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The first convoy began embarking at
Quebec on 25 September. It was the largest trans-Atlantic convoy to
date, and over 7,500 horses and 30,000 soldiers made the crossing to
the United Kingdom, the first contingent of many. What was known
initially as the Canadian Division (later, 1st Canadian Division)
spent long weeks training in southern England in an unusually rainy
winter. A second division was raised, but the British remained cool
to the idea until late October, agreeing to accept Canada's offer.
That division arrived in the U.K. in April 1915, by which time the
1st Division had seen its baptism of fire at
Ypres.4
Diversity
The sluggish response by the Minister of
Militia to the need for francophone battalions had repercussions in
French Canada.5 Other groups also found themselves
under-represented. The majority of soldiers in the initial C.E.F.
battalions - just over 50% - had actually been born in the British
Isles. Black Canadians met with racism, fostered by attitudes from
the highest ranks. The Chief of the General Staff, Canada's senior
soldier, felt as late as April 1916 that blacks were not the equals
of whites. Pressure nonetheless mounted to recruit, and an all-black
construction battalion was formed in July - with white officers.
Sixteen black soldiers served in the 106th Battalion, a unit broken
up for reinforcements, and one of them served with distinction as a
replacement in the Royal Canadian Regiment. Native Canadians were
accepted more readily, and a number served as snipers.6
Later in the war, Japanese-Canadians were given a mixed reception,
rejected by some and more openly in other C.E.F. units. In 1917 the
10th Battalion accepted several dozen Japanese-Canadians, their
comrades finding that the newcomers habitually polished their
buttons and brass even in the trenches, and convincing the
commanding officer that if they did so, so would everyone else.
Complaints by the C.O. that experience with 11 men proved them to be
"more work" than other reinforcements were ignored. At least two
went on to be decorated for valour with the Military Medal.7
To France
The 1st Division crossed to France in a
storm, landing at St. Nazaire and travelling by rail in "40 and 8"
boxcars (unheated railcars with labels advertising their capacity of
either 40 men or 8 horses, they would become familiar sights to the
soldiers over the next four years). The trip to Hazebrouck was
circuitous and took 43 hours, but by late February, Canadian units
were at last at the front. Each Canadian battalion manned trenches
for a week near Armentières paired with experienced British units,
and in early March the division was given its own sector. There were
no real trenches to speak of due to soggy conditions. Entrenchments
went half a metre down and sandbag walls and earth parapets were
built up above ground. Broken bricks were used to shore up sandbags
and duckboards were used in vain to firm up trench flooring. The
division spent 21 days in this area, 5,000 metres south of
Armentières, near Fleurbaix, experiencing some scattered shelling,
and providing small arms fire as a diversion when neighbouring
British units put in an attack at Neuve Chapelle. The British
suffered 12,000 casualties for the gain of a few thousand square
yards. The Canadians, manning a quiet sector, lost 68 killed and 210
wounded.8
Experiences
The Canadians were learning quickly that
political patronage had left them ill-equipped. Enthusiasm for the
war had been high, and a belief that the war would be over quickly
was wide-spread. The reality of service life was different, and
apart from the cruel realization that the Germans would not be
defeated before Christmas 1914 came the knowledge that Canadian
industry was not yet up to the task of equipping a large field army.
Boots disintegrated under field conditions, tunics with colourful
pre-war coloured shoulder straps were too finely tailored for field
use, and the leather Oliver pattern field gear was unsuitable as
well.9 Worst of all was the Ross rifle which armed the
contingent, a fine sporting weapon but unsuited for the rigours of
combat.10
Routine in the trenches established
itself. Enemy attacks seemed to come at dawn or dusk, as light
conditions were optimal at that time, and thus units "stood to"
while the sun rose and set. Every man assembled in the trench and
stood at the parapet with his weapon ready. During the day, men
slept. "Funk holes" were carved into the sides of the trenches to
provide overhead cover from shell splinters. Work was done at night
under cover of darkness. Carrying parties to bring up rations,
water, ammunition or other supplies ("stores", as the army called
them) were relatively safe. More dangerous were trips into No Man's
Land, the strip of ground between friendly and enemy-held trenches.
There, patrols went out to do reconnaissance or raid enemy trenches,
and wiring parties laid belts of barbed wire. Repairs were done on
their own trenches at night, as snipers were active during the day,
and the "daily hate" came at dawn - German shelling. The majority of
casualties on the Western Front were inflicted by high explosives
fired by large calibre guns.11
Situation in the Ypres Salient 21 April
1915 Ypres
See also main article:
Ypres 1915
The Canadians moved to the Ypres Salient
in April. The Salient - a large bulge in the line which placed
Allied soldiers at the mercy of German forces who surrounded them on
three sides - had been created after what was later known as the
First Battle of Ypres in the opening weeks of the war. A series of
low ridges gave the Germans excellent observation points over the
generally flat country. Between 14 and 17 April the Canadian
Division took over 4,000 yards of trench between the British 28th
Division and two French divisions. They moved into weak French
positions made up of shallow and unconnected trenches and sandbag
parapets, thinly wired and "paved with dead Germans" in the words of
one Canadian officer. Unfortunately for the Canadians, a major
German attack commenced on the afternoon of 22 April, including one
of the first uses of poison gas on the Western Front. Panicked
French troops streamed back in the face of chlorine gas toward St.
Julien while the Canadian Division attempted to seal a two-mile gap
in the line.12
See main articles:
St. Julien
and
Gravenstafel
Two Canadian battalions hurried up out
of reserve to counter-attack German troops at Kitcheners' Wood just
before midnight on the 22nd, an act later referred to by the French
Supreme Commander Marshal Foch as the "finest act in the war".13
There was no time to reconnoiter and the attack was costly, mounted
over open ground and into the face of massed machine guns.
Its execution
can be questioned, its military merits debated, but there can be
no doubt that the assault by the 10th and 16th battalions, the
first major offensive operation conducted by Canadian troops in
the Great War, was a success, although all of the objectives
could not be held. Moreover, it proved to be the only successful
attack by Allied forces during the Second Battle of Ypres, which
was a tribute to the training, discipline, and esprit de corps
of these inexperienced young Canadians...14
If there was an
absence of success elsewhere, there was no shortage of bravery.
