Arguments between the top commanders of the British and Americans were waged over readiness to participate in such an venture, and the British managed to have their desires take precedence; the western Allies would take the war to Germany and Italy through North Africa and later the Mediterranean. It was felt that an aggressive programme of raids on the Channel Coast could keep the Germans off balance, anticipating a major landing and tying up large numbers of troops in western garrisons and preventing their employment against the Red Army in the east. The commando raids also served real strategic objectives; the Raid on St. Nazaire, for example, while costly also prevented the battleship Tirpitz from having a useable port in France to use as a base of operations; the dry dock there was the only one on the French Atlantic coast capable of berthing the large ship for repairs.

The 2nd Canadian Infantry Division

During his tenure as commander of South-Eastern Command (which he almost immediately renamed "South-Eastern Army"), British General Bernard Montgomery inspected the various Canadian units in the UK, giving his assessments on not just formations but individual infantry battalions, to the senior Canadian commanders in the UK. He rated the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division as better than the 1st, and in the 2nd Division, he rated the 4th and 6th Brigades as superior to the 5th.

German Defences

The Dieppe region was garrisoned by soldiers of Infanterie Division 302, arriving in the area in Apr 1941 after a short stretch of garrison duty in Germany. While the division had been sent to France with its three regiments at full strength, many ethnic Germans were transferred after the invasion of Russia, as replacements for formations in the East. They were replaced with conscripts from the conquered territories, such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Belgium and Soviets. By the time of the Dieppe Raid, the division was equipped with a high proportion of captured and pre-war equipment of foreign manufacture.

Soldiers and sailors of the Luftwaffe (German Air Force) and Kreigsmarine (German Navy) also made up part of the Dieppe garrison, including a naval unit with eight 3.7cm antitank guns and two heavy anti-aircraft batteries manned by Air Force troops.

Infanterie Division 302 was charged with defending 100 miles of coastline, with Dieppe in the centre of the divisional area. An armoured reserve of Panzer Division 10 was located a few hours away by road. Other reserve formations in the sector included 1. SS Panzer Division "Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler" and Luftwaffe Division 7. The terrain along the coast consisted mainly of high chalk cliffs; what few beaches were present were defended by concentrations of defensive positions, barbed wire, and mines. Natural beach exits were often steep gullies, into which concrete emplacements were placed, also with wire and mines or booby traps.

The town of Dieppe proper was ringed with barbed wire, roadblocks and pillboxes. Weapons emplacements (machine guns and light anti-aircraft guns) facing seaward were located along the sea front inside the town as well as on the flanking heights ("headlands", as they were known). Four batteries of guns were located within the Dieppe defences, including 4-inch and 5.9-inch guns directly within the defensive perimeter. The headlands overlooking the town and beach had eight 75mm guns.

The beach exits in front of the town consisted of roads leading away from the broad promenade; these streets were barricaded with concrete anti-tank obstacles and covered by fire. The beach itself had two separate barbed wire obstacles emplaced, one on the shingle and another on a low sea wall, the latter being seven feet thick. Pillboxes at each end of the seafront housed weapons, including 5cm anti-tank guns.

The Plan

The plan for the raid was drafted by the staff of the new Chief of Combined Operations, British Lord Louis Mountbatten, recently promoted to the rank of Vice Admiral. His assistant, naval Captain John Hughes-Hallett also played a part in devising the plan, and after the initial raid was cancelled, took over as naval force commander for the remounted operation.
Operation RUTTER

Planning for initial raid, codenamed RUTTER, began on 25 Apr 1942. Training began on 20 May with the raid itself scheduled for Jul 1942. The 2nd Canadian Infantry Division was selected to provide two infantry brigades for the main landings with tank support from the 14th Canadian Army Tank Regiment (Calgary Regiment), drawn from the 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade. British Commandos and Airborne troops would supplement the raiding force, landing by sea and air on the flanks and behind the main objectives.

That objective was the port facilities in Dieppe, in which German landing barges were anchored. Other German installations in the area included a radar station and, it was believed, a divisional headquarters. The goal of the operation was to seize the port for a short period, withdrawing the raiding force the same day as the landing. It was hoped also to capture a German landing craft and gain insight into German radar technology. A secondary goal was to bring about a decisive air battle between German day fighters and aircraft of the Royal Air Force. Aug 1942 was the start of American participation in the Combined Bomber Offensive, with two and four-engined bombers of the United States Army Air Force beginning to attack targets in France.

