr (49th Battalion) who, though wounded, ran alone along the top of the trench, firing down upon the defenders and killing several; this heroism earned him the Victoria Cross. The 2nd Canadian Mounted Rifles attacked Mouquet Farm with apparent success. That night troops of the 2nd British Corps began to relieve the Canadians, the 34th Brigade (11th Division) taking over the farm. It turned out, however, that the German garrison, far from being annihilated had taken refuge in tunnels. The 34th Brigade finally secured the troublesome position on the 26th.⁷

Rain fell over the next few days, restricting activity by both sides. The Germans reinforced the trenches due east of Courcelette with fresh troops, and an attack on 17 September by the 5th Brigade consequently failed. The 1st Division took over General Turner's sector the next day, and on the night of 19-20 September fought off two German counter-attacks on Courcelette. In a dawn raid on 20 September, two battalions of the 3rd Division (43rd and 58th) managed to secure a hold in the Zollern Graben but were quickly counter-attacked by fresh German troops utilizing a smoke-screen. After a morning-long battle the Germans regained most of what they had lost, though the eastern stretch of trenches remained in Canadian control. The 1st Battalion managed to advanced 500 yards on a half-mile front east of Courcelette on 22 September, capturing front-line trench positions from the Germans there.

In its first major operation at the Somme the Canadian Corps had acquitted itself with credit, though the week's fighting had cost 7230 casualties. "The result of the fighting of the 15th September and following days", wrote Sir Douglas Haig in his despatch, "was a gain more considerable than any which had attended our arms in the course of a single operation since the commencement of the offensive." Breaking through two of the enemy's main defensive systems, Allied troops had advanced on a front of six miles to an average depth of a mile and captured three large villages which the enemy had organized for a prolonged resistance. Yet the main objectives were still untaken. The way to Bapaume was blocked by the strongly defended villages of Monal, Lesboeufs and Gueudecourt, and the enemy still held Combles and Thiepval at either end of the ridge. Bad weather and a shortage of ammunition for the French artillery postponed a renewal of the offensive until the 25th. The next phase was to be known as the Battle of Morval on the Fourth Army front, and by the Reserve Army as the Battle of Thiepval Ridge.⁸

Morval and Lesboeufs fell on the 25th while Gueudecourt held out an additional day, prompting the Germans to withdraw from Combles. The Morval battle gained a belt of ground 2,000 yards wide on average, necessitating the capture of Thiepval to bring the left flank into line and move the Germans off the ridge. The task fell to the Reserve Army.

In all, Flers-Courcelette had been far more successful than any British operation during the previous two months. If the employment of the newest weapon of war - the tank - had been premature, work was continuing on other weapons and methods also:

It is clear from the detailed orders and careful training of the assault divisions that tactical lessons from earlier operations were being incorporated into planning and preparation. Artillery technique was developing, even if Fourth Army's bombardment was not yet being prepared with the meticulous calculations of shells-per-metre of Sixth Army's gunners. By mid-September, Fourth Army had received many more heavy guns...The barrage would be twice as concentrated as that of 1 July, although only half as heavy as that of 14 July. Moreover, artillery technique was becoming much more sophisticated, with high-explosive shells used to cut wire, gas shells (fired by British guns for the first time) for neutralisation of enemy artillery, long-range interdiction fire, and a creeping shrapnel barrage - at a lower speed and with a greater concentration of shell - all employed to disrupt the enemy's response and fire the infantry on to their objectives.⁹

Battle Honours

The Battle Honour "Flers-Courcelette" was awarded to units for participation in these actions.

Notes

1. Goodspeed, D.J. The Armed Forces of Canada, 1867-1967: A Century of Achievement (Queen's Printer, Ottawa, ON, 1967) p.39

2. Marteinson, John. We Stand on Guard: An Illustrated History of the Canadian Army (Ovale Publications, Montreal, PQ, 1992) ISBN 2894290438p.144

3. Nicholson, Gerald Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War: Candian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919 (Duhamel, Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, Ottawa, 1964)

4. Ibid, p.152

5. Marteinson, Ibid, p.145

6. Nicholson, Ibid, p.152

7. Ibid

8. Ibid

9. Philpott, William Bloody Victory: The Sacrifice on the Somme (Little, Brown, London, UK, 2009) ISBN 978-0-349-12004-1 p.363