Gravenstafel

On the 1st of April 1915, the Canadian Division (it would not be known as the "1st" until the Second Contingent was formed and arrived overseas later in the year) was posted to the northeast corner of the salient, and given its first real heavy-duty combat assignment: 4,000 yards of front to defend. To the right was the 28th Division of the British Army, which included the newly raised Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (at that time, a battalion under British command, it later transferred to the 3rd Canadian Division), and to the left of the Canadian Division the 45th Algerian Division of the French Army. The armies were still feeling their way into the concepts of modern war, including trench warfare. The French, who had occupied the trenches the Canadians were moving into, had not felt the need to dig deep, had not connected the trenches into a complete system, had not enclosed the rear of the trenches with a parados, or wall, and in many places piles of German dead had been left unburied. Wire – some of it unbarbed – was scant and one of the 10th Battalion's machine gun sections actually walked across No Man's Land without even realizing it, until halted by a German sentry. The battalion's second in command had a similar experience, walking with another major; they blundered upon the German lines during their first night in the Salient and stumbled on a German sentry without even realizing they had crossed No Man's Land. They made good their escape by dropping to the ground and crawling back without incident.1

Map published by the New York Times in 1915. The dark line shows the Ypres Salient as it appeared more or less at the start of the 2nd Battle of Ypres, and the shaded territory shows the major area of fighting. The first gas attacks were launched in the area between Steenstraate and Langemarck, garrisoned by the French 87th (Territorial) and 45th (Algerian) Divisions. The PPCLI, in 1915 part of the British Army, had their baptism of fire south-east of St. Julien at Frezenberg, as part of the 28th Division. When all was said and done, 2nd Ypres cost the Allies 70,000 men, and the Germans 35,000 – but was considered an Allied victory. The desired breakthrough of the Allied lines never came. The British were able to shorten their lines, though with Ypres itself closer to the front, it was eventually shelled into rubble. Kitcheners' Wood suffered the same fate, and photos taken after the war show only a handful of shrapnel-riddled trunks standing on the grounds of the former oak plantation. The Canadians returned to do battle in 1917, in what historians called the 3rd Battle of Ypres, or more popularly, the Battle of Passchendaele.

A secondary trench line, marked on the maps, was nowhere to be found, and a third line – dubbed the GHQ Line – was nothing more than strong points 500 yards apart strung together in a line, with a 6-yard wide belt of barbed wire as protection. The Germans were said to be preparing an attack; rumours of poison gas spread after prisoners leaked the word of their preparations – large tanks of chlorine gas had been brought up well in advance, waiting for a favourable breeze to carry it into the Allied lines. The Germans had already used gas on the Eastern Front, but there was a reluctance among the Allies to believe that the Germans would use it in the west, where the Hague Conventions of 1907 specifically forbade the use of "poison or poisoned weapons."

Ypres Salient on the morning of 21 April 1915

Gas attack at Gravenstafel

There was no warning on the morning or afternoon of 22 April that the Canadians would be in action imminently. It was a bright and sunny day, and while the 2nd and 3rd Brigades were manning the front line, the 1st Brigade was at Vlamertinghe training, though alerted for a possible action at Hill 60. While enemy shelling had been heavy since 19 April, German fire had fallen mainly on roads and bridges to the north and east of Ypres, falling off in the afternoon. Things changed on the afternoon of 22 April when after 4:00 p.m. the French line on the northern part of the salient was violently shelled, and the fire then shifted to the Canadian sector.

The Second Battle of Ypres was opened in earnest at 5:00 p.m. when 168 tons of chlorine gas were released by the Germans, released from 5,730 gas cylinders when the valves were open, a process that took from six to eight minutes in the light north-east wind. The Canadians heard small-arms fire and French 75mm cannons firing to their north flank, and the 3rd Brigade saw the gas cloud - a green-coloured mass several hundred yards long - drift from the enemy trenches towards the French.

The chlorine drifted southward at five or six miles an hour, producing an initial concentration about half a mile in depth. It caught in its deadly embrace the Tirailleurs and African Light Infantry holding the Langemarck sector and the Territorials of the 87th Division farther west. Half suffocated, and with eyes streaming and nose and throat burning, their morale broken by this unexpected terror, many abandoned their positions and fled, leaving behind large numbers of dead.