Lance Corporal Frederick Fisher of the 13th Battalion went forward
with a machine gun detachment near St. Julien, and exposed himself
to enemy fire while driving off German attacks. He was eventually
killed in action and later awarded the Victoria Cross, the first
Canadian VC of the war. The 13th Battalion had been the left-flank
unit of the entire Canadian Division, and much fighting had
concentrated there during the early hours of the battle. The
original front-line trenches of the division still held firm on 23
April, and a new line had been stretched out to protect the left
flank, where soldiers attempted to improve positions. British
reinforcements attempted to counter-attack and improve the
situation. The
Germans renewed their bombardment at 0300 on 24 April, and attacked
the Canadian line behind another gas cloud. It was during this
action that Company Sergeant Major Frederick Hall of the 8th
Battalion was killed attempting to rescue a wounded man, for which
he was also posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross. The 15th
Battalion suffered 647 casualties, the highest number ever suffered
by a single Canadian unit in one action during the course of the
war. The Canadian line now buckled, and ad hoc groups were thrown in
to shore up the defences. The apex of the Ypres Salient fell to the
Germans, but nowhere was more than 1,000 yards of territory yielded.
German attacks continued to mount, however. Lieutenant Edward Bellew,
Machine Gun Officer of the 7th Battalion, manned a machine gun until
it ran out of ammunition, disabled his weapon and fought on with
pistol and bayonet until overwhelmed and captured. Taken prisoner,
he too received the Victoria Cross, credited for having stopped a
German attack on the 7th Battalion. Canadian determination - and the
timely arrival of British reinforcements - had saved Ypres. On 25
April, British troops attempted to retake St. Julien and lost 2,400
men attacking well-entrenched Germans. Fighting continued in the
Salient throughout May, but for the Canadians, it was mostly over by
the end of 25 April. The division had suffered 60% casualties.15
Frezenberg and the PPCLI
See main articles:
Frezenberg
and
Bellewaarde
The first Canadian unit in the field had
been the Princess
Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, the last privately raised
infantry regiment in the British Empire. Created from a cadre of
veterans and assembled at Ottawa in August 1914, PPCLI joined the
British 80th Brigade and served in the St. Eloi sector of the
Western Front from 7 January to 23 March 1915. They arrived in the
Ypres sector on 9 April and remained there until the end of May.16
A gallant stand at Frezenberg on 8 May remains an important part of
regimental lore. As German attempts to reduce the Ypres Salient
continued after the departure of the Canadians, the Patricias found
themselves subjected on 8 May to a fierce bombardment and the sight
of a flank left wide open as German attacks pierced the British
lines. Desperate counter-attacks by the Patricias and renewed
assaults by the Germans raged for hours and 329 men were killed,
wounded or went missing during the day's action.
It is easy to
claim, after the fact, that the PPCLI saved the Ypres Salient by
holding fast on the lower slope of Bellewaerde Ridge on 8 May,
and that Ypres might have fallen otherwise. But no one can ever
know what the outcome might have been, despite all the
words of praise written about the Patricias by higher commanders
after the battle. What did happen, however, was remarkable
enough. A battalion that had never seen a general action, made
up of older veterans shored up by younger reservists, a
battalion virtually worn out, and worn down by long periods
under fire, threw back a major German attack on its own front.
Outflanked, out-numbered, outgunned, the Patricias did not
break; they did not allow the enemy to pass.17
The Patricias, depleted to just 150
survivors, were merged with the 4th King's Royal Rifles and saw
further action at Bellewaarde Ridge.18
Festubert
See main article:
Festubert
In the spring of 1915, Allied leadership
still believed a successful offensive and large breakthrough could
force a German strategic retreat. While the strength of field
fortifications was acknowledged by leaders in the field, "the
generals were firmly of the opinion that persistence would win out,
particularly if massive artillery bombardments preceded the infantry
assault so that the enemy was 'gradually and relentlessly worn down'
beforehand."19
The French hoped to prove this theory
correct with a major offensive in the south in early May 1915, just
south of where their armies met the British Expeditionary Force. The
B.E.F. was to engage in a two-division diverion at Aubers Ridge.
Both elements were to begin on 9 May, but disastrous results by the
British forces ended their involvement within twelve hours. Obliged
to continue the fight to support French offensive actions, the
British senior commander, Sir Douglas Haig, concentrated his forces
on a narrow front at Neuve Chapelle and Festubert. Attacks began on
15-16 May following a 60-hour bombardment. The war on the Western
Front had become a battle of attrition.
The deductions
made by the Allies as a result of their attempts on the German
front in the Spring and early Summer of 1915 had convinced them
that the key to success lay in quantity. The larger the number
of men and guns that there were available the greater the
chances of a breakthrough. It was the principle of the
sledgehammer; the greater the weight of metal that could be
flung at the German defences the more likely they were to
crumble.20
The 1st Canadian Division was drawn into
the fighting, called on to make five separate attacks over the
course of eight days over flat, open and water-logged ground, with
attacks planned on inaccurate maps. Futile attacks had cost the
Canadians 2,468 casualties by the time they left on 31 May for the
Givenchy sector, many of the dead left to rot in No Man's Land as
there was no way to retrieve them. A thousand square yards of ground
had been the reward for their sacrifice. Lessons in tactics would be
learned, but better weapons and tactics were still a long time in
coming. For the Canadians in the summer of 1915, "(t)he German
defences - the combined effect of reinforced strong points, machine
guns in large numbers, thick barbed-wire barricades and plentiful
artillery - had simply become too strong to be carried by men armed
with rifles and bayonets."21
Givenchy
The 1st Canadian Division took over just
1,000 yards of front-line trench at Givenchy, which required just
one of the division's three brigades to man front-line positions at
any one time. Early June brought fine weather, the replacement of
the hated Ross with the British Lee-Enfield rifle, and dry ground,
meaning good, solid, deep trenches when in the line. On 15 June, the
1st Brigade was ordered to mount an attack on the German lines. The
attack would be rehearsed in advance, to give every man an idea of
what was expected. There would be a 60-hour preliminary artillery
bombardment, including from three guns with armoured gunshields
wheeled right up into the front lines, so as to be able to fire over
open-sights at any German machine guns who still resisted the
advance through No Man's Land. And British engineers, tunnelling
under No Man's Land, were to set off a mine near the objective, a
German strongpoint marked "H.2" on the Canadian trench maps.
Everything went wrong. The blast from
the mine also killed a number of assaulting troops waiting in the
tunnel, and German reaction was swift, raining down artillery into
the Canadian forward positions. Two of the Canadian guns were
knocked out and a number of troops of the 1st Battalion were hit
without ever leaving their own trench. Nonetheless, two companies of
the 1st Battalion managed to get into the German positions, and then
by "leaning on the barrage" - advancing immediately behind the
curtain of friendly shells - penetrated to their second line. As
their "bombers" cleared out enemy trenches, German counter-attacks
began in earnest. The third and fourth companies crossed over to
reinforce, taking casualties from German machine guns now back in
action. It was at this point that Lieutenant Edward Campbell took
two machine guns and stopped and enemy counterattack, earning a
Victoria Cross. Only one other man of his detachment survived;
Private H. Vincent was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal. The
1st Battalion was forced to retire, out of ammunition and with no
chance of reinforcement by the 2nd or 3rd Battalions.
