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War |
Operations |
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Battle Honours |
Boer War
First World War
Western Front
Trench Warfare: 1914-1916
Allied Offensive: 1916
►Somme, 1916 |
1
Jul-18 Nov 16 |
►Albert |
.1-13
Jul 16 |
►Bazentin |
.14-17
Jul 16 |
►Pozieres |
.23
Jul-3 Sep 16 |
►Guillemont |
.3-6
Sep 16 |
►Ginchy |
.9
Sep 16 |
►Flers-Courcelette |
15-22
Sep 16 |
►Thiepval |
26-29
Sep 16 |
►Le Transloy |
.
1-18 Oct 16 |
Allied
Offensives: 1917
►Arras 1917 |
8
Apr-4 May 17 |
►Vimy, 1917 |
.9-14
Apr 17 |
►Arleux |
28-29 Apr 17 |
►Scarpe, 1917 |
.3-4
May17 |
►Hill 70 |
.15-25
Aug 17 |
►Messines, 1917 |
.7-14
Jun 17 |
►Ypres, 1917 |
..31
Jul-10 Nov 17 |
►Pilckem |
31
Jul-2 Aug 17 |
►Langemarck, 1917 |
.16-18
Aug 17 |
►Menin Road |
.20-25
Sep 17 |
►Polygon Wood |
26
Sep-3 Oct 17 |
►Broodseinde |
.4
Oct 17 |
►Poelcapelle |
.9
Oct 17 |
►Passchendaele |
.12
Oct 17 |
►Cambrai, 1917 |
20
Nov-3 Dec 17 |
German Offensive: 1918
►Somme, 1918 |
.21
Mar-5 Apr 18 |
►St. Quentin |
.21-23
Mar 18 |
►Bapaume, 1918 |
.24-25
Mar 18 |
►Rosieres |
.26-27
Mar 18 |
►Avre |
.4
Apr 18 |
►Lys |
.9-29
Apr 18 |
►Estaires |
.9-11
Apr 18 |
►Messines, 1918 |
.10-11
Apr 18 |
►Bailleul |
.13-15
Apr 18 |
►Kemmel |
.17-19
Apr 18 |
Advance to Victory: 1918
►Arras, 1918 |
.26
Aug-3 Sep 18 |
►Scarpe, 1918 |
26-30 Aug 18. |
►Drocourt-Queant |
.2-3
Sep 18 |
►Hindenburg Line |
.12
Sep-9 Oct 18 |
►Canal du Nord |
.27
Sep-2 Oct 18 |
►St. Quentin Canal |
.29
Sep-2 Oct 18 |
►Epehy |
3-5
Oct 18 |
►Cambrai, 1918 |
.8-9
Oct 18 |
►Valenciennes |
.1-2
Nov 18 |
►Sambre |
.4
Nov 18 |
►Pursuit to Mons |
.28 Sep-11Nov |
Second World War
War Against Japan
South-East Asia
Italian Campaign
Battle of Sicily
Southern
Italy
The Sangro and Moro
Battles of the FSSF
►Anzio |
22
Jan-22 May 44 |
►Rome |
.22
May-4 Jun 44 |
►Advance
|
.22
May-22 Jun 44 |
to the Tiber |
. |
►Monte Arrestino |
25
May 44 |
►Rocca Massima |
27
May 44 |
►Colle Ferro |
2
Jun 44 |
Cassino
►Cassino II |
11-18
May 44 |
►Gustav Line |
11-18
May 44 |
►Sant' Angelo in
|
13
May 44 |
Teodice |
. |
►Pignataro |
14-15 May 44 |
Liri Valley
►Hitler Line |
18-24 May 44 |
►Melfa Crossing |
24-25 May 44 |
►Torrice Crossroads |
30
May 44 |
Advance to Florence
Gothic Line
►Gothic Line |
25 Aug-22 Sep 44 |
►Monteciccardo |
27-28 Aug 44 |
►Point 204 (Pozzo Alto) |
31 Aug 44 |
►Borgo Santa Maria |
1 Sep 44 |
►Tomba di Pesaro |
1-2 Sep 44 |
Winter Lines
►Rimini Line |
14-21 Sep 44 |
►San Martino- |
14-18 Sep 44 |
San Lorenzo |
. |
►San Fortunato |
18-20 Sep 44 |
►Sant' Angelo |
11-15 Sep 44 |
in Salute |
. |
►Bulgaria Village |
13-14 Sep 44 |
►Pisciatello |
16-19 Sep 44 |
►Savio Bridgehead |
20-23
Sep 44 |
►Monte La Pieve |
13-19
Oct 44 |
►Monte Spaduro |
19-24 Oct 44 |
►Monte San Bartolo |
11-14
Nov 44 |
►Lamone Crossing |
2-13
Dec 44 |
►Capture of Ravenna |
3-4
Dec 44 |
►Naviglio Canal |
12-15 Dec 44 |
►Fosso Vecchio |
16-18 Dec 44 |
►Fosso Munio |
19-21 Dec 44 |
►Conventello- |
2-6 Jan 45 |
Comacchio |
. |
Northwest Europe
Battle of Normandy
►Quesnay Road |
10-11 Aug 44 |
►St. Lambert-sur- |
19-22 Aug 44 |
Southern France
Channel Ports
The Scheldt
Nijmegen Salient
Rhineland
►The
Reichswald |
8-13 Feb 45 |