The Canadian sector had escaped the gas concentration, and at all levels of command steps were taken to deal with the serious situation that was developing on the northern flank. General Alderson and his C.R.A. were at the crossroads 1000 yards north-east of St. Julien when the attack started. They made their way on foot back to their horses at Wieltje and then rode back to Divisional Headquarters, in the Château des Trois Tours, west of Brielen. From here the first order was issued just before six. Shortly before 9:30 p.m. the C.R.E. reported the canal bridges prepared for demolition. Meanwhile in the front line the left company of the 13th Battalion sent two platoons to line the ditch of the Poelcappelle road in support of a small party of Tirailleurs, who from their original trench were exchanging fire with Germans occupying a parallel hedge. Some 600 yards nearer Ypres, covering the culvert over the Lekkerboterbeek, two more platoons of the 13th Battalion manned the ditch, their numbers increased by Algerian riflemen driven back by the gas. The battalion commander, Lt.-Col. F.O.W. Loomis, who was also Commandant, St. Julien, ordered his small garrison there into battle positions, placing one company on each side of the road north of the village, and holding the remaining two platoons in reserve. These dispositions left unguarded a stretch of more than a mile of the road north of St. Julien, except for the 10th Battery C.F.A. south of Keerselaere.²

Click to enlarge

The Canadians had been spared the gas concentration, but the situation was clearly a serious one. General Alderson and the division's Commander, Royal Artillery were located at the crossroad 1,000 yards northeast of St. Julien as the German attack commenced, and returned on foot to their horses at Wieltje, to ride back to Division HQ west of Brielen. Their first orders were not issued until just before 6:00 p.m. Just before 9:30 p.m. the Commander, Royal Engineers reported bridges over the Yser Canal ready for demolition. At the front, the left company of the 13th Battalion had sent two platoons to line the ditch of the Poelcapelle road to support  a small group of French troops who were in a firefight with Germans occupying a hedge parallel to their original trench. Two more platoons of the 13th occupied a ditch 600 yards closer to Ypres, covering the culvert crossing the Lekkerboterbeek. Algerian riflemen scattered by the gas attack augmented their strength. The C.O. of the 13th Battalion, also holding the appointment of Commandant, St. Julien, ordered the garrison out into defensive positions, and two companies held the road north of the village, with two platoons in reserve. Unfortunately, the deployment left a mile of the road north of St. Julien unguarded, save for a battery of Canadian artillery south of Keerselaere.

The rout of French troops of the 45th and 78th Divisions caused a larger gap west of St. Julien, and due to its location near the center of the German attack, posed a great danger. A battery of 4.7-inch guns positioned by the British at Kitcheners' Wood half a mile away was the only position still manned between the former French front line and the headquarters of the 3rd Canadian Brigade at Mouse Trap Farm. At 6:00 p.m. the 14th Battalion was ordered out of reserve by Brigadier-General Turner, and moved from St. Jean (one company was in St. Julien itself) to occupy part of the G.H.Q. Line from the Ypres-St. Julien road, to a point beyond Mouse Trap Farm. To their left, a group of 500 Zouaves extended southwest to Hampshire Farm (located 600 yards west of Brigade HQ) and on the right the 3rd Field Company, Canadian Engineers were covering the Wieltje-St. Julien road.

By that time German rifle fire was coming from Mauser Ridge, which ran westward from Kitcheners Wood. Not until 8:00 p.m. did Turner receive a delayed message releasing to him from divisional reserve his fourth battalion, the 16th Battalion, which had meanwhile lined the west bank of the Yser Canal. Elements of the 1st and 2nd Field Companies C.E. were left to guard the vulnerable canal bridges. Brig.-Gen. Currie did not wait for a parallel message releasing the 10th Battalion from reserve. He took control of the battalion and had it moving forward shortly after six o'clock. With telephone lines broken by enemy shelling, information reaching brigade and divisional headquarters was slow and frequently inaccurate. A series of messages dispatched by hand from 3rd Brigade Headquarters between 6:45 and 7:10 p.m. erroneously reported that the left of the Canadian front line had been "forced back towards St. Julien", and then "forced back on G.H.Q. line". The 1st Canadian Division at once relayed this faulty intelligence to the 5th Corps, and ordered the 2nd Brigade "to hang on and take care of your left". Currie, whose headquarters were at Pond Farm, south-east of St. Julien, immediately ordered the 10th Battalion's C.O. to report to the commander of the 3rd Brigade. To secure his own sector he concentrated the whole of the 7th Battalion about Locality "C" on the Gravenstafel Ridge.

Reports of the German attack began reaching Second Army Headquarters at Hazebrouck at 6:45 p.m., and during the next two hours a disturbing picture enveloped of both French divisions having been driven from their first and second lines of defence with the loss of all their guns, and of virtually no formed bodies of French troops remaining east of the Yser Canal. This meant that except for the hasty dispositions made from within the resources of the 1st Canadian Division the Second Army's left flank lay open for 8000 yards. A successful German attack through this gap would not only threaten Ypres but would take in the rear the three divisions still holding the Salient.³

