The British 8th Army, now linked to the U.S. 5th Army that had come ashore at Salerno, had paused to regroup along the Ofanto River, only 25 miles north of Potenza. Allied logistical problems, and an apparent lack of urgency among Allied commanders, put the drive north on halt. The Canadians were ordered to take Mount Vulture and secure the town of Melfi, but no movement was planned until the 1st of October.²

It was in this period that German strategy in Italy became clearly defined. Original plans for a withdrawal far to the north to defend what later became the Gothic Line at Rimini were scrapped in favour of defending far south of Rome.³

The nature of the German defence also became sinister:

The German high command also issued orders on Sept. 22, instructing the soldiers of 10th Army to adopt measures outlined in a directive entitled Exploitation of Italy for the Further Conduct of the War. This order demanded that “extensive use be made of the Italian male population for further military and economic purposes.” Both civilians and soldiers were to be conscripted for construction battalions and “extensive use” was to be made of conscripted drivers, mechanics and fitters “in order that the German soldiers may be freed up for fighting.” Supplementary orders required the confiscation of material in the Naples and Foggia areas that might be of value to the German war effort, especially locomotives, train cars and trucks. Material that could not be removed was destroyed.

The Canadians witnessed one of the most dramatic examples of Hitler’s scorched-earth policy when a patrol from the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry reached Atella, a village south of Melfi. That is where the Germans destroyed a section of the Apulian Aqueduct, the major source of water for the Foggia area and the heel of Italy.⁴

As the Germans retreated north towards Foggia, jaundice and infective hepatitis became a more serious enemy. Always a danger for troops in the Mediterranean (the New Zealanders at El Alamein had been particularly hard hit by disease), the incidence of hepatitis proved alarming for Canadian authorities who noted an epidemic beginning in Sicily and peaking in October (the disease re-emerged in the spring of 1944, hospitalizing over 6,000 Canadians in theatre). Infective hepatitis put a soldier out of action an average of 50 days.⁵  In late 1943, Major-General Simonds succumbed, and Brigadier Chris Vokes was selected to command the 1st Canadian Division in his absence. The appointment was a surprise to Vokes ("I was rather startled," he later wrote) as Howard Penhale was the senior brigadier of the division. In his place, Lieutenant-Colonel Bert Hoffmeister took over the 2nd Brigade. Neither appointment was intended to be permanent, and the promotions were confirmed on 1 November.⁶

The Move West From Foggia

The 1st Canadian Division did not spend long on the Foggia plain, and once again the 1st Division was heading back into mountainous country as the Allied armies reached the third phase of operations forecast by General Alexander ten days earlier. The ultimate objective was Rome, to be taken by a pincers formed by the 8th Army attacking across the peninsula from Pescara and the 5th Army driving from Naples. Confidence in their success cascaded down through all ranks, and there was a genuine belief at the end of September that the Germans would fight a staged withdrawal to the line Pisa-Rimini. The commander of the 8th Army, General Montgomery, worried about administration and the ability to logistically support an extended drive in pursuit of the Germans.⁷

The plan for the 8th Army was to gain the Termoli-Campobasso lateral (Highway No. 87, linking the post city on the Adriatic with Naples, on the opposite coast) and then halt and operate with "light forces" to ensure that an extended drive could be sustained north towards Rome. The light forces were expected to operate no further than a line Pescara-Popoli, about 130 miles from Foggia by road. Highway No. 87, the new intermediate objective of 8th Army, crossed their axis of advance 45 miles west of Foggia, passing through Campobasso. General Dempsey, commanding the 13th Corps, was ordered to advance two divisions to this line. The 78th was to move with its axis on the main coast road, with the 1st Canadian Division on the hilly left flank, aimed at Vinchiaturo, a road junction west of Campobassa, at the foot of the Matese Mountains.

The going for the Canadian Division promised to be hard; there were no alternative routes, with only Highway No. 17, the main route between Foggia and Vinchiaturo running west into the Sannio Mountains, twisting and doubling back and almost tripling the distance between towns on its path. Movement would be almost entirely roadbound, and the upper Fortore River and tributaries also flowed north-east in the path of the Canadians.

On 29 September, at his last conference before going to hospital, General Simonds announced his plan for the 1st Division's advance. He named five bounds between Lucera and Campobasso to which the main body of the 1st Brigade would move as each was reported clear by an advanced guard, whose task would be to deal with light enemy rearguards. This mobile force was commanded by The Calgary Regiment's C.O., Lt.-Col. Neroutsos, and included the 4th Princess Louise Dragoon Guards, the Calgary tanks, The Royal Canadian Regiment (carried in lorries) and the 27th Anti-Tank Battery R.C.A., with the 2nd Field Regiment R.C.A. and the 66th Medium Regiment R.A. in support.