►Waal
Flats |
8-15 Feb 45 |
►Moyland
Wood |
14-21 Feb 45 |
►Goch-Calcar
Road |
19-21 Feb 45 |
►The
Hochwald |
26
Feb- |
. |
4
Mar 45 |
►Veen |
6-10 Mar 45 |
►Xanten |
8-9
Mar 45 |
Final Phase
►The
Rhine |
23
Mar-1 Apr 45 |
►Emmerich-Hoch
|
28
Mar-1 Apr 45 |
Elten |
. |
Korean War
|
Domestic Missions |
►FLQ
Crisis |
International
Missions |
►ICCS
Vietnam 1973
►MFO
Sinai 1986- |
Peacekeeping |
►UNTEA |
W. N. Guinea 1963-1964 |
►ONUCA |
C. America
1989-1992 |
►UNTAC |
Cambodia
1992-1993 |
►UNMOP |
Prevlaka
1996-2001 |
|
Exercises |
|
Clair Tizon
Clair Tizon was
a Battle Honour granted to Canadian units participating in actions
near this town from 11 Aug 1944 to 13 Aug 1944. These actions were
among the last battles to close the Falaise Gap during the Battle of
Normandy.
The town of Clair Tizon itself, located near the Falaise Road, was
taken in a surprise attack by The Calgary Highlanders on the night
of 12-13 Aug 1944. The action forced a German abandonment of
positions during the Falaise Road fighting, and was executed with
very few casualties. The Commanding Officer, of The Calgary
Highlanders, Lieutenant Colonel DG MacLauchlan, was awarded the
Distinguished Service Order for his handling of this battle.
Strategic Position
The 2nd Canadian
Infantry Division had been directed on 11 August 1944 to conduct a
"reconnaissance in force", in the words of the commander of II
Canadian Corps, south from Bretteville-sur-Laize with a single
brigade. On the morning of August 12th, that reconnaissance became
the main effort of II Canadian Corps, and the entire division was
committed to the action, with two Army Groups, Royal Artillery
(AGRA) and two regiments of the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade in
support.
|
|
Early Advance - 4th
Brigade
The operation was to
be nothing out of the ordinary - or should have been.
General Foulkes decided that the
2nd Canadian Division would move on a single thrust line, with
4th Canadian Infantry Brigade leading. Although this particular
type of operation had been practised many times in England, it
had not previously been employed in action, and unfortunately
the casualties in the infantry battalions of 4th Brigade had
been so numerous that much of the benefit of the training was
now lost.1
The brigade moved out in the following
order of march:
Unit |
Order of March |
Objective |
The
Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (Wentworth Regiment) |
Lead |
Barbery |
The
Royal Regiment of Canada |
Centre |
Moulines |
The
Essex Scottish Regiment |
Rear |
Point 184 |
Once Point 184 - two
miles south of Moulines - was secure, the 8th Reconnaissance
Regiment was to pass through and secure Ussy. Divisional support
included a squadron of the 18th Canadian Armoured Car Regiment (12th
Manitoba Dragoons), the divisional artillery with an extra regiment
of medium guns, a battery of anti-tank guns, and machine guns of "B"
Company of the Toronto Scottish.
|
|
Barbery - Royal Hamilton Light
Infantry
The RHLI moved towards their start line
at Bretteville late on 11 August and was in position by 05:00hrs on
12 August. The regiment stepped off at 07:30, supported by a troop
of tanks, its ultimate objective Clair Tizon.