On 24 June, the Division moved once
more, to Ploegsteert (in fashion typical to English speaking
soldiers on the Western Front, it was mangled to become "Plugstreet"
by the Canadians), and on the 27th the Division went into 4,000
yards of trenches, there to remain for nine months. The sector
expanded later as other Canadian divisions joined them, and the
C.E.F. expanded to become a corps.22
Settling In
It was obvious by now that trench
warfare was to be the modus operandi of the armies on the
Western Front.
In every
theatre of war the attack was, at some time or other, faced with
the problem of an attack on an entrenched enemy. Nowhere was
this more apparent than on the Western Front, where for four
years both sides were permanently involved in finding a
satisfactory solution to this phenomenon. The techniques of
trench fighting originated for the most part, on the Western
Front; if they were used elsewhere to start with it was only in
order to prove them for use on the Western Front.23
The 1st Canadian Division, still under
its first commander, Lieutenant-General Alderson, a British officer,
spent a quiet summer improving their positions. "Live and let live"
became the order of the day, with only occasional shelling, sniper
activity, and night-time patrolling. However, Alderson was
determined to construct defensive works throughout the divisional
area, and thus there was much work conducted, primarily at night.
Forward trenches were deepened to permit movement while upright
without exposing troops to direct observation. Parapets were
reinforced with sandbags, and firesteps were added to permit troops
to observe and fire over top of the higher parapets. Trench sections
were carved out into zig-zags, creating bays for groups of four or
five soldiers, minimizing the effects a single shell burst might
have and eliminating the possibility of an enemy unit firing along
the length of an entire trench ("enfilade").
"No Man's Land" was
made more difficult to traverse by the addition of thicker barbed
wire entanglements ahead of the Canadian trenches, and concealed
listening posts were added forward of the trenches as well. "Hoochies"
dug into the rear wall of forward trenches let men sleep and eat
under cover, and deep, narrow "safety" trenches provided temporary
cover during bombardment when the front came under direct shelling.
A Support Line - a second set of trenches parallel to the front line
- was constructed in tandem with the main line of defence about 50
yards back, and several hundred yards behind that were strongpoints
into which heavy machine guns of the Motor Machine Gun Brigade were
deployed. The latter arrived from England in June. Communication
trenches - narrow walkways just wide and deep enough to accommodate
a crouching soldier - connected all these fortifications. "(A)s
similar fortifications were built by both sides, the probability of
assaulting infantry ever breaking through them became increasingly
remote. The stage was being set for the horrible battles of
attrition that would dominate warfare on the Western Front for the
next two years."24
The Canadian Corps
Even after the bloodshed at Ypres,
support for the war remained high in Canada, and the 2nd Canadian
Division was formed in Canada and moved to England during the spring
of 1915.25 The division moved to France in mid-September
1915, and plans were already in the works to create a Canadian
Corps. This meant not just a corps headquarters to oversee the
activities of the two divisions, but additional "corps troops"
including artillery, engineers, medical and logistics units as well
as additional battalions that later went on to help populate the 3rd
Canadian Division, including PPCLI (released from duty under British
command) and the Royal Canadian Regiment (Canada's only regular army
infantry unit, freshly arrived from nearly a year of garrison duty
in Bermuda). The Canadian Corps headquarters activated on 13
September 1915, extending the front of the 1st Division by 5,000
yards to permit the 2nd Canadian Division to enter the line, and
numbering 1,354 officers and 36,522 men under command. It would
increase in size the very next month and by war's end number four
divisions of robust size and reputation.25
Winter 1915-1916
Most of the Western Front had settled
into a stalemate at the time the Canadian Corps was formed, and
weather suitable for conducting offensive actions was coming to an
end. His Majesty King George V visited the Corps on 27 October 1915,
and the next day, winter rains began, falling for much of the next
four months. Some men would be lucky enough to receive waist-length
rubber trench waders, while the rest would have to endure.
Men at the
front had to spend days on end in thigh-deep water...(t)here was
simply no shelter to go to: the dug-outs that had been so
carefully prepared during the dry weather were either flooded or
had collapsed.
The intensity of the rain let up
somewhat in late November, and hand-operated pumps were able to
keep down the level of the water in the forward trenches. But
ankle-deep, slimy mud was everywhere and on everything. The men
had only one uniform, and usually only two pairs of socks, so
there was no possibility of drying out clothing or boots. And,
as there was no way to keep clean in these appalling conditions,
everyone soon had a healthy crop of lice. As the temperature
fell to near freezing for much of the next two months, it was
sustained, bleak misery. the only brief respite from being cold,
wet and dirty came once every ten days or so when units were
marched through the divisional baths. Here, besides a
luxuriously hot shower, the men got a clean pair of
underwear, while their shirts and uniform were disinfected to
kill the lice. The daily issue of service rum, supposedly to
ward off the cold, was just about the only pleasure the men had
to look forward to.27
A notable feature of the period was the
trench raid, as General Alderson insisted the the "offensive spirit"
needed to be maintained to keep up morale.28 "Trench
raids were not, contrary to popular belief, a Canadian invention,
but the Canadians became acknowledged experts in these violent
excursions into enemy-held territory."29
Expansion of the Canadian Corps
The U.K.'s War
Committee had decided in December 1915 that France would be the main
theatre of war for the British Empire, where all military emphasis
would be placed. Nine divisions were withdrawn from Egypt and
Territorial Force and "New Army" forces crossed the English Channel
to bolster the British Expeditionary Force on the Western Front.
Between Christmas 1915 and 1 July 1916 the B.E.F. under Sir Douglas
Haig grew from three armies of 38 infantry divisions and five
cavalry divisions to four armies (and a reserve army) of 49 infantry
divisions and five cavalry divisions. The reserve army became the
5th Army in October 1916. In June 1915, the British War Office
formally asked Canada for additional formations beyond its
commitment to 5,000 reinforcements monthly to the existing divisions
in the field. Initial resistance to forming a third Canadian
division was met by comments by General Alderson (the British
commander of the Canadian Corps) who noted that standard policy in
the B.E.F. was to have three divisions per corps, two in the line
and one in reserve. A 3rd Division was authorized, and when the
British asked for twelve battalions for Egypt as well, they
counter-offered with a fourth division for the Western Front. By
September 1915, Canadian officials were confident of their ability
to maintain four divisions in the field.
