Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves

In April 1995 the Honourable David Collenette, Minister of National Defence, appointed an external review committee to be known as the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves, chaired by the Right Honourable Brian Dickson. The Minister also appointed Lieutenant-General Charles H. Belzile (Ret.) and Professor Jack L. Granatstein as Co-commissioners.

The Terms of Reference of the Committee noted that the Government's 1994 White Paper on Defence identified "the need to restructure Canada's Reserve Forces, notably the Militia, with the aim of enhancing their ability to respond to the requirements of the new global strategic environment."

The Terms of Reference also referred to 1992 Auditor General's report stating that the Department of National Defence was not getting full value for money spent on the Primary and Supplementary Reserves. The Committee felt that while increasing the reserves' effectiveness both operationally and economically justified the establishment of the Commission, the Terms of Reference underscored the importance of maintaining the traditions of the reserves "that make them so important a bridge between the Canadian Forces and the people they serve."

The Terms of Reference also set out some ``general restructuring guidelines

• Reservists were essentially part-time servicemen and servicewomen.

• The Primary Reserve and the Supplementary Reserve were to be structured to provide a greater contribution to existing operational commitments. Since various elements of the Primary Reserve supported different Regular Force missions, hence different organizational and managerial approaches were seen to be possibly necessary.

• The structure of the Primary Reserve and the Supplementary Reserve was to be fully compatible with a new mobilization concept, but given resource limitations, any capability beyond that required for "force enhancement" was to be achieved at nominal cost.

• The review was to address ways whereby the Primary Reserve command, control and administrative and support "overhead" could be reduced. Command and control elements were to be streamlined and officer/NCM ratios reviewed, with the goal of reducing command and control elements to a level consistent with operational and administrative requirements.

• The new Reserve structure was to be compatible with the "Total Force" concept.

• Consideration was to be given to the idea of assigning selected Regular Force service support tasks such as medical, logistics, communications, information services and transportation to the Primary Reserve "where this (made) operational and economic sense."

• Improvements in effectiveness and efficiency were to be sought in all aspects of the operations and the structure of the Primary Reserve, including rationalization of infrastructure, consolidation of units, and the elimination of any redundant elements or sub-components.

• A strength of 23,000 for the Primary Reserve noted in the White Paper was to be the maximum (ceiling) to be funded in the immediate future. The revised structure was to be designed to ensure that the majority of Reserve funding available was used to engage the maximum number of reservists, consistent with operational requirements and the training and employment opportunities available to Reserve personnel.

• Although unit traditions, heritage, socio-economic factors and regional sensitivities were to be considered in restructuring options, the overriding criteria was to be CF [Canadian Forces] operational requirements: unit effectiveness and efficiency, the demographic distribution of reservists, available infrastructure and the location of Regular Force bases and units.

• Consideration was to be given to establishing differing levels of ``readiness for the various elements of the Reserves.

In this context the Commission was given the following mandate:

The Commission will examine and make recommendations concerning the role, structure and employment of the Canadian Forces Reserve Force and options for restructuring the Force, notably the Primary and Supplementary Reserve sub-components thereof, to maximize their operational and cost effectiveness and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, the following matters:

• The most suitable roles, missions, tasks and structure for each element of the Primary Reserve and of the Supplementary Reserve under the new mobilization concept.

• The most suitable command and control arrangements to achieve an effective and efficient use of scarce Reserve resources.

• The level of training required within all components of the Primary Reserve to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency.

• How the elements of the Primary Reserve can contribute more effectively and efficiently to Canada's defence commitments, and support other government departments and agencies.

• Specialist functions, if any, that could be effectively performed by elements of the Primary Reserve.

• The options available to the government on the organization and control of the Primary and Supplementary Reserves.

• Ways and means whereby the responsiveness and productivity of the Primary and Supplementary Reserves can be enhanced.

• Methods to reduce overhead in the Primary Reserve structure and program.

• Changes in regulations, orders, procedures or administrative approaches to implement the recommended Primary Reserve structure.