The RHLI passed Barbery, a hamlet of
a few houses which was the half-way point. Nothing stirred
there; not a person or farm animal...The men waded through the
unharvested wheat on each side of the road. Major Joe Pigott's C
Company was forward left and B under "Huck" Welch to the right,
with Jack Halladay's A Company behind it. Major Dunc Kennedy
commanded D, behind Pigott. The field narrowed about a thousand
yards beyond Barbery where woods closed in on each side of the
road. The men were sodden with sweat and chaff and pollen clung
to their trousers as they walked resolutely through the woods. A
breeze rustled the aspen and poplar, their whispers punctuated
by the odd clink of equipment and the whine and slap of the
Shermans coming up behind them. C Company was the first to come
under fire from machine guns in a copse to the left. Then all
the rifle companies were enveloped in a storm of bullets and
shrapnel. Lyle Doering, the battalion Intelligence Officer,
later recorded it as "the most intense mortaring and shelling
the unit ever witnessed."
From the German point of view it was
essential to hold the Falaise pocket open for a few more
days..."They were fanatical devils and we started to have
casualties right away," Pigott recalled later. "There was
hand-to-hand fighting as these fellows came running out of their
slits, firing rifles and grenades. The opposition was so bitter
that I determined in my own mind that we were going to have to
limit our objective."
...The companies had advanced 600
yards beyond Barbery when Pigott gave his order to stop and
consolidate. The men dug in. A private in B Company paused from
his labour long enough to glance toward the woods. "Sir, are
those our tanks over there?" he yelled to his commander. "Of
course they are," Welch replied, not bothering to look up.
"Jesus, they sure don't look like it to me." Welch straightened.
Trundling towards his company was a Tiger tank. "No, they sure
don't," he said, and every man dropped into his half-scraped
hole. The Shermans were no match for the massive Tiger, with its
88mm gun and the Tiger concentrated on knocking them out, while
a couple of Panthers which had now joined it sprayed the RHLI
with machine-gun fire. The German tanks were all out of PIAT
range and German panzer grenadier infantry stopped the RHLI from
closing with them.2
Counter-attacks continued into the
afternoon, and at 18:00hrs, battalion headquarters took a direct
shell hit, wounding the five soldiers there, including the C.O., all
of whom had to be evacuated. The tanks eventually withdrew after 20
RHLI had been killed and 100 wounded. On 13 August, the RHLI
captured 50 Germans before assaulting an enemy-held orchard, which
turned out to be abandoned. The companies nevertheless came under
shell fire during the advanced. Digging in on the objective, the RHLI
was immediately ordered to move on Tournebu, a small hamlet from
which the Germans were believed to be withdrawing. Forty more
prisoners were collected with little resistance.3
Moulines - Royal Regiment of Canada
After a day of remaining in positions on
the 9th and a day of training on the 10th, including zeroing of all
rifles, The Royal Regiment of Canada was warned that they would be
sent to attack Moulines on the evening of the 10th. After a
restlessness night (unaided by a nearby battery of American 155mm
guns firing into Falaise), patrols from the Royals reported early on
the morning of the 11th that the west bank of the Laise River was
clear of enemy from Pervouville to Bretteville, the enemy having
withdrawn. The day was again spent in training, and at 21:30hrs the
C.O. arrived back at the unit from 4th Brigade headquarters with
order to move to Bretteville-sur-Laize.
Moulines itself lay in a valley, with
high ground to both north and south. The main road through the town
ran north-to-south, where it met a small stream running
east-to-west. The battalion plan was for "A" Company to advance west
of the road, followed by "C" Company, with "B" Company on the left,
or east, of the road, with "D" behind. Each assaulting company had a
section of carriers, a section of 3-inch mortars, a section of
anti-tank guns, a section of assault pioneers, and an artillery
forward observation officer (FOO). "A" and "B" Companies were to
establish positions on the stream while "C" and "D" mopped up
by-passed pockets of resistance. Their attack went off during the
night of 11-12 August, and while slow, continued "without incident
until the R.H.L.I. in the van deployed for their attack."