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The 3rd
Division was created in December 1915 under Major-General
M.S. Mercer, a veteran of the 1st Brigade and Commander of
Headquarters Corps Troops. He was a Canadian as were all
three brigade commanders and many of his staff officers. By
the end of 1916, only three major appointments would be held
by Britons (G.S.O. I, G.S.O. II and Brigade Major
Artillery). A number of staff officers and unit commanders
had combat experience but few soldiers or sub-unit leaders
had been in the field.
The 4th
Division was accepted by the War Office on the proviso that
18 reserve battalions be created in England as a source of
reinforcements for the 36 battalions of the three divisions
extant in the Canadian Corps. The 4th Division was therefore
created from units already overseas, or imminently arriving,
on 26 April 1916. Selection was tentatively made by
representatives from both the Canadian Training Depot and
the War Office. The division concentrated and took
preliminary divisional training at Bramshott, in Aldershot
Command. The first commander, Major-General David Watson,
had led the 5th Brigade (of the 2nd Canadian Division) in
France. The 4th Division did not have its own artillery, a
situation it shared with the 2nd and 3rd, and it was not
until June 1917 that the 4th Divisional Artillery was
formed. The division moved to France in August 1916 after
shuffling its slate of proposed infantry battalions.
The
demands created by the organization of the two new
overseas divisions and the necessity of maintaining in
the United Kingdom an adequate number of reinforcement
battalions (one for every two battalions in France) were
met by an increasing flow of infantry units across the
Atlantic. Although in the first two months of 1916 a
shortage of accommodation in England restricted troop
movements from Canada, by the end of June forty-two
infantry battalions had sailed. Meanwhile the total
establishment of the armed forces had been doubled.30
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Major-General M.S. Mercer
(LAC photo) |
Canadian
Operations January-March 1916
In early 1916, the 1st and 2nd Divisions
moved to the Ypres Salient. "By then, the land had been levelled and
rendered desolate. Only grey, shrapnel-shredded trunks remained of
green woods, and the natural drainage of the land had been destroyed
so that streams flowed into the trenches. shell holes and churned
mud made bringing up supplies and other movement hazardous."31
The Canadian Corps, now consisting of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd 2nd
Canadian Divisions, held positions from Ploegsteert to just north of
Kemmel during the early winter months of 1916, and cold, damp
weather caused great misery well into March 1916. Heavy rain caused
flooded trenches, and cold biting wind added to the discomfort.
Despite no periods of major action, in January, February and March
1916, 546 Canadians were killed and 1,543 were wounded, mostly by
German shellfire.32 Additionally, three had been gassed
and one Canadian taken prisoner, while there had been 667 accidental
and other non-battle casualties, 20 of which had been fatal. " In
spite of weather and living conditions the health of the troops was
good; though there were cases of influenza, paratyphoid, and trench
feet."33
Morale,
however, remained remarkably high despite the relative
inactivity, the constant discomfort and the steady losses. Some
escape was occasionally possible, as the troops were now
permitted short periods of leave in the towns in the rear area
where they could drink plentiful quantities of rough vin
rouge. But one of the new amenities most welcomed by the
troops were the improvised laundry facilities now being set up
alongside the Divisional baths. When they did get the rare
luxury of having a shower, the men no longer had to put on damp
and filthy uniforms.34
The Corps formed part
of the British 2nd Army, its front immediately south of the Ypres
Salient. The 3rd Division rotated brigades and battalions into the
line in relief of the 1st and 2nd Divisions to gain experience, but
due to the length of the front they were required to hold, tours of
duty were frequent for all units and time out of the trenches was
short. A battalion might typically serve six days in front line
trenches, then six days in support trenches, then finally six in
reserve where billets, baths and for some even films and
entertainments awaited, such as the 3rd Division's "Dumbells"
concert party which was formed in March 1916.35
3rd Division "Dumbells" (LAC photo)
The Canadians were
ordered to comply with a general policy of "wearing down" the
Germans by sniping, trench raids and surprise artillery shoots.36
Canadian snipers, like their British counterparts, were initially
hamstrung by a lack of proper equipment. Sniper rifles were in short
supply and actually considered "trench stores" - in other words,
they were not issued to individuals, but to units, and left in the
trenches to be turned over when a battalion relieved another for its
tour of duty in the front line.37 There had also been no
standardized pattern of telescopic sight at the outbreak of war and
a variety of equipment was used, from both Canadian and British
sources. Some of Canada's leading snipers used no telescopic sights
at all, relying only on the standard aperture sight of the service
rifle. On 2
January 1916 the 25th Battalion (of the 2nd Division) used hand-held
wire-cutters during a raid on enemy trenches. The cutters were a
recent introduction into the collection of trench warfare equipment,
and as a counter-measure, the Germans began using tempered steel in
the construction of wire for use in obstacles, making the cutting of
wire by hand much more slow and difficult. Picked men of the 28th
and 29th Battalions launched a raid early on 31 January in the
centre of the Canadian sector, and 30 men from each battalion cross
No Man's Land to shower the enemy trenches with bombs, taking three
prisoners for a loss of two killed and ten wounded. More
significantly, three German regiments were positively identified. In
Sir Douglas Haig's first official Despatch on 19 May 1916, 95 units
and formations were mentioned by name for "good work in carrying out
or repelling local attack and raid" and six were Canadian, including
the 28th and 29th Battalions, as well as the 7th Battalion who had
raided across the Douve in November 1915.
The two
Canadian raids illustrated the phases through which patrolling
in trench warfare had progressed. The casual encounters of
hostile parties in the dark, which marked the first stage, had
given way to the organized trench raid by night, the pattern of
which the Canadians had set. The summer of 1916 was to see the
third and final stage - the daylight raid.38
As the Germans
prepared for their offensive against the French at Verdun, they
launched a series of diversionary attacks in other areas of the
front between 8 February and 19 February. One of these occurred at
"The Bluff" which was a tree covered mound on the north bank of the
Ypres-Comines Canal. The British 5th Corps lost the low heights in
bitter fighting on 14 February, but 17 days later a well-executed
British counter-attack took it back. Canadian participation was
restricted to artillery support, as well as extending the line of
the Canadian Corps 700 yards towards the outskirts of St. Eloi by
relieving 5th Corps units, beginning on 17 February. The first
Military Medal, created in March 1916, to be issued to a Canadian
went to Corporal R. Millar of the 1st Battalion for bravery under
fire on 18 March 1916.39
St. Eloi Craters
Mine warfare had also progressed during
1915, and by the start of 1916 commanders on both sides of No Man's
Land recognized the practice of tunnelling and mining as important
factors in the siege operations characterizing military activities
on the Western Front. Mining had been prominent in the fighting for
The Bluff, and the work of British sappers would lead to a costly
and frustrating operation for 2nd Canadian Division.