While the main advance would be made along Highway No. 17, with the 3rd Brigade in reserve, the 2nd Brigade would strike through the bleak hill country to the south, thus protecting the left flank of the Division, and indeed of the entire Eighth Army. The divisional start line was at Lucera, which has stood from Roman times on an isolated rocky fragment of the Apennines rising 500 feet above the surrounding plain. From the western edge of this natural stronghold one of Frederick II's great castles still faced the hills, and as the leading Canadian troops descended the highway past the massive walls early on the morning of 1 October, they could see, stretching across their path a dozen miles ahead, the abrupt rise of the outlying ridges of the Daunia Mountains. A strong vanguard moved well in advance of Neroutsos' force. It was led by Lt.-Col. F. D. Adams, and consisted of his Reconnaissance Regiment, a squadron of the Calgaries and a company of the R.C.R. Shortly before 8:00 a.m. the Princess Louise "A" Squadron came under machine-gun fire as it reached the lower spirals by which Highway No. 17 climbed out of the level plain. It quickly became apparent that the enemy was prepared to dispute possession of the village of Motta Montecorvino, which sat like a thimble on a pointed hill atop the first main ridge.⁸

The Battle

German machine gun posts and 8.8cm guns defended the ridge, located for four of five miles on each side of the highway. Reconnaissance made it clear that an attack in force would be necessary to move the Germans from Motta. "B" Squadron of the IV Princess Louise Dragoon Guards, the divisional reconnaissance regiment, managed a rapid move southwest from Lucera to Alberona, a hill-top village six miles south of Motta.

The commander (of "B" Squadron) , Major M. A. G. Stroud, had learned about the enemy's dispositions from Major Vladimir Peniakoff*, the founder of "Popski's Private Army". The two pooled their resources, and the combined armoured-car and jeep force, making its way with difficulty up a narrow and tortuous track into the hills, assaulted Alberona from the rear. Without suffering a single casualty the attackers drove the Germans from the town, killing at least fifteen. It was the first of many instances of active co-operation between "P.P.A." and Canadian troops.The dead Germans were clothed in the familiar Luftwaffe blue with yellow pipings; for the line of the Motta ridge was being held by elements of the 3rd Regiment of Heidrich's 1st Parachute Division.⁹

The advanced guard of the main Canadian force then went into action at 16:00hrs. The Calgary Tanks and Royal Canadian Regiment were delayed in bad traffic congestion and only the 10th Field Battery was available for artillery support, so that "A" and "B" Squadrons of the Calgaries had to advance in the face of heavy anti-tank fire to fight their way into the town in what was "intended to be a combined infantry and tank attack."

But now infantry-tank co-operation broke down. Machine-gun fire sweeping the exposed slopes was evidence that the enemy still held the town and the flanking hills, and it was apparent that heavy casualties would accompany any attempt by the R.C.R. to follow the armour into Motta by daylight. As darkness fell Neroutsos ordered his tanks to withdraw to a less hazardous position, and the R.C.R. commander, Lt.-Col. D. C. Spry, reorganized his troops for a night assault.¹⁰

By 21:00hrs, two companies of The Royal Canadian Regiment ("C" and "D") were halfway up the main ridge, having secured an intervening platform north of the highway, while an "A" Company patrol reported the edge of town clear. The remained of the company attempted to enter Motta to be met by heavy machine gun fire. The Commanding Officer pulled his troops back down the slope in order to shell the town and attack again in force; by now the 2nd Field Regiment was able to deploy, and just before 03:00hrs was able to put a brief but heavy concentration of 25-pdr shells into Motta. Attacking into a violent thunderstorm, "A" and "B" Companies assaulted the town once more, facing scattered resistance, the Germans beginning to withdraw up Highway No. 17. By first light, the RCR had secured the town and were in positions on the far edge of the town.

The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment "received instructions for one of its famous flank approaches" at noon on 2 October, and "promptly set out in single file toward a cavernous gulley that reached upward to the east of Motta." In the words of the Regimental historian:

The approach was arduous but uneventful until the leading companies clambered out of the head of the gulley and began to scuttle across a narrow opening towards the shelter of an oak forest. Instantly the waiting Germans opened fire from both flanks and the front, and the two forward companies dropped into what cover they could find. It was uncomfortable, and frustrating. The enemy lay concealed in the forest only a few hundred yards ahead, but could not be dislodged. Smoke was called for, and under its cover the rest of the unit attempted to come forward, but was soon halted. Individuals exchanged fire with their opposite numbers or crawled snake-wise amongst the rocks. The heat was heavy and the dust was acrid. The day drew on, bringing a chill darkness and a driving rain that saturated the men in their makeshift fox-holes. Scrambling through the dripping underbrush, firing at shadows, nervous and wet and cold, the unit edged forward and the enemy withdrew. Dawn broke at last as the Regiment reached its objective, feeling exhausted and disgruntled.¹¹