The R.H.L.I. were held up by
enemy fire in Favrolle, just north of Barbery, and at
approximately 4:30 in the morning the Royals were therefore
ordered to advance to a point half a mile north of Favrolle and
deploy astride the axis of advance, with "A" and "C" Companies
on the right and "B" and "D" Companies on the left. This
movement was carried out under intermittent shell and mortar
fire, which caused some casualties in all companies.4
In mid-morning, as the RHLI consolidated
south of Barbery on high ground, the Royals continued to Moulines,
bypassing Barbery to the east with the same order of march for their
companies, with a squadron of tanks in support. "A" Company came
under heavy machine-gun fire about 800 yards south-east of Barbery,
passing through open grain fields. The company started working
forward to a small wood near a crossroads, where it found a company
of the RHLI under shell, mortar and small arms fire. The company
sheltered in old slit-trenches and folds in the ground, but was
unable to entrench due to the high volume of enemy sniping.
The tank support attempted to move up
and deal with an enemy gun on the right flank, but the lead Sherman
was hit coming up a sunken road immediately ahead of "A" Company,
and when it brewed up the rest of the tanks withdrew.
Captain J.E. Strothers, who was
acting company commander while Major Whitley was left out of
battle, was now called back for a battalion orders group. He
returned soon afterwards bringing with him a new plan of attack.
The Royals were to clear Moulines as far as the bridge over the
river and secure the high ground on the left of the stream about
1000 yards short of Point 151. "A" and "C" Companies were to
advance on the right, and "B" and "D" Companies on the left,
this time with "C" and "D" Companies leading.
"C" and "D" Companies moved off
again at 5:30 in the afternoon, only to find that most of the
enemy had by now withdrawn. Three German snipers, including a
sergeant, were captured in Moulines. Well before last light the
new position was secured. The day's fighting had cost the Royals
ten other ranks killed and 57 wounded.
...During the course of the night
the R.H.L.I. passed through to secure some high ground about a
mile to the south-east, and the Essex Scottish moved forward to
capture Point 184, two miles to the south. The Essex Scottish,
however, did not take their objective and by morning had
consolidated a defensive position on the Royals' left flank.5
Point 184 - Essex Scottish and The Royal
Regiment of Canada
The Essex Scottish were warned at
20:00hrs on 11 August to prepare to move to take Point 184. An
elaborate fire plan was devised using the divisional artillery, with
extra artillery support, two squadrons of tanks, a platoon of MMGs
from The Toronto Scottish Regiment, a troop of anti-tank guns, and a
section of engineers.
B Company, the right forward
company, ran into trouble at the forming up point as the enemy
had not been cleared from that area. It was engaged with the
enemy before it crossed the start line. As a result of this
early action, the Company veered to the right and headed for the
village of Tournebu instead of directly to Point 184. The two
officers with B Company were wounded along with thirty men. At
that juncture Acting Company Sergeant Major Stuart Kirkland took
command and placed himself at the head of the remaining sixty
riflemen. He ordered his Bren gun and mortar crews to direct
their fire on a hedgerow that screened the village and held at
least two machine-guns. He then had his men fix bayonets and led
them in the charge to the hedgerow where they quickly overcame
enemy resistance and captured thirty prisoners. they then moved
into the village and began clearing the houses of Germans,
capturing another nine. With the village clear, Kirkland sent a
runner to battalion headquarters with the news and quickly
consolidated his position before gathering the wounded for
evacuation...
Lieutenant Ashbury noted that the
carrier platoon had played a major part in the success of the
operation when it stormed onto a field surrounded by a ditch,
which held at least twelve machine-gun posts and five bazookas.
They took seventy-five prisoners...Altogether, 150 prisoners
were captured along with a good deal of equipment in exchange
for twenty men killed and numerous wounded. The survivors dug
slit trenches on the objective and remained there over night.6
CSM Stuart Kirkland received the
Distinguished Conduct Medal from Field Marshal Montgomery in October
1944.