Captioned on the LAC website as "Crater
on the Bluff looking toward St. Eloi." (click to enlarge).
Ammunition boxes and what looks like a German helmet can be seen in
the middle ground.
The desolation of the terrain is apparent; by mid-1916, No Man's
Land on the Canadian front had been shattered to a
treeless morass. LAC photo
German sappers generally operated 10-30
feet underground, exploding mines under British trenches or using
lightly charged camouflets to destroy installations without creating
craters. British countermining was done at the same depths
initially, and also aimed at destroying German galleries. In time
they found the Germans lacked the skill to operate at greater depth
and so the British began their own mines farther back, and at depths
of 50-90 feet. By December 1915 more than 20 tunnelling companies
had been created in the B.E.F., with a system of training and
supervision to coordinate their activities put into place that
culminated in the creation in the first mining school in June 1916.
Before the British counter-attack and
recapture of The Bluff on 2 March 1916, the 5th Corps was ordered to
cut off the enemy held salient created at St. Eloi, a mile
south-west of the Ypres-Comines Canal. The salient was 600 yards
wide and penetrated about 100 yards north into British lines
Part of the
salient here was elevated 10 to 20 feet above the surrounding
water-logged area. At the western end of this rise was "The
Mound"-a clay bank coveringhalf an acre which had been formed by
the overburden from a brickfield nearby. Its original height of
thirty or more feet had been reduced by much shelling and
mining, but as an observation post overlooking the adjacent
trenches it was still an important objective for either side.
The Mound had unpleasant memories for the P.P.C.L.I., who had
had the task of holding it in January 1915, when it was still in
British hands. Within this area miners on both sides had waged
an almost continuous battle throughout 1915, laboriously driving
their sheeted galleries through the shifting quicksands below no
man's land and the opponent's trenches. Altogether 33 mines and
31 camouflets had been blown in a space of ten acres.
To offset the enemy's aggressive
activity near the surface, British tunnellers had in August 1915
begun sinking three shafts 50 to 60 feet deep, running galleries
forward well below the sand. So quietly did they work and so
skilfully did they conceal the spoil from the tunnels that the
enemy's suspicions were not aroused. Early in March they were
under the German positions. On a front of 600 yards six mines
(numbered consecutively from west to east), with charges ranging
from 600 to 31,000 pounds of ammonal, were in readiness to
initiate the British attack by blowing up The Mound and the
enemy's front-line trenches. Staffs were confident that the
outcome of the mining would ensure the success of the operation,
even if the approaching spring weather should fail to improve
the deplorable conditions of sticky mud and water-filled
shell-holes and craters through which the infantry must assault.
Capture of the objectives would reverse the salient by securing
a new line which would thrust south into the German position to
as much as 300 yards from the existing British trenches.40
Rejecting plans for the British 3rd
Division to carry out an assault at St. Eloi (when first planned,
they had been fresh but by mid-March were much depleted and of
doubtful use) and so General Alderson proposed accelerating a
planned relief of the 5th Corps by the Canadian Corps and using the
fresh 2nd Canadian Division. The British troops had rehearsed on a
course simulating the actual terrain and time constraints left no
ability for the Canadians to do the same: each day of delay meant
risk of discovery and/or counter-mining by the Germans. A compromise
was struck in which the 3rd Division provided the assault troops,
but the Canadians relieved them as soon as the objectives were
taken.
At 4:15 a.m. on 27 March 1916 a barrage
of 41 guns and howitzers opened the battle, and the six mines were
fired in sequence, blotting out landmarks and collapsing trenches on
both sides of the line. Two companies of the 18th Reserve Jäger
Battalion disappeared as Mines 2, 3, 4 and 5 went up and with it the
remains of The Mound collapsed into Mine 3. Mines 1 and 6 failed to
reach the German line and remained in No Man's Land.41 Crater 3,
the largest of the new landmarks created by the mine explosions, was
15 yards deep and over 55 yards across at its widest point. Craters
2, 4 and 5 were smaller, but only slightly. The lip on each crater
rose as high as six yards above the surrounding ground, and the
debris blocked lines of sight from the former British front line.42
The British 9th Brigade assaulted with two battalions,
capturing Craters 1, 2 and 3 and their objective of the German third
line 200 yards beyond. On the British left, only Crater 6 and a
smaller hole from earlier fighting (later referred to as Crater 7)
were taken. The devastation wrought by the mines resulted in mass
confusion and troops on the left thought that they secured Craters 4
and 5 when in fact, neither British nor German troops were in
possession of the holes. The 3rd Division remained oblivious to the
fact the Germans had moved up troops to Crater 5, though on 30 March
they did establish a machine gun post in Crater 4.
Nearly a week of fighting followed until
the last uncommitted battalion of the 3rd Division took back Crater
5 on 3 April, with only Point 85 remaining to be taken. Point 85 was
a machine gun emplacement at a trench intersection 150 yards to the
south-west which had become a key location through which German
counter-attacks were mounted. German losses in the first three days
of fighting had been 921 by enemy accounts, with about 300 men being
killed or buried by the mine explosions - and would have been higher
if not for careless security by British sappers and soldiers who
gave away the operation with poor field telephone discipline, loose
talk in civilian establishments, and permitting tell-tale
underground noises to escape.
Every battalion of the 3rd Division had
required to rotate through the craters, to withstand shellfire, long
duty either standing or crouching in water-filled holes, some waist
deep, with no prospect of rest. On 1 April the relief of 5th Corps
was accelerated due to the exhausted nature of the division, and on
the night of 3-4 April the Canadian Corps exchanged places with the
5th Corps, moving from a sector of line to the south, the Canadians
assuming command at 12:00 pm on 4 April. As there was an
unwillingness to register new artillery during ongoing operations,
the British 3rd Divisional Artillery remained in place, along with
mortars, a battery of Vickers machine guns and 24 Lewis guns. The
occasion marked the first time an entire corps had relieved another,
and on an active battle front. Because of the Canadian government's
wishes to keep its divisions together as a national contingent, the
practice became the rule rather than an exception to standard
practice for the Canadians. The Canadian Corps would move as one.43
Another first occurred on 4 April when
the 6th Canadian Brigade took over a section of line from the
British 76th Brigade wearing steel helmets for the first time. Like
telescopic rifles had been when first issued, these were considered
"trench stores" and were issued to units rather than individuals.44
The first issues were done on a scale of just 50 per company.45
The 27th Battalion went into the line
next to the corps right boundary, occupying 1,000 yards of front
running east opposite Craters 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. The line was badly
damaged and amounted to little more than a ditch, proving hard to
identify. The 250 yards opposite Craters 4 and 5 were supposed to
hold 12 Lewis gun posts, but only four could be found. The 27th
Battalion defended this area with bombing posts linked by patrols.
