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Britain's Second Army formed in the U.K. in the summer of 1943 and was raised specifically for the invasion of Europe. The insignia of the army incorporated the familiar Crusader's cross and sword designs. Commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Miles Dempsey, the British 2nd Army landed in Normandy with both I Corps and XXX Corps under command. In June, VIII Corps arrived in the bridgehead, with British forces floundering before Caen in the face of massed German armour. Hard fighting in July (during which II Canadian Corps landed) and August saw the destruction of the German 7th Army at Falaise, and the beginning of the breakout from Normandy. The Army's commander enjoyed a close relationship with the commander of 21st Army Group, General Montgomery; they had served together since just after El Alamein (Dempsey was promoted to command XIII Corps in December 1942, and served under Montgomery who commanded 8th Army at the time). Their relationship was unique throughout the Northwest Europe campaign in that Montgomery still behaved in many ways as an army commander and Dempsey a corps commander – the latter was frequently bypassed by Montgomery who gave orders directly to subordinate corps commanders.
The role thus given to Dempsey was one Montgomery himself would never had accepted but it was a measure of Dempsey's loyalty that he served in this diminished capacity without protest...While this practice was not altogether unusual in the British Army, it did mean that Dempsey had to formulate a role for himself.1 Unfortunately for the historical record, Dempsey avoided publicity, and left little in the way of personal papers to posterity. He was also faithful and loyal to his superiors, never taking issue with Montgomery's actions or objecting, all of which has driven historians to distraction in coming to an honest assessment of Dempsey's true abilities and role as commander of 2nd Army.2
Montgomery wrote on 10 June 1944 that he had two inexperienced army commanders (Bradley and Dempsey) which he had the necessity of watching over as they acclimated to their new duties. Montgomery remained anxious also about the staff officers of the 2nd Army, and in particular the ability to inter-operate with supporting air forces. Montgomery also wielded considerable influence on senior appointments in 2nd Army, a situation opposite to that in 1st Canadian Army where national imperatives came into play.4 Notes
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British
2nd Army 
While
some interpretations of Dempsey as a weak commander have been drawn from the
available evidence, more recent studies are drawing other conclusions and
seeing evidence of stronger personality traits and signs that significant
influence had been exerted by the army commander. For example, Dempsey
altered the schedule for follow-on forces in the Normandy bridgehead,
insisting that II Canadian Corps headquarters precede the 2nd Canadian
Infantry Division. More significant to the campaign was Dempsey's drafting
and execution of Operation GOODWOOD – and while he fell short of influencing
Montgomery to the desired extent of adopting a breakout role for the
British, he again influenced planning during the drafting of BLUECOAT by
selecting the Caumont sector. His diary reveals constant communication with
his corps commanders, generally twice a day during the Battle of Normandy.
There are also a number of examples where Dempsey “tightly gripped”
subordinate commanders where necessary, intervening at a crucial time,
giving or denying permission for a reserve to be used, shifting a unit to a
flank, etc.3