On the 13 August 1944, the
battalion [Essex Scottish Regiment] was ordered to attack the
feature point 184 and the woods 0544. "B" Company, with Sergeant
Kirkland as Acting Company Sergeant-Major, was the right forward
company. The forming up position had not been mopped up by the
troops proceeding, with the result that the company became
committed before crossing the start line. As a result of this,
direction was lost and the company's axis of advance was
interpreted as being towards Tourneau. On the outskirts of
Tourneau, the only two officers in the company were wounded by
heavy machine gun fire from the hedges which pinned the company
down. Despite the loss of about 30 men from a company of 90,
Sergeant Kirkland immediately took hold. Placing himself at the
head of the remaining riflemen, he ordered the Bren guns and
mortars to give covering fire while he led a bayonet charge
against at least two machine gun posts in the hedge on the
outskirts of the village, resulting in the destruction of the
enemy position and the capture of about 30 prisoners of war.
Following the assault, Sergeant Kirkland carried on the attack
against the buildings on the outskirts of the village, directing
the fire and leading his men in to clear the houses and more.
Having completed this, he consolidated the company about the
houses despatching a runner to report to Battalion Headquarters.
Then he started arranging the collecting [and] evacuation of the
wounded. During the whole of this action, communications over
the wireless with Battalion Headquarters were spasmodic and he
was left to his own resources. The fact that the company
overcame the opposition which had pinned them to the ground was
due entirely to the initiative and the gallant and spirited
leadership of Sergeant Kirkland who, discarding any thought of
personal safety, placed himself at the head of his men for the
assault. His display of courage and singleness of purpose to
come to grip and destroy the enemy was a source of inspiration
to his men and is, and will be, an example to the regiment for
all time.7
On 14 August, the Royals were once again
tasked, this time to capture Point 184.
The route was to be along the main
road to the south, and the order of march was to be "D" Company
leading, with under command one troop of tanks, followed by "C",
"B", and "A" Companies.
After moving off at nine o'clock
(p.m. on August 14), "D" Company, under Captain A. Macmillan,
had advanced about 500 yards down the road when the leading tank
was knocked out by a (German) bazooka. At this, the remaining
tanks withdrew and did not reappear till later in the afternoon.
Thus deprived of its tank support, "D" Company was pinned down
by severe machine-gun and mortar fire from both flanks.
Nevertheless, by eleven o'clock the infantry had worked forward
and occupied the ground in the vicinity of the knocked out tank;
but when Lieutenant M.G. Berry's platoon attempted to drive off
the enemy on the left flank, it made no progress and suffered
heavy casualties...
Lieutenant Colonel Anderson
thereupon ordered the companies to withdraw about 400 yards so
that artillery fire could be brought to bear on the enemy
positions. Unfortunately, before the artillery support could
materialize, the Battalion Command Post was shelled, and, among
other casualties, the artillery representative, Major Gordon
Wren, was mortally wounded and his command vehicle put out of
action. This delayed the artillery programme for about two
hours, by which time the fire plan was cancelled by higher
authority.8
At 14:00hrs, the divisional and brigade
commanders arrived at battalion headquarters with information which
led them to believe the enemy was withdrawing, and so "D" Company
went forward without artillery support. The heavy volume of fire
they received made it appear the Germans were, in fact, reinforcing
their positions. "D" Company was left in place to provide fire
support for "B" and "C" Company to make simultaneous attacks to the
flanks, with tank support. "A" Company also provided fire support
from its positions. The enemy, probably already beginning his
withdrawal, was easily overwhelmed, yielding 60 prisoners and 12
machine-guns. The Royals consolidated atop Point 151 and the Essex
were finally able to secure Point 184. Total losses for the Royals
had been three killed and 41 wounded.9
Clair Tizon - Calgary Highlanders
By mid-August 1944, it began to look to
many like the German Army in Normandy was finally collapsing, and
the 5th Brigade War Diary reflected on the 10th that German forces
opposite were mainly low-grade battle groups. The Calgary
Highlanders' regimental newsletter noted in July 1945:
The tempo of the fighting decreased
as we fought our way through Bretteville and Clair Tison. However,
the fatigue of the pursuit increased as we tried, generally in vain,
to engage the enemy at Urville, Fontaine-les-Pin, through the
shelling at Orbec to Ste. Germain-la-Campagne. It was on the way to
Orbec, as we passed through Vimoutier and Laboscraie, that we felt
the first collapse of the German Army. |
|
Nonetheless, despite
the breakthrough to Falaise and the rout of the German 7th Army,
there was still work to be done. A period of rest ended on the 12th
by orders to move southwards again. On entering Mesnil-Touffrey in
the late afternoon, enemy artillery fire killed Private Wallace
Bradley, the C.O.'s driver. By last light on 12 August 1944, the
Calgary Highlanders were ordered to pass through Moulines and move
south to Clair Tizon, described as "a few stone farmhouses lying
mostly on the north side of a narrow east-west blacktop road." It
was located in a valley, with high ground to east and west, with the
River Laise flowing through the town and irrigating the orchards and
farmland that surrounded the small hamlet. |
By advancing to Clair Tizon,
the Highlanders would be leading the entire 2nd Canadian Division in
their attempt to turn the German flank along the river. For the third
consecutive time, the Calgary Highlanders were required to lead a 5th
Brigade attack, as the other two battalions were too depleted. (The
Maisonneuves were 231 riflemen short, effectively only being able to
field two companies instead of four).
