Operation VERITABLE

(Note: this article describes the planning and other items of interest regarding Operation VERITABLE: discussion of the actual battles and fighting in the Rhineland will be covered in other articles on the site.)

Operation VERITABLE was the code name for the offensive launched by First Canadian Army during the opening phase of the Battle of the Rhineland. An operation named VALEDICTION had originally been planned for early January, but was cancelled. General Eisenhower, supreme commander of the Allied forces in North-West Europe, was faced with a variety of choices as to how to proceed against the Germans following their failed Ardennes Offensive. Despite promptings by Field Marshal Montgomery, commander of 21st Army Group, Eisenhower elected to retain his "broad front" policy. A limited allocation of American forces under British command was made for Operation VERITABLE, which was to be half of a two-pronged assault out of the Nijmegen Salient, intended to clear the land between the Maas and the Rhine River, with the intent of securing a foothold on the west bank in preparation for crossing the river itself. The second part of the assault towards the Rhine was to be Operation GRENADE, launched by the U.S. 9th Army. A planned third assault had to be cancelled; the British 2nd Army was to be employed in a holding action on the Maas, as well as planning for the Rhine crossings.¹

Montgomery had pressed for command of all the divisions in the U.S. 12th Army Group, perhaps unaware of the bad feelings a press conference he had held in the wake of the Ardennes fighting had caused among his contemporaries. Having been given temporary command of the U.S. 1st and 9th Armies, press reports later gave the impression that the situation in the "Battle of the Bulge" had been reversed due to the influence of  British commanders, when in fact that influence on the battle had been minimal at best. The Americans were upset at having had the credit taken from them, and little mollified even when Montgomery held a press conference to clarify - days later - that the entire "Allied team" had contributed to the victory over what was in actuality the German's last great offensive action on the western front for the war. The damage was done and strained relations had been taken to the breaking point; nonetheless General Eisenhower had no choice but to consider the needs of the Allied cause. He ordered 12 divisions transferred to Montgomery's command for the dual operation - though some formations earmarked for GRENADE were still engaged in operations at the time the orders were given.²

The 1st Canadian Army by this time had a fighting strength of 380,000 men, but with attached civilian labourers, POWs, and other personnel, actually had a ration strength in excess of 470,000 men. General Crerar was to find himself in command of no less than 13 divisions for a time in February, including nine American divisions. A desire to have a single corps control operations in the initial phase of the attack, however, put a British headquarters in the spotlight, as XXX Corps was given operational control of both 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions.³

Order of Battle

Allied

(Formations involved in Operation VERITABLE)

• 21st Army Group

  • First Canadian Army

    • II Canadian Corps

      • British 11th Armoured Division

      • 4th Canadian (Armoured) Division

      • 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade

    • British XXX Corps

      • Guards Armoured Division

      • 2nd Canadian Infantry Division

      • 3rd Canadian Infantry Division

      • 15th (Scottish) Division

      • 51st (Highland) Division

      • 53rd (Welsh) Division

      • 43rd (Wessex) Division

      • 6th Guards Tank Brigade

      • 34th Armoured Brigade

• Elements of 79th Armoured Division attached (including 1st Canadian Armoured Carrier Regiment)

(Formations involved in Operation GRENADE)

• US 9th Army

  • XIII Corps

    • 5th Armored Division

    • 84th Infantry Division

    • 102d Infantry Division

  • XVI Corps

    • 8th Armored Division

    • 35th Infantry Division

    • 79th Infantry Division

  • XIX Corps

    • 2nd Armored Division

    • 29th Infantry Division

    • 30th Infantry Division

    • 83d Infantry Division

  • VII Corps

    • 3d Armored Division

    • 104th Infantry Division

    • 8th Infantry Division

German

• Army Group "G"

  • 1st Parachute Army

    • II Parachute Corps

      • Infanterie Division 190

      • Parachute Division 7

      • Parachute Division 8

    • LXXXVI Corps

      • Infanterie Division 84

      • Infanterie Division 180

      • Elements of Parachute Division 2

    • XVII Panzer Corps

    • XLVII Panzer Corps

• Panzer Division 116 (reserve)

• Panzergrenadier Division 15 (reserve)⁷

Artillery Plan

Much has been written about the artillery preparation for VERITABLE; even decades after the event, the Standing Orders of the Royal Canadian Artillery held the operation up as an example of the penultimate in artillery preparation:

General Crerar had to make a frontal attack against three successful fortified zones, each firmly anchored on the Rhine River. The defences included two and three lines of trench works linking strongpoints and reinforced by anti-tank ditches. Small towns and villages between the second and third zones had been extensively fortified. General Crerar’s final objective lay 40 miles from his front lines. Due to this depth, VERITABLE was planned in three stages, with enough time between each to regroup infantry and armour and to bring supporting artillery to within range of their new targets. General Crerar had XXX British Corps under command, while I British Corps would provide a secure anchor and deception to the South. Due to the narrow distance between the Rhine (to the north) and the Maas River (to the south), the initial assault would be made by the five divisions of XXX Corps (including 2nd Canadian Infantry Division), and as the distance widened, II Canadian Corps would join in on the left flank.

The artillery support for the operation was intended as a major battle-winning factor. The XXX Corps Fire Plan was designed to take advantage of a 14:1 advantage in Allied versus German artillery to use massive gunfire to blast a way for the infantry into the enemy’s defences. The Fire Plan called for:

• preliminary bombardment to prevent the enemy from interfering with the initial assault;

• complete saturation of enemy defences;

• destruction of known concrete positions;

• immediate supporting fire for the attack; and

• maximum fire of the medium regiments on the Materborn feature 12,000 yards from the start line, without their having to move forward.

The fire of seven divisional artilleries would be augmented by five AGRA’s and two anti-aircraft brigades together with units of Corps and Army level artillery, for a total of 1034 guns (in addition to the 17-pounders and 40mm Bofors which would be used with tanks, mortars and machine-guns to “Pepperpot” selected targets). All known enemy localities, headquarters and communications sites were targeted. An estimated six tons of shell would fall on each target. The concrete defences of the Materborn would be subjected to the fire of the 8-inch and 240mm guns of the 3rd Super Heavy Regiment RA located in the 1st British Corps area to the South.

The Fire Plan would open with the preparatory fire from 5:00 to 9:45 A.M. on D-Day (8 February 1945). It would be followed by a Block Barrage planned to support the three central divisions in their advance. This barrage would last for seventy minutes on the initial positions and was 500 yards deep. At H Hour the barrage would lift 300 yards, repeating this every twelve minutes to allow for the advancing speed of the infantry and armour over the difficult terrain.

A novel feature was introduced into the schedule for the preliminary bombardment. Between 7:30 and 7:40 a smoke screen would be fired across the front, followed by 10 minutes of complete silence. It was hoped that the enemy, assuming that the screen heralded the main assault, would engage with his artillery, thereby exposing his gun positions. Flash spotters, sound rangers and pen recorders of the locating batteries would attempt to pinpoint the enemy battery positions, allowing counter battery fire to neutralize the exposed enemy guns before H-Hour.

A massive ammunition dumping program was carried out by II Canadian Corps prior to the assault. More than half a million rounds, weighing more than 10,000 tons were dumped - 700 rounds per gun on field gun positions and 400 rounds per gun on medium positions. In addition 120 truck loads per division of 40mm, 17-pounder, 75mm and 12.7mm ammunition was dumped for the “Pepperpot” requirement. More than 10,000 three-inch rockets for the Land Mattress Battery were brought in.

Stunned by the ferocity of the preliminary bombardment of over 500,000 rounds of various natures of ammunition, and pinned down by the tremendous barrage which had expended more than 160,000 shells, the badly disorganized enemy troops offered little resistance to the assaulting infantry and armour. The effectiveness of the counter battery and counter mortar programs was seen in the almost complete lack of German shelling and mortaring. Most of the Allied casualties, which were relatively light, came from mines rather than artillery or small arms fire. Interrogators were told that the bombardment had a devastating effect upon morale, producing a feeling of complete helplessness and isolation, with no prospect of any possible reinforcement. The artillery fire had also succeeded in seriously disrupting the German lines of communication and resupply.

The day’s success owed much to the contributing factors of well-prepared gun programs, carefully sorted ammunition, much improved meteorological data and recently-calibrated guns. The massive preparations had been successful in providing effective artillery support to the operation. It didn’t end there, however. The artillery would provide continuous support with barrages, screens, direct support and counter battery fire until the enemy was finally beaten three months later.⁸

Infantrymen of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles in a Buffalo amphibious vehicle taking part in Operation VERITABLE en route from Niel to Keeken, Germany, 9 February 1945.