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Operation VERITABLE
(Note: this article
describes the planning and other items of interest regarding Operation
VERITABLE: discussion of the actual battles and fighting in the Rhineland
will be covered in other articles on the site.)
Operation VERITABLE was the
code name for the offensive launched by First Canadian Army during the
opening phase of the Battle of the Rhineland. An operation named
VALEDICTION had originally been planned for early January, but was
cancelled. General Eisenhower, supreme commander of the Allied forces in
North-West Europe, was faced with a variety of choices as to how to
proceed against the Germans following their failed Ardennes Offensive.
Despite promptings by Field Marshal Montgomery, commander of 21st Army
Group, Eisenhower elected to retain his "broad front" policy. A limited
allocation of American forces under British command was made for Operation
VERITABLE, which was to be half of a two-pronged assault out of the
Nijmegen Salient, intended to clear the land between the Maas and the
Rhine River, with the intent of securing a foothold on the west bank in
preparation for crossing the river itself. The second part of the assault
towards the Rhine was to be Operation GRENADE, launched by the U.S. 9th
Army. A planned third assault had to be cancelled; the British 2nd Army
was to be employed in a holding action on the Maas, as well as planning
for the Rhine crossings.1
Montgomery had pressed for
command of all the divisions in the U.S. 12th Army Group, perhaps unaware
of the bad feelings a press conference he had held in the wake of the
Ardennes fighting had caused among his contemporaries. Having been given
temporary command of the U.S. 1st and 9th Armies, press reports later gave
the impression that the situation in the "Battle of the Bulge" had been
reversed due to the influence of British commanders, when in fact
that influence on the battle had been minimal at best. The Americans were
upset at having had the credit taken from them, and little mollified even
when Montgomery held a press conference to clarify - days later - that the
entire "Allied team" had contributed to the victory over what was in
actuality the German's last great offensive action on the western front
for the war. The damage was done and strained relations had been taken to
the breaking point; nonetheless General Eisenhower had no choice but to
consider the needs of the Allied cause. He ordered 12 divisions
transferred to Montgomery's command for the dual operation - though some
formations earmarked for GRENADE were still engaged in operations at the
time the orders were given.2
The 1st Canadian Army by
this time had a fighting strength of 380,000 men, but with attached
civilian labourers, POWs, and other personnel, actually had a ration
strength in excess of 470,000 men. General Crerar was to find himself in
command of no less than 13 divisions for a time in February, including
nine American divisions. A desire to have a single corps control
operations in the initial phase of the attack, however, put a British
headquarters in the spotlight, as XXX Corps was given operational control
of both 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions.3
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The enemy was convinced of a need for
holding the territory west of the Rhine; despite protestations by the
Commander-in-Chief West, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt
(Eisenhower's opposite number in the German field forces), Hitler
personally forbade the retreat from any German soil. Militarily,
Rundstedt felt it far more prudent to defend behind the natural
obstacle of the Rhine river but his wishes did not prevail.
Nonetheless, there were a series of concrete fortifications - the West
Wall - along the frontier. Also known as the Siegfried Line, these
fortifications had been begun before the war, and consisted of weapons
bunkers and "dragon's teeth" anti-tank obstacles.4 There
were in fact three separate lines of defences in the sector earmarked
for VERITABLE. A series of outpost positions to the west of the
Reichswald forest; the West Wall, running through the forest itself,
and the Hochwald "Layback" position, which covered the approaches to
the Rhine river near Xanten.5
One historian has
speculated as to why the Germans continued to resist into 1945:
There is strong
evidence, borne out by the testimony of many Allied and German
commanders, that (the) no-compromise approach (of unconditional
surrender) merely stiffened the German will to fight and prolonged
the war. Hitler managed to convince even the most reasoned and
influential anti-Nazis that because of the Allied insistence upon
unconditional surrender, there could be no alternative to stubborn
resistance, no thought of a negotiated peace.6
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Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt was twice
hired and fired as Commander-in-Chief West. As Honourary
Colonel-in-Chief of Infanterie Regiment 18, he preferred to wear an
infantry officer's collar tabs rather than those of a general officer. |
Order of Battle
- Allied
 (Formations
involved in Operation VERITABLE)
(Formations involved in
Operation GRENADE)
-
US 9th Army
-
XIII Corps
-
5th Armored Division
-
84th Infantry
Division
-
102d Infantry
Division
-
XVI Corps
-
8th Armored Division
-
35th Infantry
Division
-
79th Infantry
Division
-
XIX Corps
-
2nd Armored Division
-
29th Infantry
Division
-
30th Infantry
Division
-
83d Infantry Division
-
VII Corps
-
3d Armored Division
-
104th Infantry
Division
-
8th Infantry Division
- German
Artillery Plan
Much has been written about
the artillery preparation for VERITABLE; even decades after the event, the
Standing Orders of the Royal Canadian Artillery held the operation up as
an example of the penultimate in artillery preparation:
General Crerar had to
make a frontal attack against three successful fortified zones, each
firmly anchored on the Rhine River. The defences included two and three
lines of trench works linking strongpoints and reinforced by anti-tank
ditches. Small towns and villages between the second and third zones had
been extensively fortified. General Crerar’s final objective lay 40
miles from his front lines. Due to this depth, VERITABLE was planned in
three stages, with enough time between each to regroup infantry and
armour and to bring supporting artillery to within range of their new
targets. General Crerar had XXX British Corps under command, while I
British Corps would provide a secure anchor and deception to the South.