Hot food was brought up
to the men at midnight on the night of 12-13 August, welcome after a day
of marching in the hot sun. The Highlanders would go without sleep for
another night. Brigadier Megill withdrew the planned armoured support
from the 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment, and the C.O. of the Highlanders
was advised that tanks of the 27th Armoured Regiment would instead
rendezvous during the morning at Le Mesnil, on the anticipated axis of
advance. The advance started at 01:45. The route had not been
reconnoitered and the night was especially dark. Enemy positions were
unknown, and the battalion set off through thick trees. Only maps and
compasses were available to guide the unit over sunken roads and
unmarked tracks. The night is described by Bercuson's history as still
and thick with mist.
Moulines was not in the
hands of the 4th Brigade as expected, and it was apparent that any
continued advance would be unsupported. Lieutenant Colonel MacLauchlan
decided to push forward. Passing through an orchard south of Moulines,
the battalion found a narrow dirt track, which they followed east for a
kilometre, then turned south, and skirted the western edge of a thick
wood before arriving at Le Mesnil just before dawn. The lead company was
halted and ordered to wait; as battalion headquarters arrived, brigade
ordered defensive positions dug around Le Mesnil.
At this point, a German
Regimental Aid Post was captured, complete with enemy Medical Officer
and wounded soldiers. Since RAPs are set up well to the rear of
battalion fighting positions, it became apparent that somehow the entire
battalion had infiltrated the German defences. Retreating German troops
were encountered and seemed eager to surrender, many bearing safe
conduct leaflets. One German jumped into Major Mark Tennant's jeep,
desperate to give up. Some 75 soldiers were captured at Le Mesnil during
the night.
German soldiers were reported near "D"
Company's positions in the morning, to the left and rear of the
battalion. A brief firefight resulted in many German casualties, and
some companies, in the words of Roy Farran, "were fighting backwards in
the direction from which they had come." The lead companies were engaged
in shootouts with German transport on the road to the south, and
prisoners from that direction included a German Regimental commander.
Signals Sergeant Alvin Palfenier, who had
distinguished himself at May-sur-Orne, was wounded in the head, and
loaded into a jeep with a medical orderly. The driver got lost on his
way back to the Highlanders' RAP, and the jeep was captured. The driver
escaped, but Palfenier disappeared. He was initially listed as missing;
he today lies in the Bretteville-sur-Laise war cemetery.
The battalion stayed in Le Mesnil throughout
the morning of 13 August. The tanks of the 27th Armoured Regiment
arrived and the company commanders planned the advance on Clair Tizon
with the C.O. It would be a mutually supporting affair, with companies
covering each other by bounds. The advance started at 14:00, with "D"
and "C" Company in front from left to right. "D" went through the north
end of a triangular-shaped orchard west of Les Houlles - a small hamlet
northwest of Clair Tizon. A "C" Company platoon meanwhile captured a
suddenly encountered 88mm gun, driving the crew off. As "D" moved into
Les Houlles, "B" moved through "C" into the south end of the orchard.
"A" moved into a smaller orchard 400 metres west of Clair Tizon. All the
while, German artillery fire harrassed the unit, and two tanks were
lost. The battalion's anti-tank platoon brought up two 6-pounders in
case enemy tanks were spotted.
"A" Company managed to
secure an important crossroads in an orchard west of Clair Tizon, and
"D" Company left Les Houlles to move through them, parallel to and north
of the main road. The carrier platoon moved in to hold Les Houlles in
their place. "C" moved toward Clair Tizon on the south side of the road.