Their sector was also an ideal target for German shell fire and
enemy observers on Wytschaete Ridge, with the sun to their backs for
the majority of the day, could observe Canadian movements them at
will while British observers had no commanding positions and could
see only the lips of the craters on the sky-line, meaning that only
when the sun was low could individual craters be seen by their
shadows with the front line lying in the dead ground beyond.46
On the east side of the salient single
companies of the 31st relieved three entire exhausted British
battalions: "A" Company took the right sub-section over from the
12th Yorks, "B" Company the centre from the 4th East Yorks, and "C"
Company the left from the 7th King's Own Shropshire Light Infantry.
Their relief was effected under heavy shellfire and they also
occupied trenches that offered little protection, with obliterated
communications trenches and dugouts.47 The craters
themselves had not been occupied by the 3rd Division, being
considered too dangerous since German guns and mortars could easily
target them. Since they were on higher ground they had the advantage
of being relatively dry and the Canadian brigade commander,
Brigadier-General Ketchen, planned to fortify them.48
One of the craters at St. Eloi, likely
taken long after the battle.
Horses and men can be seen on the road on the far side. (click to
enlarge).
LAC photo
The original front line that the 3rd
Division had attacked from was now the 2nd Division reserve line,
but it had been obliterated for a distance of 1,000 yards, beaten
down and drenched, every shell hole turned into a pond and some
trenches with as much as three feet of standing water. Communication
between the captured German line and the rear was non-existent save
for what existed around the flanks of the system of craters. The
four centre craters had been created in such proximity that they
were an impassable obstacle, the largest being 50 feet deep and 180
feet across.
In spite of
these disadvantages General Turner felt that, given time, "we
could make a pretty good line of the position selected, but that
a very great amount of work would be required". The advice of
the commander of the outgoing division, based on some experience
in crater-fighting, was "to make good the [new] front line and
wire it ... dig a support line in front of the craters and wire
it ... provide communication trenches between old and new front
lines ... make tunnelled dugouts in the rear exterior slopes of
the craters as soon as the earth had consolidated sufficiently
... make and maintain dummy trenches round the lips of the
craters to induce the enemy to waste ammunition by shelling
them. Brig.-Gen. Ketchen was not in agreement with this proposed
scheme of developing field works. The 3rd British Division,
handicapped by the impossible ground and weather and the enemy's
harassing fire, had made little progress on such a programme.
Although two communication trenches had been dug, only one was
still recognizable by the time of the hand-over. Ketchen was
concerned over the extreme vulnerability of the new trench line
and wanted instead to occupy and fortify the craters as the main
defensive position - which is exactly what the Germans later
did. But there was no time to change policy or to arrange for
the men and materials required for such a task. The work of
consolidation was attacked with energy. During the first two
nights the 2nd Canadian Pioneer Battalion, under engineer
direction and assisted by large parties drawn from the 4th and
5th Brigades, toiled vigorously to improve the defences. Firing
positions in the captured German trenches which formed the front
line were reversed, pumping slightly reduced the water level,
British wounded were evacuated and the bodies of British and
German dead were removed. A support trench running eastward was
started south of the line of craters. Throughout 4 and 5 April
the whole of the Canadian front line came under almost continual
bombardment. The intensity of the German fire was described by a
British artillery officer who had been in the Ypres Salient for
the past year as far greater than any he had hitherto
experienced.49
The sectors of both the 27th and 31st
Battalions were punished by the German fire, 200 yards of trenches
in the 27th Battalion's area were completely blown in.50
The history of the 31st Battalion described the shell fire as
"intermittent" and "less severe than the bombardment of the previous
night" but recorded that "it was sufficient to keep the men on edge,
and prevent sleep" then noted that a violent bombardment resumed at
07:00 a.m. on 5 April. During the day 26 casualties were suffered by
the battalion.51
When shellfire destroyed the sandbag
parapet in front of a 31st Battalion trench, they were enfiladed by
German machine guns at Point 85 and exposed to sniper fire from
German positions only 150 yards distant. By this point, troops had
managed to dig individual slit trenches in the mud but casualties
had mounted in the 27th Battalion to the point they were were forced
to thin their front line to cover it, and contact couldn't be
maintained between the two battalions. On the evening of 5 April
sniper and observation parties of the 28th Battalion moved into the
large craters to attempt to hold them until they could be fortified,
but there remains confusion as to which ground they actually
occupied. On the night of 5-6 April, the 29th Battalion began to
relieve the 27th Battalion.52 Plans to relieve the 31st
Battalion were abandoned when it was found to be impossible to do
so.53
During the relief, which was carried out
over a single communication trench already in use by pioneers and
carrying parties, two battalions of Germans made an assault on the
craters at 3:30 a.m. on 6 April. Following an intense barrage, the
Germans were able to move into positions not yet occupied by relief
troops of the 5th Brigade. Attacking astride the road from St. Eloi
to Warneton, they moved right between Crater 3 and Crater 4, wiping
out machine gun posts. Their eastern wing was temporarily stopped by
machine guns of the 31st Battalion, who beat back attacks on Crater
6 and Crater 7, but artillery fire failed to stop the Germans from
splitting into small groups and securing Craters 2, 3, 4 and 5. In
just under three hours the enemy had regained all the terrain they
had lost between 27 March and 3 April.
Counter-attacks went poorly. Bombers of
the 27th and 29th Battalions were shot down before they could get
within grenade range of Craters 2 and 3. The 31st Battalion was
reinforced by the 28th and attacked Craters 4 and 5. Losing
direction in the featureless morass, they occupied Craters 6 and 7
and assumed they had taken their objectives. They were then cut off
by German shellfire, where no reconnoitring officer could link up in
daylight with them. Reconnaissance aircraft were similarly grounded
due to weather and no aerial photographs were produced between 8 and
16 April. Troops could see the high edge of Crater 5, thinking it to
be Crater 3. An attack on the night of 6-7 April by 75 bombers of
the 28th Battalion was held up by German shells and heavy rain. They
lost their way in the dark, captured some German patrols, and failed
to identify the objective while nonetheless occupying a group of
craters north of Crater 4. The 4th Brigade meanwhile relieved the
6th which had lost 617 men in four days of fighting.