As planning continued, many elements of the original draft were changed; an anticipated aerial bombardment of the town of Dieppe was deleted, as was an anticipated heavy ship-to-shore bombardment of the seafront of the town. The Raid was scheduled for 5 Jul 1942, but weather postponed the operation two days running, after which time it was finally cancelled.
Operation JUBILEE

The plans for the raid were resurrected on 10 Jul 1942, and rechristened Operation JUBILEE.

The decision to remount the raid is a subject of controversy; historian Brian Loring-Villa presents the case that the remounting was never authorized by his commanders – in essence, the Combined Chiefs of Staff (ie the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (senior British Army officer), and the senior British air and naval officers) and Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Great secrecy among even participants of the Raid hampered some aspects of the planning and execution of the plan.

For a minor example, brand new Sten Guns had been issued for the Jul raid, and required much cleaning and modifications to work without flaw. (Dieppe would in fact be the first combat use of the Sten by Canadians). The Stens were withdrawn in Jul, but when the raid was remounted, brand new Stens were issued out less then 24 hours before the landing giving no time for users to degrease and prepare the weapons for action.

Other more serious problems arose; failure to involve (or even inform) the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Inter-Service Security Board in the remounting meant that no new intelligence on enemy dispositions would be added to that in hand.

For example, the failure to inform the Joint Intelligence Committee or the Inter-Service Security Board meant none of the intelligence agencies were involved, so no current information was added.

Loring-Villa has suggested a deliberate leak of news of the Raid to the Germans in an additional chapter of later versions of his book, mentioned above. There has been no substantiation of this; C.P. Stacey in the Official History was adamant that the Germans were not forewarned of the Raid. Loring-Villa raised the point in his book that if a German divisional commander wanted to test his garrison’s abilities, he might sit on any information received on a limited raid on his stretch of coastline, in order to see how his men reacted. No other historian seems to have discussed this hypothesis in detail.

The Attack

The 252 ship convoy carrying the JUBILEE force sailed from various ports on the night of 18 Aug. The convoy met with a German convoy unexpectedly early on the morning of 19 Aug, several craft carrying British troops of No. 3 Commando were torpedoed.

Yellow Beaches

Due to the convoy action, only a handful of commandos were put ashore, and only 18 men engaged their target. Unable to destroy the coastal guns, they engaged the German crews with small arms fire and successfully suppressed the positions.
Orange Beach

No. 4 Commando turned in the most successful performance of any Allied troops on 19 Aug, landing in good order and destroying their targets.

Blue Beach

The landing at Puys by the Royal Regiment of Canada and a company of the Black Watch was delayed by navigation errors and the element of surprise was sacrificed by a landing in daylight. The narrow beach, at the foot of a steep cliff and defended by just 60 Germans, was immediately brought under heavy machine gun and mortar fire. Of the Canadians engaged, 225 men were killed, 264 surrendered and 33 returned to England. Some Canadian casualties had resulted from a grenade-priming accident on the transport ships during the channel crossing.

Aftermath at Blue Beach, on the afternoon of the Raid.

Green Beach

At Pourville the South Saskatchewan Regiment and the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada landed in good order, though they came in astride west of the Scie rather than astride it as planned. The SSR were halted by concrete blockhouses, occupied buildings, and a defended bridge over the river. Both regiments suffered heavily, though the CO of the SSR, Lieutenant Colonel CCI Merritt, personally led attacks across the bridge and into the occupied houses on the far bank of the river. He was captured, and after release in 1945 awarded the Victoria Cross.

Red and White Beaches

The main landings at the town itself were supported by Hurricane aircraft strafing the town front. A simultaneous landing of the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry on the right and the Essex Scottish on the left was to be supported by the 14th Canadian Army Tank Regiment (Calgary Tanks), though in the event, the tanks arrived late. Engineers tasked to destroy obstacles were unable to move in the face of heavy fire and the attacking infantry were driven to ground. Limited advances into the town were made by both infantry battalions, notably however through the Casino, which was in the process of being demolished by the Germans at the time of the raid due to its proximity to the beach.