The release of the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade from army reserve at Vlameringhe was one of the first moves General Smith-Dorrien made in response to the German attack, and the 5th Corps was able to provide the 2nd and 3rd Battalions to General Alderson at 8:15 p.m. They moved forward immediately with an escort from the divisional cavalry, across 3,000 yards of open front. The 2nd Battalion, East Yorkshire Regiment (then the reserve battalion of the 28th Division a mile northwest of Ypres) was also put at the disposal of the 1st Division. During the course of 2nd Ypres, no fewer than 33 British battalions would come under the command of General Alderson's 1st Canadian Division. Throughout the salient, reserves of the British 27th and 28th Divisions were called forward, including the 4th Battalion, The Rifle Brigade, the 2nd Buffs (East Keng Regiment) and the 3rd Battalion, The Middlesex Regiment, all in and around St. Jean. The situation north of St. Jean was especially dire, as only a single French machine gun had remained to seal a 3,000 yard gap between Hampshire Farm and the Yser Canal.⁴

The Germans had achieved a clear victory; in the words of one historian, "...one of the few occasions in the entire war that either side achieved a clear-cut breakthrough."⁵ However, despite the fact that "(f)or a few tantalizing hours, the salient was theirs for the taking, and with it, four British divisions and most of their artillery and support services", the Germans were unable to capitalize.⁶ The advance on the German right and centre halted as both enemy corps gained their initial objectives. Units on the canal flank were an exception; gas cylinders on the western end of the flank had not discharged for some reason, and Steenstraat held out against the 45th Reserve Division until late evening, and the left wing of the 46th Reserve Division was kept from the eastern bank of the canal. To the east, the 51st Reserve Division was also checked at Langemarck, the Allied garrison escaping the punishing full effect of the gas cloud, though the village was eventually occupied by the Germans by 6:00 p.m. The British guns at Kitcheners' Wood were eventually overrun before nightfall, and the 52nd Reserve Division too Mauser Ridge and positions overlooking the Boesinghe railway bridge. Satisfied with their gains, the Germans dug in.⁷

In recording the difficulties encountered by the 51st Reserve Division at Langemarck and farther east, the German Official History blames the fact that the gas "had not had a decisive effect, or else the troops had not followed it up immediately. So it was that the extreme right wing of the French and the Canadians adjoining on the east could offer an obstinate resistance." The two isolated platoons of the 13th Battalion's No. 3 Company at the Lekkerboterbeek crossing fought with mounting casualties until overwhelmed by superior numbers. Farther north, at the left of the Canadian front line, the Algerian detachment was forced back to the Poelcappelle road, where the 13th Battalion's detachment, reinforced by two more platoons drawn from other companies, maintained a stalwart defence against the attackers' heavy rifle fire. South of Keerselaere guns of the 10th Field Battery, in action since early evening, halted a body of Germans marching on St. Julien. To cover the battery in its exposed position, within 500 yards of the enemy, the Commandant of the St. Julien garrison sent forward a party of 60 infantrymen of the 14th and 15th Battalions and a machine-gun detachment of the 13th Battalion. This manoeuvre, which contributed to the safe withdrawal of the 10th Battery's guns, owed much of its success to the skill and daring of Lance-Corporal Frederick Fisher in working his Colt machine-gun forward under heavy fire and bringing it into effective action against the Germans. Fisher, who was awarded the Victoria Cross, was killed next day.⁸

Aftermath

 

The German 4th Army, under the command of Duke Albrecht, had not been allocated sufficient reserves to carry out the intended strategic mission asked of it. Originally intended as a limited operation to test the tactical use of gas as a weapon, a secondary objective was to create a diversion for German units departing the west for the Eastern Front. The threat of a German breakthrough of the Allied lines to the Channel ports was exaggerated in both contemporary and post-war histories, but the crisis faced by the BEF was nonetheless real. The collapse of the French divisions had posed a major difficulty for the division of untested Canadians. Albrecht, the German commander, had erred in focusing his own efforts away from the salient, towards Poperinghe, west of the Yser Canal, at a time when victory was within his grasp. The fighting ability and unwillingness to concede displayed by the Canadians, in all phases of the Ypres fighting, proved to be major contributions to Allied victory in the 2nd Battle of Ypres.⁹

 

Battle Honours

The Battle Honour "Gravenstafel" was awarded to the following units for participation in these actions:

Notes

1. Dancocks, Daniel G. Gallant Canadians: The Story of the Tenth Canadian Infantry Battalion 1914-1919 (The Calgary Highlanders Regimental Funds Foundation, Calgary, AB, 1990) ISBN 0-9694616-0-7 p.20

2. Nicholson, Gerald W.L. Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War: Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919 (Queen's Printer Ottawa, ON, 1964) pp.57-58

3. Ibid, pp.58-59

4. Ibid, p.59

5. Dancocks, Ibid, p.28

6. Ibid

7. Nicholson, Ibid, pp.59-60

8. Ibid, p.60

9. Dancocks, Ibid, pp.28-29