German artillery remained inaccurate, falling to the rear of the
advancing Canadians, and Canadian armour tried to engage German 88mm
guns. "A" Company followed "C" and "D" into Clair Tizon itself.
The bridge over the Laise
was checked for mines by the battalion's pioneer platoon. The unit had
three companies in the town, but all were west of the river, and so the
CO ordered "B" Company to leave its position in the triangular orchard
and move east, through Les Houlles, to the Laise. They moved at the same
time battalion HQ made its move south through the same area, and German
shelling sent the company to ground, ordered to stand firm until "A"
Company could withdraw and assist them. The company was reorganized, and
moved away from the area, towards the river, crossing the obstacle at
17:30. "A" Company also crossed the river at about this time.
German artillery
observers, on high ground to the east less than a kilometre away,
brought down heavy shelling, setting most of the buildings afire and
knocking out two more Shermans. Tank fire and artillery of the 5th Field
Regiment was called down on the Germans on the high ground. The
Highlanders had two companies on each side of the river now, with a
small bridge between them - but further movement into Clair Tizon was
impossible due to the clear fields of observation German artillery
observers had.
Aftermath
On the evening of the
13th, Le Regiment de Maisonneuve attacked south through the bridgehead
towards Le Chesnaie, but were repulsed from the high ground east of
Clair Tizon. A second attack through the Highlanders by the 6th Canadian
Brigade managed to secure a bridgehead over the Laise River, taking high
ground at La Cressonierre, on a ridge overlooking the Laise Valley. This
assisted the forward movement of II Canadian Corps, and again put the
Highlanders behind the front.
The action was
overshadowed by Operation TRACTABLE that same day, with four divisions
attacking towards Falaise after carpet bombing by heavy bombers. For the
Highlanders, though, it was a time of rest. They marched northwest to
Tournebu, having been without food and sleep for an extended period of
time. For all intents and purposes, their involvement in the Battle of
Normandy was over; the final act would be pursuing the defeated German
armies to the Seine.
Casualties were
"amazingly low", and morale high. They had improved greatly since Hill
67 and Bretteville. Their actions, according to Terry Copp, "unhinged
German resistance on their right flank, assisting 4 Brigade's advance to
Tournebu and 53rd (Welsh) Division's movement to Mortainville."
Three major decorations
were awarded for this battle. The Commanding Officer received the DSO in
October 1944, and the citation read as follows:
On 13 August 1944, the Calgary
Highlanders under command of Lieutenant-Colonel MacLauchlan advanced
along the low wooded country immediately to the west of River Laise to
capture a crossing at Clair Tison. The battalion had just completed a
night march through difficult country and was to be covered in its
further advance by another brigade which was to secure the high ground
on the right. This ground was not in fact captured and the Calgary
Highlanders were therefore advancing, overlooked from both flanks.
Undeterred by this or by the fact that Battalion Headquarters was under
heavy shell fire and mortar fire throughout the day, Lieutenant-Colonel
MacLauchlan pressed his battalion on making skilful use of the ground
and passing companies through to successive objectives so quickly and
steadily that the enemy was not able to determine the exact course of
the battle and take any effective counter measures.
As a result of this determined drive, the
battalion was able to form a firm bridgehead over the River Laise by
1800 hours that evening and to hold it in spite of all enemy attempts to
dislodge the battalion until the flanks had been secured and another
formation passed through to the high ground beyond.
Lieutenant-Colonel MacLauchlan,
demonstrating outstanding leadership by his personal courage and
example, determination and endurance enabled his battalion to inflict a
severe defeat on the enemy in this important engagement.10
Lieutenant Ross was
awarded the French Croix de Guerre with Silver Star in April 1945. His
citation read:
On 12 August 1944 the Calgary Highlanders
were given the task of establishing a bridgehead across the River Laise
near the town of Clair Tison. The operation involved the seizing of
three intermediate objectives before the crossing could be made and the
bridgehead secured. Communications were of paramount importance and when
at the end of the second phase wireless failed liaison had to be
established by an officer on foot.
Lieutenant Ross was chosen for this
important role and although very tired from previous operations he set
out immediately and under heavy enemy shell and mortar fire made his way
to the forward companies and brought back the complete picture of the
situation to his commanding officer.