The tanks were hindered by the chert beach; stones entering the tracked suspension caused broken track pins. Some tanks managed to cross the chert and approach the town, but concrete obstacles prevented their exit from the beach. The armour of the Churchill tanks proved impervious to enemy fire; not a single Canadian crewman was killed while inside his machine. The tanks expended their ammunition on targets of opportunity, and many crewmen were captured, having stayed at their posts to cover the withdrawal of the infantry.

Due to communications problems, the floating reserve was committed to the main beach, and troops of Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal were landed during the morning as well, suffering heavy loss. No. 40 Commando Royal Marines was also ordered ashore, though their commander wisely refused to land as he examined the beach on their run to shore.

The order to withdraw was moved up to late morning from the scheduled time of early afternoon.

"Bert" sits abandoned near the Casino. German Army. LAC photo.

Wreckage on the main beaches. Body in centre of photograph (wearing canvas leggings and light coloured jacket) is believed to be  US Army Ranger Lieutenant Joseph H. Randall, one of 50 Americans who participated in the Raid as ground troops. German photo, via LAC.

Canadian prisoners marched through the town. German photo, via LAC.

Dieppe Raid by Charles Comfort. This famous painting has been lauded for its attention to detail, but criticized for placing the tanks on the beach along with the leading waves of infantry. The painting depicts White Beach; at right is the Casino; note the battle patches of the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry on the sleeves of the battledress. CWM.

Battle Honours

The following Canadian units were awarded the Battle Honour "Dieppe" for participation in these actions:

1st Canadian Armoured Brigade

• 14th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Calgary Regiment)

2nd Canadian Division

• The Toronto Scottish Regiment (MG)

4th Canadian Infantry Brigade

• The Royal Regiment of Canada

• The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry

• The Essex Scottish Regiment

6th Canadian Infantry Brigade

• Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal

• The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada

• The South Saskatchewan Regiment

Recommended Reading

• Robertson, Terrence. The Shame and the Glory: Dieppe (Toronto: McLelland & Stewart, 1967.) ISBN 0771075421

• Villa, Brian L. Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.) ISBN 0195408047

• Whitaker, Denis and Shelagh. Dieppe: Tragedy To Triumph (Whitby, ON.: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Trade, 1993.) ISBN 0075516411

While dozens of books have been written on the subject, the three titles above are generally considered the best. The first contains a great deal of first person detail; the second is a detailed and very scholarly look at high level planning almost exclusively, and the last is a mixture of both first person account (Whitaker was the only officer of his brigade to return from the main beach unwounded and later commanded the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry in North-West Europe) and scholarly history. Villa's book offers up tantalizing theories on deliberate leaks of information to the Germans, and attempts to prove the thesis that Admiral Mountbatten mounted the raid without approval from above. Whitaker's book attempts to prove that valuable lessons were learned at Dieppe and may be forgiven for some measure of bias due to his personal involvement in the historical action. Robertson's book is the most even-handed but suffers from being written before many files were available to researchers, especially those relating to Ultra.

For a general overview and statistics about the raid, the Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War is an excellent source: Stacey, C.P. Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War Volume I: Six Years of War (Queen's Printer, 1960) p. 117.

Other Reading

• Ford, Ken. Dieppe 1942, Prelude to D-Day; Osprey Campaign Series #127, Osprey Publishing, 2003. Primer, with good 3-dimensional artwork of the battle area.

• Leasor, Stephen. Green Beach (Corgi Books, London, UK 1976). Covers the actions of an RAF radar expert assigned to capture German radar equipment, and the men assigned to guard him - and kill him if it seemed he might fall into enemy hands.

• Mordal, Jacques Dieppe: The Dawn of Decision (Souvenir Press Ltd, UK, 1963) 288pp ISBN 0450050041 Decent, but not detailed, overview of the planning, mounting and execution of the Raid. Good info on naval side of things; Mordal was himself a sailor in the French Navy (though after the war).)

• Neillands, Robin. The Dieppe Raid: The Story of the Disastrous 1942 Mission (Aurum Press 2005 UK), ISBN 1845131169, A recent overview by a British Historian

• Reynolds, Quentin. Dress Rehearsal: The Story of Dieppe (Blue Ribbon Books, Random House, Inc., 1943). Story of the Dieppe Raid by a journalist; obviously written under wartime constraints. Author admits it is not a "profound dissertation".