On 8 April, Major-General Turner,
commanding the 2nd Division, suggested that the Germans be given the
same treatment they had meted out and urged a general evacuation
from the craters in order to heavily bombard them, or alternately to
attack along a wider front in order to present a wider objective for
return fire from German artillery. A surprise attack would have been
impossible in the small sector and resources were required for the
coming Somme offensive. General Alderson, the corps commander,
discussed the matter with General Plumers, the Army Commander, who
though that only Craters 2 and 3 had been retaken and the Canadians
were ordered to hold in place and retake the craters. Work continued
on Canadian fortifications by the 4th Brigade and reserve troops
while another attack, this time by the 21st Battalion, went in on
Craters 2 and 3 on the night of 8-9 April, to be thrown back by
small arms fire. Three Canadian battalions tried again the next
night, but the 18th, 20th and 21st Battalions once again made no
headway.
Another of the craters at St. Eloi. In
the distance is Kemmel. (click to enlarge).
LAC photo
On 10-11 April the Germans tried twice
to enlarge the salient, but were stopped by Canadian bombers. On
12-13 April, the 5th Brigade relieved the 4th Brigade and efforts
turned to improving the front line.54 On 13 April, the divisional
commander called off further attacks. It was finally realized that
Craters 2, 3, 4, and 5 were in possession of the enemy (it wouldn't
be until 16 April that aerial photography finally confirmed it). Nine days of confusion had
yielded little gain, and 1,373 casualties.
The sodden
condition of the ground, together with the difficulty in
determining locations caused by the greatly altered lay of the
terrain, were among the reasons for the failure to dislodge the
Germans...Blame, of course, had to be placed somewhere. The Army
Commander and General Alderson wanted to remove both Generals
Turner (the divisional commander) and Ketchen (commander of the
6th Brigade) but in the end - in the interest of not offending
Canadian sensibilities - it was General Alderson who would go.
On 28 May, he was relieved on orders from Ottawa, supposedly
because the government lacked confidence in his ability to hold
the Canadian divisions together. There is no doubt he was badly
treated. His competence in the field, first as Division and then
as Corps Commander, could not be questioned, and it is to him that
credit is due for building Canada's field army from a mob of
rank amateurs to one that was skilled and well-trained. The new
Corps Commander, fortunately, was perhaps even more competent,
and grew to be greatly respected by all Canadians.55
Lieutenant-General
Julian Byng, who had commanded corps at Gallipoli and in France,
arrived to take command of the Canadian Corps on 29 May. He would
lead the corps into its most famous battle a year later. Author Tim
Cook had a different assessment of the battle. He notes that the
G.O.C. of the British 3rd Division was "negligent in handing over
inadequately fortified lines to the relieving Canadians" but
concedes that "under the terrible German bombardment and vicious
trench fighting there was little his troops could have done." He
continues:
Ultimately,
however, Turner must be held accountable for his neglect of the
situation throughout the battle. The 2nd Canadian Division was
far from being the shock troops of 1918, and although it was to
develop into one of the finest divisions on the Western Front,
at St. Eloi it was ill-prepared and ill-led...
...Turner was certainly out of
his depth as a Divisional commander, yet his incompetence was
overlooked for fear of removing one of Canada's few heroic
generals. After the St. Eloi battle the British command,
although sacrificing Alderson for political reasons, realized
that Turner was unfit to command front-line troops and cleared
the way for Sir Arthur Currie to take command of the Canadian
Corps.
...St. Eloi was a squalid affair in which the Canadians were
trounced by both German commanders and troops. But it was not
simply, as one historian has observed, a battle in which "the
2nd Division lost the ground a British division had painfully
captured." There were many factors, especially the incompetence
of both Canadian and British commanders, which deprived the
inexperienced soldiers of the 2nd Canadian Division of a fair
chance to defend its position. But just as the 1st Division's
troops had a bloody inauguration into the Western Front, so
those of the 2nd Division at St. Eloi displayed in defeat the
determination and bravery that in time marked the Canadian Corps
as one of the finest fighting forces on the Western Front.56
Return to Static Warfare
St. Eloi was actively bombarded by both
sides for two more weeks. The 2nd Canadian Divisional Artillery
relieved the British 3rd Division's gun on 12-13 April. With
preparations for the Somme offensive underway, ammunition for
British heavy artillery was restricted and Canadian positions
suffered more heavily than the Germans. Craters 6 and 7 were
captured by the Germans on 19 April, but the enemy did not occupy
them.
Thereafter
both sides reverted to static warfare, glad to end fighting
under conditions so indescribably miserable. Enemy records give
the German losses in the recapture of the craters and the
subsequent fighting as 483; between 4 and 16 April the Canadian
casualties numbered 1373.
...The struggle for the craters left
an important tactical question unsolved. The operations
demonstrated that it was possible in trench warfare, given
proper preparations and the help of surprise, to seize a limited
objective. But they also proved the impossibility of holding out
against the volume of observed artillery fire which such a
narrow front invited. Future planners still had to decide the
best width of front to attack-"small enough to ensure success
but large enough to prevent the enemy's artillery making it
impossible to hold the captured ground".
St. Eloi was the 2nd Division's
first fight, and from it the troops emerged with a sense of
frustration. Fortunately this was only temporary, for the
Battles of the Somme were approaching, and in September the
Division was to prove its prowess and re-establish its
reputation by its sterling performance at Courcelette.57
During the fighting
at St. Eloi, the remainder of the Canadian Corps occupied positions
to their left, with the 1st Division in the centre of the Corps
front and the 3rd Division farther north. The Corps sector extended
from half a mile south-east of St. Eloi to a point 500 yards
north-west of Hooge, on the Menin road. Activity in the 1st and 3rd
Division sectors had been mainly shelling, patrolling and sniping on
both sides, with attempts to improve positions. Two German mines
were exploded on the 1st Division front on the night of 26-27 April,
and an attack on the 1st and 2nd Divisions driven off.