The divisional advanced guard's operations thus came to an end. On 2 October, the acting divisional commander directed the 1st Brigade to take over the lead. "C" Company of the RCR, with "C" Squadron of the 14th Canadian Armoured Regiment advanced on their next objective, a road junction 2,000 yards west of Motta, where a secondary road to Castelnuovo della Daunia branched off of Highway No. 17, along the dominating heights of Mount Sambuco. Both infantry and armour were caught by heavy German fire in an exposed saddle between the objective and the Motta hill, and six Canadian tanks were knocked out, while the RCR company was pinned down 600 yards from the ridge.

Soldiers of The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment advance through Motta on 2 October 1943. LAC photo.

The fighting at Motta had also represented the first major engagement fought by Canadians on the Italian mainland.

In striking their first blow against the protecting screen of the 1st Parachute Division, the Canadians encountered a new pattern of enemy behaviour-determined and fierce resistance up to an unpredictable moment, then rapid withdrawal to another dominant feature. These effective tactics were being employed by the enemy in accordance with a Tenth Army order issued late in September for a slow withdrawal to defence positions south of Rome. Two of its paragraphs suggest that the order might have been written expressly for the battle group of paratroopers who opposed the Canadians at Motta Montecorvino.

Within the limits of the delaying action, every opportunity is to be taken of destroying enemy forces that have pushed ahead incautiously, and of inflicting heavy losses through action of combined arms. Withdrawal to the individual defence lines and the delaying action between them are dependent on the enemy advance.

Withdrawal movements must only take place as a result of overwhelming enemy pressure or of heavy losses caused by intense artillery fire. The practice is to be followed of intensifying our own artillery fire shortly before withdrawal, and posting rearguards well supplied with ammunition to screen the withdrawal movement ....

This systematic opposition to our advance was to continue as the 1st Division pushed deeper into the rocky uplands of the Molise. Allied staffs were soon to realize that an unexpected development had taken place in the German plan of campaign. On 30 September…Hitler had ordered the Tenth Army to stabilize and hold a winter line across the narrowest part of the peninsula. On the German left flank this position was to be at the River Sangro, which flowed across the 76th Corps' sector 50 miles north-west of Motta. Herr was notified that his withdrawal across these 50 miles should not be completed before 1 November.¹²

Soldier of The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment equipped with a PIAT and Thompson machine carbine advances through Motta on 2 October 1943. LAC photo.

 

Private A.R. Beaton of the Saskatoon Light Infantry (M.G.) plays his accordion for infantrymen of The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment at Motta on 3 October 1943. Fromt left to right are Lieutenant Farley Mowat, Private J. Dalton, Private A.R. Beaton, and Captain J.A. Baird. Mowat went on to great fame as an environmentalist and prolific author following the war, including writing a regimental history of The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment as well as two memoirs of his war-time service.

Battle Honours

The following Canadian units were awarded the Battle Honour "Motta Montecorvino" for participation in these actions:

1st Canadian Division

• 4th Reconnaissance Regiment (4th Princess Louise Dragoon Guards)

1st Canadian Brigade

• The Royal Canadian Regiment

• The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment

1st Canadian Armoured Brigade

• 14th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Calgary Regiment)

Notes

1. Copp, Terry "Moving Forward With Boforce" (Legion Magazine, May 1, 2006) accessed online at http://legionmagazine.com/en/index.php/2006/05/moving-forward-with-boforce/

2. Ibid

3. McKay, Donald A. Gaudeamus Igitur "Therefore Rejoice" (Bunker to Bunker Books, Calgary, AB, 2005) ISBN 1894255534 p.76

4. Copp, Ibid

5. Ibid

6. Dancocks, Daniel G. D-Day Dodgers: The Canadians in Italy 1943-45 (McLelland & Stewart Inc., Toronto, ON, 1991) ISBN 0-7710-2544-0 p.125. Hoffmeister went on to command the 5th Canadian (Armoured) Division and Vokes the 4th Canadian (Armoured) Division.

7. Nicholson, Gerald. Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume II: The Canadians in Italy, 1943-1945 (Queen's Printer, Ottawa, ON, 1957) p.234

8. Ibid, pp.235-236

9. Ibid. "Popski's Private Army" was a small special scout force of the 8th Army; it was originally formally designated No. 1 Long Range Demolition Squadron. It fielded a number of jeep mounted .50 cal. Browning machine-guns as its main weaponry.

10. Ibid

11. Mowat, Farley The Regiment (McLelland & Stewart, Toronto, ON, 1989) ISBN 0-7710-6694-5 p.148

12. Nicholson, Ibid, p.237