Due to the narrow distance between the Rhine (to the north) and the Maas
River (to the south), the initial assault would be made by the five
divisions of XXX Corps (including 2nd Canadian Infantry Division), and
as the distance widened, II Canadian Corps would join in on the left
flank.
The artillery support
for the operation was intended as a major battle-winning factor. The XXX
Corps Fire Plan was designed to take advantage of a 14:1 advantage in
Allied versus German artillery to use massive gunfire to blast a way for
the infantry into the enemy’s defences. The Fire Plan called for:
-
preliminary
bombardment to prevent the enemy from interfering with the initial
assault;
-
complete saturation
of enemy defences;
-
destruction of known
concrete positions;
-
immediate supporting
fire for the attack; and
-
maximum fire of the
medium regiments on the Materborn feature 12,000 yards from the start
line, without their having to move forward.
The fire of seven
divisional artilleries would be augmented by five AGRA’s and two
anti-aircraft brigades together with units of Corps and Army level
artillery, for a total of 1034 guns (in addition to the 17-pounders and
40mm Bofors which would be used with tanks, mortars and machine-guns to
“Pepperpot” selected targets). All known enemy localities, headquarters
and communications sites were targeted. An estimated six tons of shell
would fall on each target. The concrete defences of the Materborn would
be subjected to the fire of the 8-inch and 240mm guns of the 3rd Super
Heavy Regiment RA located in the 1st British Corps area to the South.
The Fire Plan would
open with the preparatory fire from 5:00 to 9:45 A.M. on D-Day (8
February 1945). It would be followed by a Block Barrage planned to
support the three central divisions in their advance. This barrage would
last for seventy minutes on the initial positions and was 500 yards
deep. At H Hour the barrage would lift 300 yards, repeating this every
twelve minutes to allow for the advancing speed of the infantry and
armour over the difficult terrain.
A novel feature was
introduced into the schedule for the preliminary bombardment. Between
7:30 and 7:40 a smoke screen would be fired across the front, followed
by 10 minutes of complete silence. It was hoped that the enemy, assuming
that the screen heralded the main assault, would engage with his
artillery, thereby exposing his gun positions. Flash spotters, sound
rangers and pen recorders of the locating batteries would attempt to
pinpoint the enemy battery positions, allowing counter battery fire to
neutralize the exposed enemy guns before H-Hour.
A massive ammunition
dumping program was carried out by II Canadian Corps prior to the
assault. More than half a million rounds, weighing more than 10,000 tons
were dumped - 700 rounds per gun on field gun positions and 400 rounds
per gun on medium positions. In addition 120 truck loads per division of
40mm, 17-pounder, 75mm and 12.7mm ammunition was dumped for the
“Pepperpot” requirement. More than 10,000 three-inch rockets for the
Land Mattress Battery were brought in.
Stunned by the
ferocity of the preliminary bombardment of over 500,000 rounds of
various natures of ammunition, and pinned down by the tremendous barrage
which had expended more than 160,000 shells, the badly disorganized
enemy troops offered little resistance to the assaulting infantry and
armour. The effectiveness of the counter battery and counter mortar
programs was seen in the almost complete lack of German shelling and
mortaring. Most of the Allied casualties, which were relatively light,
came from mines rather than artillery or small arms fire. Interrogators
were told that the bombardment had a devastating effect upon morale,
producing a feeling of complete helplessness and isolation, with no
prospect of any possible reinforcement. The artillery fire had also
succeeded in seriously disrupting the German lines of communication and
resupply.
The day’s success owed
much to the contributing factors of well-prepared gun programs,
carefully sorted ammunition, much improved meteorological data and
recently-calibrated guns. The massive preparations had been successful
in providing effective artillery support to the operation. It didn’t end
there, however. The artillery would provide continuous support with
barrages, screens, direct support and counter battery fire until the
enemy was finally beaten three months later.8
Infantrymen of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles
in a Buffalo amphibious vehicle taking part in Operation VERITABLE en
route from Niel to Keeken, Germany, 9 February 1945.
Notes
-
Stacey, C.P. The Canadian Army
1939-1945 (Queen's Printer, 1948) p.237
-
Whitaker, Denis Rhineland p.21
-
Stacey, Ibid, p.238
-
Whitaker, Ibid, pp.24-25
-
Stacey, Ibid, p.238
-
Whitaker, Ibid, p.27
-
Hogg, Ian. Great
Land Battles of World War II (Doubleday & Company, Inc.,
Garden City, NY, 1987) ISBN 0385242409 p.177
-
RCA Standing Orders
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