As the battalion's position was such that
immediate bold action seemed vital to the success of the operation,
Lieutenant Ross volunteered to return to the forward companies, brief
them and start them off. Reading the battle as he went he decided when
he reached the fourth company that the opportune moment for a company to
rush the bridge and seize the high ground on the far side of the river
had arrived. He issued the necessary instructions accordingly and so
accurate had been his analysis that the bridge was secured intact and
the bridgehead established.
During all this time intense enemy fire
was directed on the area in which he had to move about but regardless of
the risks he was taking, Lieutenant Ross remained cool, and not only
performed the task detailed, for which he had volunteered, but studied
the progress of the battle and by using initiative and excellent
judgement enabled his battalion to strike at the exact moment when the
changes of success were greatest.
This officer's total disregard for his
personal safety, his calmness and quick thinking more than compensated
for the lack of normal communications and were in no small measure
responsible for the successful establishment of this important
bridgehead essential to the success of the brigade...11
Sergeant Harbut was
awarded the Croix de Guerre with Bronze Star in April 1945:
On the morning of 12 August 1944 the
Calgary Highlanders prior to an attack on Clair Tison moved into Le
Mesnil. A quick reorganization had to be made due to a report of enemy
being on the left flank.
Lance-Sergeant Harbut in charge of a Bren
group, by using initiative and very good judgement, so positioned his
guns that a maximum volume of fire was soon brought down on the enemy.
The resultant very large number of killed and wounded was so
demoralizing to the remaining twenty that they speedily surrendered.
Lance-Sergeant Harbut's effective and quick action in clearing up the
area enabled his battalion to rapidly reorganize and prepare for further
engagements.
Later that morning [his] company was
ordered to seize and clear Les Houilles. During the approach to Les
Houilles the company was stopped by very heavy machine gun fire.
Lance-Sergeant Harbut by his unconcerned actions and daring example so
encouraged his section that they too disregarded the fire. The whole
company becoming infected with the same spirit, immediately advanced,
captured Les Houilles, and forced the enemy to retire to Claire Tison.
The attack on Claire Tison was planned
and launched immediately. D Company's two-inch mortars were concentrated
under command of Lance-Sergeant Harbut. Although by now very tired, and
in spite of the intense enemy machine gun and mortar fire brought down
on his every movement, he skilfully directed and maintained the volume
of fire from his mortars. By altering his position continually as his
company advanced, he was able to support them on to their objective.
While consolidating D Company was
subjected to a terrific enemy artillery and mortar barrage.
Lance-Sergeant Harbut moved from trench to trench encouraging his men
until wounded and ordered out for medical attention.
Lance-Sergeant Harbut's total disregard
for personal safety, his initiative and outstanding leadership were an
example to all ranks as well as being of immeasurable assistance in
contributing to the success of this action.12
Battle Honour
The following Canadian units were awarded the Battle Honour "Clair
Tizon"
for participation in these actions:
2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade
2nd Canadian Division
4th Canadian Infantry Brigade
-
The Royal Regiment of Canada
-
The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry
-
The Essex Scottish Regiment
5th Canadian Infantry Brigade
Notes
-
Goodspeed, D.J. Battle Royal: A
History of The Royal Regiment of Canada 1862-1962 (Royal
Regiment of Canada Association, Toronto, ON, 1962), p.446
-
Greenhous, Brereton Semper Paratus: The History
of The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (Wentworth Regiment) 1862-1977
(W.L. Griffin Ltd, Hamilton, ON, 1977) ISBN 0-9690754-0-5,
pp.259-260
-
Ibid
-
Goodspeed, Ibid, p.447
-
Ibid, p, 448
-
Antal, Sandy and Kevin R. Shackleton Duty Nobly
Done: The Official History of The Essex and Kent Scottish Regiment
(Walkerville Publishing, Windsor, ON, 2006) ISBN 0-9731834-8-9
pp.465-467
-
Blatherwick, John and Hugh Halliday.
Courage & Service: Second World War Awards to Canadians
(Service Publications, Ottawa, ON) ISBN 1894581229
-
Goodspeed, Ibid, p.449
-
Ibid, pp.449-450
-
Blatherwick, Ibid
-
Ibid
-
Ibid
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