While the month of
May produced no great battles for any of the divisions in the
Canadian Corps, there were nonetheless 2,000 casualties, again
mostly due to continual artillery fire. The Germans continued to
have the advantage as the British built up their guns for the coming
Somme offensive leaving few surplus weapons for the rest of the
front. During May 1915 Canadian troops first used wireless to
control artillery fire. The "experiment ... was awkward and confused
and nearly ended in tragedy, but it marked the beginning of a new
system of control which gave more rapid and accurate fire."58
 Mount
Sorrel
See main article:
Mount
Sorrel
During this quiet period, the Germans
were preparing an attack aimed at the sector held by the 3rd
Canadian Division, the high ground between Mount Sorrel and Hill 61
known as Observatory Ridge, jutting into the Ypres Salient for some
500 yards. While Allied intelligence had spotted warning signs of a
possible assault, the presence of additional German troops had not
been detected and no precautions were in place when on the morning
of 2 June 1916 a heavy bombardment was brought down. Major-General
Mercer, commanding the 3rd Division, was inspecting the 4th Canadian
Mounted Rifles with Brigadier-General Williams of the 8th Brigade
and was killed by shrapnel while Williams was seriously wounded. Of
702 officers and men, just 76 of the 4th CMR survived. German
infantry swarmed forward following the detonation of four mines at
1:00 p.m. and met little Canadian resistance. Mount Sorrel and HIlls
61 and 62 fell quickly, while PPCLI and 5th CMR were able to put up
a stand in Sanctuary Wood and Maple Copse, respectively.
The new corps commander set out to
recapture every bit of lost ground, and the 2nd Army agreed to
provide all the guns in the Ypres Salient for support - 218
artillery pieces. General Currie's 1st Division prepared to smash
the Germans with heavy gunfire first, then counter-attack. Planning
was thorough, with detailed reconnaissance, aerial photographs, and
artillery registered on targets. Units rehearsed their role in the
upcoming attack.
On 12 June the entire German line was
bombarded, and shells crashed down between Sanctuary Wood and Hill
60 for ten hours. For 45 minutes before Zero Hour, 1:30 a.m. on 13
June, a final barrage fell and the attack went in under a smoke
screen in heavy rain. Light resistance was unable to stop the
Canadians from regaining almost all of the original, battered front
line. The cost of the fighting in June, including the initial German
attack as well as the successful counter-attack, was 8,000
casualties.59
Notes
-
Interested readers may find Barbara Tuchman's
The Guns of August useful. The work received the
Pulitzer Prize in 1963 for general non-fiction.
-
Lotz, Jim Canadians at War (Bison
Books Ltd., London, UK, 1990) ISBN 0-86124-641-1 pp.24-25
-
Dancocks, Daniel G. Welcome to Flanders
Fields: The First Canadian Battle of the Great War: Ypres, 1915
(McClelland and Stewart, Toronto, ON, 1988) ISBN
0-7710-2545-9 pp.36-37
-
Ibid, pp.60-66
-
Ibid, p.37
-
Lotz, Ibid, p.31
-
Dancocks, Daniel G. Gallant Canadians: The
Story of the 10th Canadian Infantry Battalion 1914-1919
(The Calgary Highlanders Regimental Funds Foundation, Calgary,
AB, 1990) ISBN 0-9694616-0-7 pp.102-132
-
Marteinson, John (editor) We Stand on Guard: An Illustrated History of the Canadian
Army (Ovale Publications, Montreal, PQ, 1992) ISBN
2894290438 pp.103-104
-
Lotz, Ibid, p.25
-
For a full account see Duguid, A.F. A
Question of Confidence: The Ross Rifle in the Trenches
(Service Publications, Ottawa, ON) ISBN 1-894581-00-8
-
Lotz, Ibid, pp.28-29
-
Marteinson, Ibid, pp.105-106
-
Dancocks, Welcome to Flanders Fields,
Ibid, p.134
-
Ibid, pp.133-134
-
Marteinson, Ibid, pp.105-116
-
Ibid, p.116
-
Bercuson, David J. The Patricias: The Proud
History of a Fighting Regiment (Stoddart Publishing Co.
Ltd., Toronto, ON, 2001) ISBN 0-7737-3298-5 p.66
-
Nicholson, Gerald
W.L. Official History of the
Canadian Army in the First World War: Canadian Expeditionary
Force 1914-1919 (Queen's Printer Ottawa, ON, 1964)
p.79. The figure of 150
survivors comes from page 116 of Marteinson, Ibid.
-
Marteinson, Ibid, p.118
-
Messenger, Charles Trench
Fighting (Ballantine Books Inc., New York, NY, 1972),
ISBN 345-02456-7 p.52
-
Marteinson, Ibid, pp.118-121
-
Ibid, pp.122-125
-
Messenger, Ibid, p.9
-
Marteinson, Ibid, pp.126-127
-
Chartrand, René The Canadian Corps in World
War I (Osprey Publishing Ltd., Botley, Oxford, UK, 2007)
ISBN 978-184603-186-1 p.11
-
Marteinson, Ibid, p.128
-
Ibid, p.129
-
Ibid
-
Dancocks, Ibid, p.65
-
Nicholson, Ibid,
p.117
-
Lotz, Ibid, p.35
-
Marteinson, Ibid, p.133
-
Ibid
-
Nicholson, Ibid, p.121
-
Nicholson, Ibid, p.119
-
Pegler, Martin Sniping in the Great War
(Pen & Sword Books Ltd, Barnsley, South Yorkshire, UK, 2008)
ISBN 978-1-84415-755-6 p.147
-
Law, Clive M. Without Warning: Canadian
Sniper Equipment in the 20th Century (Service
Publications, Ottawa, ON, 2004) ISBN 1-894581-16-4 pp.16-22
-
Nicholson, Ibid, p.120
-
Ibid
-
Ibid, pp.121-122
-
Ibid
-
Marteinson, Ibid, pp.135-136
-
Ibid, pp.121-123
-
Lucy, Roger V. Tin Lids: Canadian Combat
Helmets (2nd Ed) (Service Publications, Ottawa, ON,
2008) ISBN 0-9699845-3-7 p.5
-
Nicholson, Ibid, p.123
-
Ibid
-
Singer, Horace C. (Edited by Carrell Knight)
History of the 31st Canadian Infantry Battalion C.E.F.
(Detselig Enterprises Ltd., Calgary, AB, 2006) ISBN
978-1-55059-316-7 p.94
-
Nicholson, Ibid
-
Ibid
-
Ibid
-
Singer, Ibid, pp.98-99
-
Nicholson, Ibid
-
Singer, Ibid, p.99
-
Nicholson, Ibid, p.127
-
Marteinson, Ibid, p.136
-
Cook, Tim "The Blind Leading the Blind: The
Battle of the St. Eloi Craters," Canadian Military
History, Vol. 5, Iss 2 accessed online at
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol5/iss2/4 The historian that
Cook refers to is Desmond Morton, quoting his book When Your
Number's Up.
-
Nicholson, Ibid, p.128
-
Ibid, p.129
-
Marteinson, Ibid, pp.137-138
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